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PREFACE 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
This dissertation aims to augment our understanding of the determinants of visual short-
term memory (VSTM) capacity for complex objects. Much of the work exploring VSTM 
capacity has used very simple objects, such as colored dots (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Todd & 
Marois, 2004) and it is unclear how well such findings extend to VSTM for more complex items, 
such as faces or other real-world objects such as cars. A number of studies have described the 
influence of stimulus-based features—such as perceptual complexity or object structure—on 
VSTM, but a crucial insight, as yet unexplored by this literature, is that different classes of 
complex stimuli tend to be processed in qualitatively different ways. In this dissertation I 
specifically address the influence of processing biases on visual short-term memory capacity 
(VSTM) for faces and objects. I build an important bridge between the VSTM literature and the 
vast literature demonstrating that upright faces and other objects of expertise recruit 
fundamentally different (holistic) processing strategies than do inverted faces or objects for 
which one does not possess expertise with.  
This dissertation begins (CHAPTER I) with a review of our current knowledge of the 
determinants of VSTM capacity, specifically VSTM for objects. I then describe the current 
understanding of face and object processing, with an emphasis on the implications of the 
development of perceptual expertise and the shift to a more holistic processing strategy.  
Following this review of the literature, CHAPTER II reports a series of three experiments that 
compare VSTM for holistically processed faces and more featurally processed non-face objects 
and inverted faces.  
After establishing a clear VSTM advantage for upright faces when sufficient encoding 
time was allowed in CHAPTER II, CHAPTER III reports a series of four experiments that tests 
whether this advantage is specific to faces or whether it extends to non-face expert categories 
that have also been shown to recruit a holistic processing strategy, thus providing a clear test of 
the proposed influence of encoding strategy on VSTM capacity. An effect of expertise on VSTM 
capacity for cars was demonstrated and once again this effect depended on sufficient encoding 
time. Additional experiments replicated the VSTM advantage for objects of expertise and also 
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ruled out alternative accounts based on verbal working memory, long-term memory and even 
differences in eye-movement strategies.  
CHAPTER IV reports experiments that were inspired by the dependency of the expert 
VSTM advantage on sufficiently long encoding times. Specifically, CHAPTER IV addresses the 
question as to whether holistic processing results in a greater temporal burden to perceptual 
processing than that for more feature-based processing strategies. Recognition performance for 
upright faces and inverted faces, and cars among car experts and car novices, is compared under 
different temporal constraints. Estimates of the rate of processing and onset of perceptual 
processing are compared for holistically processed items (upright faces, and cars among car 
experts) and less holistically processed items (inverted faces and cars, and upright cars among 
car experts). The results of these studies suggest that experts’ experience a ‘head-start’ in the 
form of an earlier onset of perceptual performance, although there may be no difference in the 
rate of increase in performance with encoding time relative to that for novices. 
I conclude my dissertation with CHAPTER V in which I discuss the specific implications 
and limitations of a role of experience and/or processing biases on our understanding of VSTM 
capacity and perceptual expertise. Here I also speculate about the broader implications of these 
findings and future avenues that could provide an empirical answer to these speculations.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
VISUAL SHORT-TERM MEMORY, HOLISTIC FACE REPRESENTATIONS AND 
PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE 
 
Shelves are stocked with endless books offering advice on how to increase one’s memory 
capacity. Their popularity is not surprising given how painfully obvious the limitations of short-
term memory are in our daily lives. Even a mundane task like attaching new electronic 
equipment to a television or following a street map forces us to look continuously back and forth 
between the diagram and the task at hand, revealing the limited amount of visual information we 
can keep in memory at any one time. However, people who are experienced with maps, even if 
they have never followed a particular path before, appear to need only a few glances to extract 
and retain all the information needed to perform the same task. Despite its centrality to everyday 
life, the precise factors that constrain or increase short-term memory are still relatively 
unknown.  Some suggest that visual short-term memory (VSTM) has a fixed number of ‘slots’, 
each capable of temporarily storing one object (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 
2001). Others argue that VSTM capacity is influenced by the complexity of the items stored 
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004). An interesting, yet hitherto neglected, question is whether VSTM 
is fixed solely by stimulus factors such as perceptual complexity or object number, or if instead it 
can be influenced by the processing strategy used to encode an object, as suggested by an 
experienced map reader’s efficiency at reading maps.  This question is particularly important 
given evidence that experience can lead to a qualitative change in the perceptual processing of 
visual information.  This chapter will first review the state of current knowledge about VSTM, 
factors that influence its capacity, and how learning might influence VSTM capacity. The 
specialized holistic processing strategy used for faces will then be discussed with an emphasis on 
this processing strategy as a result of the development of visual expertise more generally.  This 
chapter will conclude by raising important questions about the influence of learning and 
encoding strategy on VSTM—questions that form the basis of this dissertation.      
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Working memory and visual short-term memory 
Distinctions between working memory and short-term memory are often lost in the 
literature with the two terms frequently used interchangeably.  The term short-term memory was 
originally introduced as a contrast to long-term memory (LTM), describing the temporary 
storage of information as opposed to the more permanent storage of information (James, 1890). 
Decades later, the term working memory was introduced to describe a system that encompassed 
not only mechanisms for the temporary storage of information, but also executive or control 
mechanisms for the manipulation of this information during cognitive tasks (Atkinson & 
Shiffrin, 1971; Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  Short-term memory came to be 
considered one component of the working memory system.  
Early models of short-term memory assumed a unitary nature, with no distinction 
between the storage of different types or modalities of information (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971). 
However, the lack of interference between concurrent performance of visual and verbal memory 
tasks, in contrast to the substantial interference between concurrent performance of two verbal or 
visual tasks, prompted Baddeley and Hitch to propose a multi-component model of short-term 
memory (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). This model proposed separate modality-
specific stores or subsystems for verbal (phonological loop) and visual (visual-spatial sketchpad) 
information that were controlled by an active attentional control system referred to as the central 
executive. With each passing decade, more and more evidence accumulates for a distinction 
between verbal and visual information storage, and now few question the existence of this 
distinction.  
This dissertation focuses on the storage of objects in the visual subsystem of short-term 
memory, akin to the passive visual cache proposed as an extension to Baddeley’s model of 
working memory (Logie, 1995).  This dissertation uses the term “visual short-term memory” 
(VSTM) to refer to a limited capacity sub-system or mechanism for the temporary representation 
and maintenance of visual information in the absence of external input.  Similarly, VSTM 
capacity is defined as the upper limit of visual information that can be successfully maintained 
and retrieved from this visual subsystem.  Specifically, VSTM for objects is reported in terms of 
an estimate of the number of objects that can be successfully maintained and later recognized 
from VSTM stores.  It is important to note that VSTM capacity is a function of the particular 
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characteristics of a task, for example the presentation time of the items to be encoded in VSTM 
can limit capacity (Eng, Chen, & Jiang, in press).  
The capacity of VSTM may be overestimated in some classic VSTM paradigms, such as 
match-to-sample or change detection, since VSTM capacity estimates can be inflated by 
contributions from other storage systems such as verbal or long-term memory (Ericsson & 
Chase, 1982; Ericsson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Olsson & Poom, 
2005).  Following Olson, Jiang and Moore (2005), throughout this dissertation I will refer to 
these inflated estimates as ‘functional’ VSTM capacity.  
VSTM can be readily distinguished from other forms of visual memory. Unlike iconic 
memory, which has a temporal span of approximately half a second (Phillips, 1974; Sperling, 
1960), and LTM, which can have a seemingly infinite span, VSTM lasts for seconds (Pashler, 
1988). In addition, in contrast with LTM or iconic memory, VSTM for objects has an extremely 
limited capacity with typically only 3-4 items stored at any one time (Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
Vogel et al., 2001).  
At a neurophysiological level, VSTM is believed to be supported by a network of areas 
distributed across prefrontal, parietal, and temporal/occipital cortex (Smith & Jonides, 1997, 
1998; Wager & Smith, 2003). Recently, the role of temporal cortex in VSTM for objects has 
become a topic of increasing interest. Perceptual, category-selective, areas in the temporal lobe 
appear necessary for encoding objects into VSTM (Druzgal & D'Esposito, 2001). There is a 
growing body of evidence suggesting that these areas also play an important role in storing 
object information in VSTM. Consistent with this proposed role of perceptual areas in VSTM 
storage, the face-selective temporal area (also known as the FFA) remains activated during delay 
periods in VSTM tasks with faces (Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & Haxby, 1997; Druzgal & 
D'Esposito, 2003; Ranganath, Cohen, Dam, & D'Esposito, 2004). FFA activation is also 
influenced by face memory load during both the encoding and maintenance stages in a VSTM 
task (Druzgal & D'Esposito, 2001; Druzgal & D'Esposito, 2003; Postle, Druzgal, & D'Esposito, 
2003). Some researchers even suggest that the FFA serves as a domain-specific storage space for 
VSTM (Druzgal & D'Esposito, 2003; Postle et al., 2003; Ranganath, DeGutis, & D'Esposito, 
2004). Similar to the FFA, the scene-selective parahippocampal area (PPA) appears to play a role 
in maintaining scenes in VSTM (Ranganath, DeGutis et al., 2004). Therefore, the perceptual 
areas recruited at encoding also appear to be involved in storing information in VSTM.  
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The determinants of visual short-term memory capacity 
 
Object number and featural organization 
Much research has targeted the question of what determines the capacity of VSTM. 
Factors such as perceptual organization can greatly increase the capacity of VSTM, such as 
whether visual features are attributed to the same or different objects (Luck & Vogel, 1997). For 
example, although observers can only reliably retain information about four colors or four 
orientations of simple stimuli, they can retain both the color and orientation of the same number 
of objects (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001).  This result extends to objects defined by 
conjunctions of up to four different features, thereby allowing observers to retain 16 features 
providing they are only distributed across four objects. These results provide support for object-
based accounts of VSTM, in which VSTM capacity is determined by the perceptual organization 
of the information to be stored. 
At a finer scale, VSTM is also influenced by the organization of features within objects; 
VSTM for features is improved when the features come from the same part of an object 
compared to when the features come from different parts of an object (Xu, 2002a).  For example, 
color and orientation information are best encoded when they are from the same part of an 
object, less well encoded when they are from different parts of the same object, and least well 
encoded when they are from spatially separated objects (Xu, 2002a). These findings provide 
evidence of the influence of an object-based hierarchical feature coding on VSTM capacity, 
suggesting that the perceived relationship between features within objects may also have 
consequences for VSTM.  
Not only does the organization of features influence VSTM, but the dimension from 
which they belong does as well.  Wheeler and Triesman (2002) reported that predictions of a 
strong object-based account of VSTM capacity break down when the features, within or across 
objects, are from the same dimension, such as color or shape. A strong object-based account 
would predict that VSTM capacity would only be sensitive to the number of objects, irrespective 
of the number or organization of features within the objects. Instead, they found that features 
from the same dimension compete for capacity, while features from different dimensions can be 
stored in parallel (Delvenne & Bruyer, 2004; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). They suggest that 
binding in VSTM can occur for features within an object, but that this requires capacity-limited 
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attention. Consistent with previous work, the viability of such binding depends on the perceptual 
organization of the features. However, more recent work suggests that features such as shape and 
texture can be bound together in VSTM and stored just was well as a single feature, providing 
the features share the same coherent boundary and thus share the same spatial location (e.g., a 
textured square; Delvenne & Bruyer, 2004). Therefore, feature-based accounts of VSTM suggest 
that capacity is determined by the perceptual organization of the features to be stored, the 
capacity of independent feature stores, and also the capacity of attentional mechanisms required 
to bind the features together into objects.  
  
Object complexity and encoding limitations 
It has recently been suggested that VSTM is not only influenced by the organization of 
features into objects, but also by the complexity of the resulting objects. More specifically, 
although VSTM capacity for objects consisting of a number of simple features can appear to be 
strongly object-based, VSTM for more complex stimuli does not fit with a ‘strong’ object-based 
account (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Olson & Jiang, 2002).  Contrary to the object-based 
account, it has been shown that VSTM capacity for object categories that vary in complexity, 
from simple colored squares to complex line drawings of familiar objects, is highly correlated 
with the information load for each category (information load was operationalized as the rate 
with which items of a particular category could be searched; Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004). 
Therefore, VSTM capacity is at least partly determined by the nature of the items being stored, 
with more complex objects requiring more ‘space’ in VSTM.  
Notably, Alvarez & Cavanagh’s (2004) measure of information load, visual search rate, 
is influenced by the same factors of object-based hierarchical encoding that have been 
demonstrated for VSTM. For example, visual search rate for conjunctive targets was faster for 
features from the same part of an object compared to features from different parts of an object 
(Xu, 2002b). Therefore, the information load of an object is not simply the sum of the relevant 
features composing that particular object, as would be suggested by a strong version of the 
feature-based theory of VSTM capacity. Instead, it also appears to be influenced by the 
perceptual organization of diagnostic features (Delvenne & Bruyer, 2004).  
Recent work has revealed that the relationship between information load and VSTM 
capacity is particularly strong when perceptual encoding time is limited (Eng et al., in press). 
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Complex objects with greater information loads, such as faces, require more time to be encoded 
into VSTM than simpler objects like letters or colored squares. When the presentation duration 
of the memory array was limited (500 ms), such as it was in Alvarez and Cavanagh’s (2004) 
study, this resulted in a disadvantage for objects with greater complexity. However, when 
encoding limitations were taken into consideration by providing longer presentation durations, 
the relationship between information load and capacity was reduced.  This finding suggests that 
studies of VSTM capacity must also consider the role of task factors such as the presentation 
duration of the memory array. Such factors may create bottlenecks in perceptual encoding or 
consolidation that impact capacity independently of any storage or maintenance limitations in 
VSTM. Thus, VSTM capacity is influenced both by the complexity of the items to be stored and, 
under some conditions, encoding limitations.  
 
Learning and familiarity 
Most studies of VSTM have focused on the influence of task- or stimulus-based factors, 
such as object structure or complexity, with little regard to how learning or experience might also 
impact VSTM. VSTM capacity estimates of 3-4 items remain stable from early in development 
(12 months; Rose, Feldman, & Jankowski, 2001) to adulthood (Luck & Vogel, 1997) suggesting 
that VSTM capacity may be relatively inflexible and immune to the effects of learning.  
However, other studies from the verbal working memory literature suggest that task-specific 
experience and training can have a profound impact on the ‘functional’ capacity of short-term 
memory (Chase & Ericsson, 1981).   For example, training can improve digit span memory from 
7 items to around 80 items.  This increase in short-term is strategy dependent, for example one 
participant in this training study reported using a strategy in which the digits were encoded as 
running times.   This participant’s superior short-term memory capacity was so strongly reliant 
on this strategy that when the digit list included groups of digits that did not make sense as 
running times (e.g. “498”, or “4 minutes and 98 seconds”) his performance on such lists 
approached his pre-training digit span (Chase & Ericsson, 1981).  Therefore, task-specific 
experience can impact the functional capacity of VSTM. 
There are a number of ways in which learning and experience might impact VSTM 
capacity.  Most intuitively, learning may establish LTM traces that can supplement VSTM.  In 
this case, learning would increase ‘functional’ estimates of VSTM capacity but not the actual 
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capacity of the VSTM system. Indeed, a recent study exploring the influence of domain-specific 
training on VSTM for novel objects reported that participants who viewed a set of eight random 
polygons 160 times in the context of a VSTM task were no more accurate detecting a change in a 
VSTM array containing these trained shapes compared to unfamiliar ones (Chen, Eng, & Jiang, 
in press).  Importantly, participants in this study could accurately identify the trained polygons in 
a two-alternative-forced-choice task, confirming that they did in fact have representations of 
these items in LTM. However, VSTM performance improved for both trained and untrained 
polygons, suggesting there is a more general practice effect on VSTM performance rather than a 
direct influence of LTM.  Consistent with this finding, other studies have only found evidence of, 
at best, a limited role of experience in influencing VSTM capacity (Olson & Jiang, in press). 
The inconsistency between the dramatic increase in verbal memory with training (Chase 
& Ericsson, 1981) and the failure to find an increase in VSTM with training (Chen et al., in 
press) could be interpreted as a fundamental difference between verbal and visual short-term 
memory systems.  However, it might also reflect the different levels of training between the two 
studies; 50 hours or more versus less than an hour, respectively. Limited laboratory-based 
training cannot compare with the degree of experience we have for many object categories in our 
daily environment.  Therefore, conclusions drawn by using such brief laboratory-based training 
likely underestimate the potential for experience to impact VSTM.  
Consistent with the idea that extensive training is required before learning will impact 
VSTM, students who had never played chess before also required approximately 50 hours of 
memory practice to demonstrate superior memory for meaningful chess configurations (Ericsson 
& Oliver, 1989). The absence of a VSTM advantage for unfamiliar chess configurations among 
real-word chess experts suggests that this advantage relies on stored representations in long-term 
memory, rather than a more qualitative change to the way information is stored in VSTM (Chase 
& Simon, 1973). Further support for this suggestion is the failure of intervening short-term 
memory tasks during the retention interval to impact memory performance for familiar chess 
positions (Charness, 1976). Practice appears to increase chess experts’ VSTM by “chunking” 
information into larger units in long-term memory and storing pointers to these chunks in VSTM 
(Chase & Simon, 1973; Freyhof, Gruber, & Ziegler, 1992; Gobet & Simon, 1998). These 
“chunks” have arbitrary sub-parts and properties, can be used as a processing unit, and—
importantly—can be retrieved by a single act of recognition (Gobet & Simon, 1998). These 
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findings are consistent with reports that participants who demonstrated dramatic increases in 
verbal memory relied on chunking digits together and matching them to existing chunks in LTM, 
such as semantically meaningful dates or running times (Chase & Ericsson, 1981; Ericsson & 
Chase, 1982). 
Recent work suggests another possibility for how learning might impact VSTM; 
knowledge of category structures increases our VSTM capacity for items that cross category 
boundaries (Olsson & Poom, 2005). For instance, different colors and shapes that cross category 
boundaries are commonly used in VSTM paradigms (e.g., Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & 
Machizawa, 2004; Vogel et al., 2001). Olsson and Poom (2005) have suggested that previous 
VSTM estimates from such studies are inflated due to support from LTM in the form of this 
knowledge of category differences. In addition, since items separated by category boundaries are 
easily labeled (e.g. ‘red’ or ‘blue’) their recall may also be facilitated by contributions from 
verbal short-term memory. Notably, when these factors were controlled, VSTM capacity for 
intra-categorical novel items made of geometrical shapes was found to be limited to one object. 
Therefore, learning can impact the functional capacity of VSTM in a number of different ways, 
allowing it to not only utilize existing representations and categorical structures in LTM, but also 
to recode familiar items verbally and thus recruit verbal short-term memory stores.    
Although the above-mentioned studies demonstrate a benefit of learning, the advantages 
they report appear to reflect the utilization of additional resources, such as LTM or verbal 
memory, to supplement VSTM rather than a true change to VSTM capacity. However, the 
impact of the perceptual organization of information on VSTM capacity (Delvenne & Bruyer, 
2004; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001; Xu, 2002a) may provide a potential avenue for 
extensive learning to more directly influence VSTM capacity. One possibility is that experience 
may impact VSTM by influencing what and how information is stored rather than simply 
allowing for the recruitment of additional capacity from other systems. For example, a single 
fixation (200 ms) is sufficient for highly experienced radiologists to detect and identify, with 
70% accuracy, major pathological features in x-ray images (Kundel & Nodine, 1975) suggesting 
that experience can impact the relative weighting of different perceptual features. In addition, 
expert radiologists' have poorer memory for briefly presented (500 ms) normal x-ray images, but 
better memory for abnormal x-rays, relative to radiology residents or novices (Myles-Worsley, 
Johnston, & Simons, 1988).  Therefore, experience and the development of visual expertise have 
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been demonstrated to have important consequences for both perception of and memory for items 
from one’s domain of expertise.  
Visual search studies with upright and inverted faces or digits also provide indirect 
evidence for the hypothesis that extensive experience impacts VSTM more directly; despite 
equivalent perceptual complexity, search rate is faster for upright (familiar orientation) than 
inverted faces (unfamiliar orientation) (Tong & Nakayama, 1999) and for upright compared to 
rotated digits (Wang, Cavanagh, & Green, 1994).  Most importantly, in the case of visual search 
for faces, this reduction in information load (indexed via search rate) was found with both 
familiar and unfamiliar faces, suggesting that the lower information load for highly familiar 
categories is not merely a result of pre-existing representations in LTM. Rather, it seems to result 
from a change in the way the category as a whole is processed. Interestingly, despite indirect 
evidence that VSTM may be greater for highly familiar categories, such as upright faces, the 
influence of this change in processing strategy on VSTM capacity is unknown. It is possible that 
experienced-based changes in the way information is processed translate to changes in VSTM 
capacity. 
 
Interim summary and implications 
It has been demonstrated that VSTM capacity is influenced by the perceptual 
organization of the information to be stored.  Both the organization into discrete objects (Luck & 
Vogel, 1997) and the organization of features within objects (Xu, 2002a) impact VSTM. VSTM 
is also influenced by the complexity or information load of an object, with more complex objects 
requiring more ‘space’ in VSTM. Although a number of studies have failed to detect a reliable 
influence of LTM on VSTM capacity as would be expected from studies of memory expertise, 
there is indirect evidence that experience can influence the information load of an object 
category. One possibility is that experience and learning impact VSTM capacity by influencing 
the encoding and perceptual organization of visual information within a highly familiar category 
such as that observed with perceptual expertise. This leaves open the possibility that VSTM is 
influenced by an individual’s domain-specific processing biases that develop through extensive 
experience, as is the case for visual experts. The next section will review experience-based 
changes in performance within the context of face and object recognition. 
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Comparing face and object recognition 
We have more specialized and extensive experience with faces than with any other object 
category, and this appears to have important consequences for the perceptual organization and 
processing of information in faces. For example, anecdotally, relative to the processing of non-
face objects, face processing appears unique in its relative immunity to irrelevant featural 
changes and occlusion, such as a change in expression or the addition of a hat.  We also have 
remarkable memory for faces; adults can recognize familiar faces with accuracy greater than 
90%, despite not having seen some of these faces for over 35 years (Bahrick, Bahrick, & 
Wittlinger, 1975). Face perception is also characterized by its extreme sensitivity to subtle 
changes in the spatial-relations between features (Bruce, Doyle, Dench, & Burton, 1991; Haig, 
1984; Hosie, Ellis, & Haig, 1988; Kemp, McManus, & Pigott, 1990).  For example, adults can 
detect subtle changes in the configuration of facial features as small as one minute of visual 
angle, which approaches the limits of normal visual acuity (Haig, 1984). Such findings have 
inspired much research on face perception and how it differs from typical object perception.  
Much of what we know about face recognition and how it differs from that of other 
object categories began with exhaustive studies on the face inversion effect.  This effect was first 
reported by Yin (1969) and refers to the disproportionately large cost of inversion to face 
processing compared to that for other object categories, such as houses, planes, or stick figure 
people.  Yin (1969) suggested that the cost to recognition due to inversion has two sources: (1) a 
general cost of inversion for mono-oriented1 objects, and (2) a ‘special’ face-specific cost. Yin’s 
subjects reported employing a global (or holistic) strategy for upright faces and a more analytic 
(or feature-based) strategy for the other categories, providing some clue as to what makes face 
processing ‘special’ compared to the processing of other object categories. 
 
Holistic face perception 
Research from the next three and half decades proved Yin’s participants to be remarkably 
perceptive; not only is the analytic processing strategy reported for non-face objects consistent 
with many later theories of how non-face objects are represented (Biederman, 1987; Jolicoeur, 
1990; Marr, 1982; Marr & Nishihara, 1978), but their report of a ‘holistic’ processing strategy 
                                                
1 Mono-oriented objects are objects that are predominantly seen in only one orientation (Yin, 
1969) 
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for faces is also consistent with many of the hallmarks of face perception that are now known to 
distinguish it from the perception of other object categories (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & 
Sengco, 1997; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). Consistent with the reports of Yin’s subjects, 
Tanaka & Farah (1993) suggested that differences between face and object processing stem from 
a qualitatively different holistic representation for faces compared to a more piecemeal 
representation for objects. In holistic representations the information about the individual 
features (featural information) and the relations between features (configural information) are 
relatively inseparable (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). 
Consistent with this account, observers demonstrated superior performance identifying a feature 
of a face (originally learned in the context of the whole face) when it was embedded within the 
context of a surrounding—but irrelevant— face compared to when it was presented in isolation 
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Importantly, this advantage was not present for non-face objects, such 
as houses, suggesting that features in non-face objects are processed more independently than 
those in faces. In addition, this advantage was also absent for inverted faces, suggesting that to 
elicit this holistic processing advantage faces must be configurally intact. However, the effect of 
face context remains even for face parts learned in isolation, although in this case the context 
interferes with, rather then facilitates, the identification of the parts (Leder & Carbon, 2005).  
Therefore, the nature of the impact of the face context depends on how the part is represented in 
memory. Nonetheless, these studies provide further evidence for the obligatory holistic 
processing strategy recruited for configurally intact faces. 
The obligatory influence of task-irrelevant features on face part judgments has also been 
demonstrated in a number of other paradigms (Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003; Young 
et al., 1987). For example, individuals were more accurate at identifying a part of a famous face 
when it was presented in isolation compared to when it appeared as part of a chimeric face made 
from halves of different famous people (composite effect; Young et al., 1987). Interestingly, 
when the halves were misaligned participants experienced a release from the interference of the 
to-be-ignored part (configural effect; Young et al., 1987). The two parts appeared to fuse 
together when aligned, creating a new identity and making it difficult to identify the two parts 
independently. Consistent with the absence of a whole-part advantage for inverted faces, 
alignment had no effect on judgments about inverted chimeric face halves. Similarly, when 
participants were asked to make a same/different judgment about parts of unfamiliar chimeric 
 12 
faces (e.g., the bottom halves) their performance was influenced by whether the same/different 
relation of the to-be-ignored top parts was consistent or inconsistent with the same/different 
relation between the task-relevant bottom halves (Gauthier et al., 2003).  For example, if the 
bottom halves differed across the two faces in question, performance was better if the (irrelevant) 
top halves also differed. Once again, if the configuration of the faces was disrupted (e.g., by 
inverting the irrelevant half) participants demonstrated a release from this interference, 
suggesting that this integrated processing also depended on the faces being configurally intact 
(Gauthier et al., 2003).  
Face processing effects such as the whole-part advantage, composite effect, and 
configural effect, led many to ask what makes configurally intact faces so special?  What is lost 
when the face configuration is disrupted through manipulations such as inversion? Conclusions 
drawn in response to this question are consistent across most of the studies that have explored 
this issue:  inversion selectively interferes with the processing of configural information in faces 
(Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Bruce et al., 1991; Collishaw & Hole, 2002; Kemp et al., 1990; Leder 
& Bruce, 1998, 2000; Leder, Candrian, Huber, & Bruce, 2001; Murray, Yong, & Rhodes, 2000; 
Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Thompson, 
1980). For example, observers were far more sensitive to configural changes in upright faces 
than in inverted or non-face objects, but inversion did not influence the ability to detect featural 
changes (Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). The most striking example of this lack of sensitivity to 
configural changes in inverted faces is the Thatcher Illusion (Thompson, 1980).  This illusion 
refers to observers’ failure to notice that the eyes and mouth in a face are upright when the 
surrounding face is inverted; when the face is upright, however, (with eyes and mouth now up-
side down) this change in the configuration of the features has a striking impact, rendering the 
face image grotesque. Therefore, inversion disproportionately impairs an observer’s sensitivity to 
the configural information within faces, which appears to be a crucial element for the 
establishment of holistic face representations. 
 
Holistic processing and expertise: Face processing as a model of visual expertise 
Diamond & Carey (1986) suggested that faces are not inherently special, but rather that 
they acquire their uniqueness as a product of our extensive domain-specific experience with 
them.  They suggested that what makes face processing unique is that it involves the encoding of 
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configural information relative to the prototypical configuration of features within a face.  The 
development of this prototypical representation is a by-product of our extensive experience and 
resulting expertise with faces in combination with the importance of configural information for 
distinguishing exemplars in highly homogeneous categories. The suggestion that faces may 
acquire their uniqueness through experience is consistent with other work showing that face 
recognition in young children is more susceptible to irrelevant featural changes, less sensitive to 
configural changes, and is marked by an interaction between inversion and age, with the 
magnitude of the inversion effect increasing through development (Carey, 1981; Carey, 
Diamond, & Woods, 1980; Diamond & Carey, 1977). Further support for this expertise-
hypothesis of face processing is provided by the demonstration of a greater inversion effect for 
judgments about dogs among dog experts, compared to dog novices making the same judgment 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986).  These results suggest that the ‘unique’ nature of face processing 
develops over many years of practice and that similar processing strategies can develop for non-
face categories after extensive experience.  
Recent evidence has generally been consistent with Diamond & Carey’s suggestion that 
the holistic processing mechanism that supports face recognition also supports expert visual 
recognition more generally (Diamond & Carey, 1986).  For example, holistic processing effects 
such as sensitivity to configural changes can be obtained for non-face objects in observers 
trained to become experts with a novel category (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). In addition, real-world 
car experts also have more difficulty processing only a part of a car when it is presented in the 
context of a whole car (Gauthier et al., 2003). These results support Diamond and Carey’s 
suggestion that holistic processing is associated generally with expert visual processing rather 
than with any single stimulus domain, such as faces.  
Neurophysiological evidence is also consistent with notions of face perception as a model 
of expert processing. At a neurophysiological level, the robustly face-selective fusiform area 
(FFA) in the temporal lobe is believed to be a critical node in the system responsible for face 
perception (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). After expertise training with a novel 
stimulus-category (“greebles”) fMRI has revealed that participants also recruited the FFA for the 
trained stimulus class (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). This FFA activity 
correlated with the degree of behaviorally induced holistic processing of the greeble stimuli 
(Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). In addition, FFA activity to non-face objects such as birds or cars was 
 14 
correlated with observers’ real-world expertise (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; 
Xu, 2005). Electrophysiological studies recording event-related brain potentials (ERPs) also 
reveal expertise effects in the brain as early as the first face-selective response, referred to as the 
N170, which occurs around 170 ms following stimulus presentation (Gauthier et al., 2003; 
Tanaka & Curran, 2001). These results suggest that the development of visual expertise with a 
particular category results in a shift towards the recruitment of a cognitive processing strategy 
and neural substrate similar to face processing. 
Further evidence for a functional overlap between face and non-face object expertise has 
been provided by the demonstration of interference between face and car processing in car 
experts (Curby & Gauthier, 2001; Gauthier et al., 2003).  The level of interference measured 
between the processing of these categories depended on the degree to which the car task 
recruited a holistic processing strategy.  More specifically, this level of interference depended 
both on one’s visual expertise with cars and also whether the cars were configurally intact.  In an 
interleaved 2-back VSTM task that required car experts to process a face and a car in an 
overlapping manner, the degree of holistic processing of the faces was influenced by the format 
of the cars (intact or inverted tops).  Faces in the context of normally configured cars were 
processed less holistically than those presented in the context of cars in a modified configuration 
(tops inverted). Importantly, cars in the modified configuration were processed less holistically, 
and therefore presumably competed less for holistic processing resources. Therefore, there 
appears to be some functional overlap for face and car processing that is related to an 
individual’s level of expertise with cars. 
Functional overlap between face and expert object processing was also demonstrated in 
lab-trained greeble experts (Rossion, Kung, & Tarr, 2004). In a flanker paradigm, subjects 
attended to a centrally presented greeble and reported on which side of the screen a distractor 
face appeared.  After expertise training with greebles, the N170 in response to the distractor face 
was reduced when participants were concurrently processing a greeble compared to a novel 
(untrained) object. This study provided further evidence that the concurrent processing of non-
face objects in a domain of expertise interferes with early face-selective responses, suggesting a 
functional overlap between face and non-face expert processing. 
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Summary and Implications 
Configurally intact face processing and expert non-face object processing both show 
similar processing effects such as sensitivity to inversion and obligatory processing of the whole 
object even when only certain parts are task relevant.  It has been suggested that these processing 
effects reflect qualitatively different representations created by expert and novice observers, in 
which the visual information is organized in a holistic rather than in a feature-based manner, 
respectively (Farah et al., 1998; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997).  The recruitment of overlapping neural 
substrates, linked with behavioral measures of holistic processing, for faces and objects of 
expertise provides further support for the hypothesis that at least part of the ‘specialness’ of faces 
is a product of our extensive experience with this category. The role of category-selective 
temporal lobe brain areas in VSTM functions, briefly outlined earlier in this chapter, suggests an 
interesting possibility: if working memory functions are to some extent supported by posterior 
areas, such as the FFA, which demonstrate effects of expertise, then expertise might also 
influence VSTM functions. 
The major goal of this dissertation is to answer a number of specific questions.  First 
CHAPTER 2 asks whether there is a VSTM advantage for holistically encoded faces compared 
to more featurally encoded objects or inverted faces. After evidence for such an advantage was 
found, CHAPTER 3 asks if this advantage is face-specific, or if it extends to holistically 
processed non-face objects within a participant’s domain of expertise.  This chapter also 
addresses whether the basis of this advantage is perceptual, or if instead it can be explained by 
contributions from verbal or long-term memory. The expert VSTM advantage was found to 
depend on sufficient encoding time, raising interesting questions about the relative time-course 
and capacity of encoding mechanisms among expert and novice observers.  To explore some of 
these questions, CHAPTER 4 compares the time-course of processing for upright and inverted 
faces and cars among car experts and novices.  Specifically, this chapter addresses the question 
as to whether the qualitative difference between expert and novice encoding mechanisms results 
in a quantitative or qualitative difference in the time-course of processing for object of expertise. 
 16 
CHAPTER II 
 
COMPARING VISUAL SHORT-TERM MEMORY FOR UPRIGHT AND INVERTED 
FACES AND OBJECTS 
 
Introduction 
An insight gleaned from the face and object recognition literature, and yet to be 
considered in the VSTM literature, is that different classes of stimuli can be processed in 
different ways.  Can the processing strategy used to encode an object influence VSTM capacity 
for a given category?  As noted in CHAPTER I, upright faces tend to be processed more 
holistically than non-face objects or inverted faces, which are both processed in a more feature-
based manner (Tanaka & Farah, 1991, 1993; Yin, 1969).  To review, this has been demonstrated 
through greater sensitivity to configural changes in upright faces compared to upright objects or 
inverted faces and also the obligatory processing of the whole (upright) face in part judgment 
tasks (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Young et al., 1987).  Although it has 
never been tested directly, some evidence raises the possibility that, despite their equivalent 
perceptual complexity, VSTM capacity for upright and inverted faces may differ.  For example, 
search rate, used by Alvarez and Cavanagh (2004) as a measure of information load found to be 
highly correlated with VSTM capacity, is faster for upright than inverted faces (Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999).  It may be that the processing strategy recruited for upright faces serves to 
reduce information load, which in turn leads to differences in encoding and/or VSTM capacity 
for upright faces versus that for inverted faces or other complex objects.  Notably, like search 
rates for upright and inverted faces, search rates are also faster for familiar compared to 
unfamiliar objects (Mruczek & Sheinberg, in press; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Wang et al., 
1994). The relationship between information load (search rate) and VSTM capacity has been 
shown to be strongest when encoding time is limited, being reduced when encoding duration is 
extended (Eng et al., in press). Therefore, VSTM capacity may not be fixed by the perceptual 
features of a stimulus; experience and processing biases might influence it as well.   In addition, 
the influence of experience on information load, and thus VSTM, may interact with encoding 
duration. 
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This chapter reports on three experiments that compare VSTM capacity for upright and 
inverted faces and different categories of non-face objects. Experiment 1 compares VSTM for 
upright and inverted faces under different temporal encoding limitations.  To anticipate the 
results, an advantage for upright faces over inverted faces at long, but not short encoding times, 
was found. Experiment 2 then compares VSTM for faces and non-face categories under the same 
encoding limitations.  Once again upright faces benefit more from additional encoding time, but 
this time compared to non-face upright objects rather than inverted faces.  This finding suggests 
that the VSTM advantage for faces in Experiment 1 is not merely due to a general cost of 
inversion.  However, VSTM performance for faces does not exceed that for the non-face objects 
at the longest encoding time (2500 ms). Experiment 3 compares VSTM capacity for faces and 
non-face objects under even less limiting encoding conditions, and finds an advantage for faces 
over non-face upright objects.  
 
Experiment 1 
Given the relatively high informational load of unfamiliar faces and the fact that they are 
intra-categorical items with no labels in long-term memory, VSTM capacity for this class of 
stimuli would be expected to be especially small (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng et al., in 
press; Olsson & Poom, 2005). One limitation to our understanding of VSTM for faces is that 
studies have not compared faces with objects of similar complexity—for instance, shaded 
photographs of other objects from within the same category. Therefore, it is difficult to separate 
the influence of perceptual complexity on VSTM capacity from more obligatory face-specific 
differences in encoding strategy. Inverted faces may be especially useful in this regard as they 
are particularly well-matched to upright faces in image complexity. Yet, because visual search 
rate is faster for upright than inverted faces (Tong & Nakayama, 1999), suggesting a lower 
information load, one might expect a VSTM advantage for upright faces at short encoding 
durations. When the presentation duration of the memory array is extended allowing for 
additional time to encode the items, prior findings (e.g., Eng et al., in press) suggest that the 
difference between upright and inverted faces should be reduced or abolished. However, holistic 
processing may confer an advantage to upright faces, leading them to be encoded more 
efficiently than inverted faces even at long encoding times. Experiment 1 examines this 
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possibility by comparing VSTM capacity for upright and inverted faces while manipulating the 
time allowed for encoding the items in VSTM.  
 
Methods 
Participants.  Participants were 24 (18 female) employees, undergraduate students or graduate 
students of Vanderbilt University with normal or corrected to normal vision, ranging in age from 
19 to 33 (M = 24.3, SD = 3.86). Participants were compensated $10 per hour for their time.  
 
Stimuli. Stimuli were 72 grayscale faces (1.9° x 2.3°) from the Max-Planck Institute for 
Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany.  
 
Procedure. The task was presented using a 19” monitor (1024 x 768 pixel resolution, 85 Hz 
refresh rate) driven by Matlab (Mathworks, Inc) together with the Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997) on a 450 or 733 MHz G4 Macintosh computer.  Normal overhead lighting 
illuminated the testing room. Participants sat at an unconstrained distance of approximately 70 
cm. For each participant, a random selection of half the faces appeared in the upright trials while 
the remaining faces appeared in the inverted trials. Participants performed a delayed match-to-
sample probe recognition task (see Figure 1): the memory array, consisting of 1-5 faces either all 
upright or all inverted evenly spaced in a circular array (6.1° visual angle diameter), appeared for 
either 500, 1200, or 2500 ms, and after a 1200 ms delay participants were presented with a face-
probe in one of the locations from the memory array.  The probe remained on the screen until 
participants pressed a key to indicate whether the face was the same as or different from the one 
that appeared in that location in the memory array.  Participants were instructed to respond as 
accurately and as quickly as they could.  Their response and the time to respond were recorded. 
To minimize confusion, within each trial, the probe was never a face that had appeared at a 
different location in the memory array.  However, participants were not informed of this. 
Participants also performed an articulatory suppression task to prevent verbal rehearsal: at the 
beginning of a trial, before the study array appeared, two digits were presented auditorily, to be 
rehearsed out loud throughout the trial.  After making a response to the visual probe, a screen 
with two digits appeared and participants made a key press to indicate whether they were the 
same as those rehearsed.  
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Participants performed 900 trials across three sessions, each consisting of 10 alternating 
blocks (30 randomized trials/block) of either upright or inverted faces.  In sum, across the 
experiment, there were 450 trials with upright faces and 450 with inverted faces.  Within these 
stimulus categories, there were 15 conditions (5 set sizes x 3 presentation durations), each of 
which included 30 trials.   
 
 
 
Analysis.  Data from one participant were removed from the analysis due to poor performance in 
the auditory task.  Accuracy for this component exceeded 95% for all other participants.  
Incorrect articulatory suppression trials were removed from further analyses. For each 
participant, hit rate and correct rejection rate were calculated for each condition.  These values 
were used to derive a measure of VSTM performance using Cowan’s K, an estimate of the 
Figure 1. The sequence of events that occurred in each trial in Experiment 1.  Participants first were 
presented with two digits followed by a visual stimulus that consisted of a screen that had 1, 2, 3, 4, 
or 5 upright or inverted faces in a circular array. This memory array appeared for either 500 ms, 
1500 ms, or 2500 ms. After a 1200 ms delay a single face, serving as a probe, appeared in one of 
the locations filled in the memory array.  Participants responded using the keyboard whether or not 
the probe face was the same as the one that appeared in this location in the memory array.  After a 
response was made, a screen with 2 digits appeared and participants were required to state whether 
the two digits on the screen were the same as those they had been rehearsing throughout the trial. 
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number of objects successfully encoded in VSTM (Cowan, 2001).2 The maximum K (K-max) 
was identified for each presentation duration, regardless of set size, to provide an estimate of 
individuals VSTM capacity under these task conditions. All subsequent analyses were performed 
on these K or K-max values. 
 
Results 
As shown in Figure 2, increased encoding time led to increased VSTM capacity for both 
upright and inverted faces, although this effect was greater for upright faces. With 500 ms 
encoding time, orientation had little effect on VSTM capacity estimates, but longer encoding 
times (1500 ms or 2500 ms) led to greater VSTM capacity for upright than for inverted faces.  
Inverted faces benefited less than upright faces from additional encoding time. These results 
were not explained by a difference in response times between upright and inverted faces (see 
APPENDIX A).  
 
 
                                                
2 K=(hit rate + correct rejection rate - 1)*set size 
Figure 2. (A) Estimated number of upright or inverted faces stored in visual short-term memory 
(VSTM) using Cowan’s (2001) formula at each of the different set sizes when the memory array was 
presented for 500 ms, 1500 ms, or 2500 ms, and (B) the maximum number of items in VSTM for each 
orientation and presentation duration. VSTM for upright and inverted faces were similar at the shortest 
presentation duration, and both increased with longer presentation durations. However, VSTM for 
upright faces were greater than that for inverted faces when ample encoding time was allowed, 
suggesting that affects of processing strategy on VSTM capacity emerge with sufficient encoding 
time. Error bars represent pooled standard error values. 
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A 2 (upright vs. inverted faces) x 5 (set sizes 1-5) x 3 (500 ms vs. 1500 ms vs. 2500 ms 
encoding time) ANOVA revealed a main effect of face orientation, with the overall K for 
inverted faces being lower than that for upright faces, F(1,23)=29.38, p≤.0001.  In addition, there 
was a main effect of presentation duration, with longer encoding times leading to greater VSTM 
capacity, F(2,46)=83.43, p≤.0001.  Most importantly, there was an interaction between 
orientation and presentation duration with the effect of orientation greater for longer presentation 
durations (F(2,46)=4.35, p=0.019; see Figure 2 A).3  
An ANOVA on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-max) for upright and inverted faces 
across the different set sizes produced similar results, with a main effect of orientation. 
F(1,23)=15.26, p=.0007, and duration, F(2,46)=30.76, p≤.0001. Although the interaction 
between orientation and duration was not significant (F<1, ns.), paired t-tests revealed a 
significant difference in K-max for upright and inverted faces in the 1500 ms, t(23)=3.095, 
p=.0051, and 2500 ms, t(23)=2.59, p=0.016, encoding conditions, but not the 500 ms 
presentation condition (t(23)=1.66, p=.11; see Figure 2 B).  
 
Discussion 
Despite equivalent perceptual complexity, VSTM for upright faces was greater than that 
for inverted faces. The lower VSTM capacity for inverted faces compared to upright faces at the 
longer encoding durations is consistent with the drop in face recognition performance reported in 
a wide variety of perceptual tasks when faces are inverted (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & 
Sengco, 1997; Tong & Nakayama, 1999; Yin, 1969). The advantage for upright faces may result 
from holistic processing mechanisms not implemented for inverted faces.  In addition, the 
proposed effect of these orientation-specific processing mechanisms increased with additional 
encoding time. 
One possibility is that the VSTM capacity for inverted faces would be equivalent to that 
of upright faces if encoding time was extended beyond 2500 ms. That is, the absolute VSTM 
capacity for upright and inverted faces may be equivalent, but inverted faces are processed more 
                                                
3 Additionally, the main effect of set size, and its interactions with encoding duration and orientation 
were significant (p<.05).  These effects are not central to our research question. 
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slowly.  However, this is unlikely, as the maximum VSTM capacity for inverted faces failed to 
increase when the presentation duration was extend from 1500- to 2500 ms4 (see Figure 2b).  
An alternative interpretation of these results is that the orientation effect in VSTM 
capacity for faces may not be due to processing strategy, but may instead reflect other 
differences between upright and inverted stimuli more generally (e.g., additional costs incurred 
when processing objects in unfamiliar orientations; Lawson & Jolicoeur, 1998). However, this 
account would not predict that these effects would extend to a comparison between upright faces 
and other upright objects that are not processed in a holistic manner.  This prediction is 
addressed in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 compares VSTM capacity for upright faces, cars, and watches. As 
discussed in CHAPTER I, previous studies suggest that these objects should be processed less 
holistically than faces. Cars, like faces, are typically seen in an upright orientation and thus 
provide a comparison to test if the results of Experiment 1 are merely due to the mono-oriented 
nature of our experience with faces (Yin, 1969). Watches were chosen because they are highly 
homogeneous and subjects would typically not have had much experience in discriminating 
among them. If the effects found in Experiment 1 were attributable to a more general cost due to 
inversion rather than to different processing mechanisms, then similar results should not be 
found when comparing upright faces to upright complex non-face objects.  However, the 
opposite pattern of results is predicted because faces and non-face objects are thought to recruit 
different processing strategies, providing an advantage for upright faces over the more featurally 
processed non-face object categories. Experiment 2 tests this prediction by comparing VSTM 
capacity for upright faces to that for upright cars and upright watches while once again 
manipulating the time allowed for encoding the items in VSTM.  
 
                                                
4 t(23)=0.82,p>.05. 
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Methods 
Participants.  Participants were 21 (11 female) employees, undergraduate students, or graduate 
students of Vanderbilt University with normal or corrected to normal vision, ranging in age from 
19 to 39 (M = 26.3, SD = 5.2).  Participants were compensated $10 per hour for their time. 
 
Stimuli.  The stimuli were 216 grayscale images of upright human faces (1.9° x 2.3°), watch 
faces (1.9° x 2.3°), and cars (2.3° x 1.5°) (72 of each; see Figure 3). The faces were the same as 
those used in Experiment 1. The watch images all depicted front-on upright views. The 
viewpoint of the cars varied from three-quarter to side views across images.  
 
 
 
 
Procedure.  The general procedure was the same as Experiment 1 except that participants 
performed 420 trials for each stimulus category (faces, cars, watches), in three separate sessions. 
The order of the sessions was counterbalanced across subjects. For each category there were 28 
trials of each of the 15 conditions presented in a random order.  
 
Figure 3. Examples of the stimuli presented in Experiment 2.  The same faces (in either an 
upright or inverted orientation were also used in Experiment 1.  
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Results 
As in Experiment 1, and as shown in Figure 4, providing observers with additional 
encoding time considerably increased their ability to correctly identify an object from the study 
array. Also, the relative VSTM capacity between categories again depended on encoding time. 
However, the relationship between VSTM capacity for faces and objects differed from that 
between upright and inverted faces; at short encoding times (i.e. 500 ms) capacity for faces was 
less than that for other categories, however when given 2500 ms encoding time there was no 
difference between face and object VSTM capacity (see Figure 4 and 5). These results were not 
explained by a difference in response times between faces and the other categories (see 
APPENDIX B).  
 
 
 
An ANOVA performed on these data confirmed these results.  There was a main effect 
presentation duration, F(2,40)=128.76, p≤.0001, with VSTM performance greater with longer 
presentation durations.  There was also a main effect of stimulus category,  F(2,40)=12.06, 
p≤.0001, with VSTM performance greater for watches or cars compared to faces.  Most 
Figure 4. Estimated number of faces, watches or cars in visual short-term memory (VSTM) 
using Cowan’s (2001) formula for each of the different set sizes when the memory array was 
presented for (A) 500 ms, (B) 1500 ms, or (C) 2500 ms. VSTM increases with additional 
encoding time for all three categories, and is similar across the categories when ample encoding 
time is allowed. However, VSTM for faces is lower in the shorter presentation duration 
conditions compared to that for the object categories. Error bars represent pooled standard error 
values. 
 
 
A) B) C) 
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importantly, stimulus category interacted with presentation duration, with the effect of 
presentation duration being larger for faces than watches or cars, F(4,80)=6.52, p≤.0001.5 
An ANOVA on the K-max for each category across the different set sizes (Figure 5) also 
supported the above results with a main effect of category, F(2,40)=5.13, p=.01, and presentation 
duration, F(2,40)=57.89, p≤.0001. The interaction between category and presentation duration 
approached significance, F(4,80)=2.14, p=.084. There appeared to be an overall advantage for 
cars, which may reflect participants’ ability to use the variability in views to facilitate VSTM 
performance.  When cars were removed from the analysis the interaction between presentation 
duration and stimulus category reached significance, F(2,40)=3.76, p=0.032.  Paired t-tests 
revealed a significant difference in K-max between faces and cars, t(20)=4.05, p=.0006, and 
faces and watches, t(20)=3.27, p=.0038,  in the 500 ms presentation condition, but not the 1500 
ms or the 2500 ms conditions (all ps>.09; there was a trend for a general advantage for cars over 
the other stimulus classes).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Additionally, the main effect of set size and its interactions with encoding duration and with 
stimulus category were significant, p<.05.  These effects were not central to our research 
question. 
Figure 5. The maximum number of faces, watches, or cars (K-max) in visual short-term memory 
(VSTM) when the memory array was presented for 500 ms, 1500 ms, or 2500 ms. K-max 
increased with presentation duration for each of the categories, however the benefit of additional 
encoding time was greatest for faces. Error bars represent pooled standard error values. 
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Discussion 
As predicted based on the proposed role of processing strategy on VSTM capacity, 
participants experienced a greater increase in VSTM capacity with additional encoding time for 
upright faces compared to objects. These results allow us to reject the possibility that the greater 
benefit for upright compared to inverted face VSTM capacity in Experiment 1 was due to 
differences between canonical and non-canonical stimulus views.  Therefore, the results of 
Experiment 2 support suggestions that both encoding capacity limitations (encoding time) and 
processing strategy influence VSTM capacity. However, inconsistent with our predictions, 
VSTM for faces did not exceed that for objects.  Possible explanations are discussed later and 
explored in Experiment 3. 
The smaller VSTM capacity for faces compared to objects at the shortest presentation 
duration (500 ms) likely reflects a general difference in perceptual complexity or within category 
homogeneity between faces and objects.  This had not been an issue in Experiment 1.  The lower 
VSTM capacity for faces compared to objects at short encoding times suggests that faces may 
have a greater information load compared to watches or cars, and this is consistent with slower 
search rates for faces compared to those for multiple different object categories varying in 
complexity (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng et al., in press; Mruczek & Sheinberg, in press).  
Indeed, evidence suggests that our capacity for simultaneously processing faces in an identity 
recognition task may be as little as one (Bindemann, Burton, & Jenkins, in press). Importantly, 
the absence of a difference between upright and inverted face VSTM capacity at short encoding 
times in Experiment 1 suggests that the difference in encoding limitations between faces and 
objects in Experiment 2 may be unrelated to processing strategy.  Instead, it may be due to 
stimulus factors such as perceptual complexity that are also reflected in measures of information 
load.  
Our results, consistent with those of Eng et al. (in press), suggest that additional encoding 
time for items to be stored in VSTM can partly compensate for differences in information load 
between stimulus categories.  Despite the smaller VSTM capacity for faces relative to cars or 
watches at short presentation durations, VSTM for faces approximates that of the other 
categories with sufficient encoding time. However, in Experiment 1, VSTM for inverted faces 
did not reach that of upright faces even when the memory array was presented for 2500 ms. 
Further, these results suggest that the influence of encoding time on VSTM capacity depends on 
 27 
processing strategy, with greater benefits of encoding time for more holistically processed faces 
compared to more featurally processed inverted faces and familiar objects.  
In sum, based on the results of Experiment 1, we expected VSTM capacity for upright 
faces to exceed that of familiar objects at the longest presentation duration.  However, the lower 
VSTM capacity for faces compared to objects at short presentation durations suggests that 
VSTM for faces may be disadvantaged at short encoding times due to the greater information 
load or higher homogeneity. Such differences between faces and objects may be too great to be 
fully offset by the recruitment of a different processing strategy.  Alternatively, as suggested by 
Eng and colleagues (in press), 2500 ms may not be sufficient time to eliminate perceptual 
encoding limitations for faces.  We address this possibility in Experiment 3. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that VSTM for faces benefits more from additional 
encoding time than does VSTM for cars, watches, or inverted faces. It is possible that VSTM for 
upright faces would continue to benefit from even more encoding time (i.e. >2500 ms), perhaps 
then exceeding VSTM for objects. To investigate this possibility, Experiment 3 measured VSTM 
capacity for upright faces, watches and cars with 4000 ms encoding.  
 
Methods 
Participants.  Participants were 36 (18 female) employees, undergraduate students or graduate 
students of Vanderbilt University with normal or corrected to normal vision, ranging in age from 
18 to 33 (M =20.85, SD =3.01).  Participants were compensated $10 per hour for their time. 
 
Stimuli.  The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2 except that the viewpoint of the cars was 
controlled to avoid any advantage for VSTM capacity for cars due to the use of viewpoint 
information. 
 
Design, Procedure, and Analysis.  The general design, procedure, and analysis was the same as 
in Experiment 2 except that the study array was always presented for 4000 ms, and only set sizes 
3, 4, and 5 were used. For each category there was a total of 84 trials (28 trials for each of the 3 
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set sizes). We note that the smaller number of trials per category than Experiment 2 (420) may 
lead to a general drop in performance, however this should be independent of any advantage for 
faces over cars or watches due to processing mode.  
One participant with a VSTM capacity for cars greater than 2.7 SD above the mean was 
excluded as an outlier. 
 
Results 
As shown in Figure 6, when the memory array was presented for 4000 ms VSTM 
performance for faces exceeded that for either cars or watches. An ANOVA performed on these 
data confirmed this result.  There was a main effect of category, F(2,70)=7.03, p=.0017, with 
VSTM capacity for faces exceeding that for both watches and cars. There was also a main effect 
of set size, F(2,70)=9.91, p=.0002, but no interaction between set size and category, 
F(4,140)=1.14, p=.3396,  suggesting that the VSTM advantage for faces did not differ across the 
three set size conditions. The advantage for faces was confirmed by a priori 1-tailed paired t-tests 
(Faces vs. cars, t(107)=3.28, p=.0007; Faces vs. watches, t(107)=23.69, p=.0002). These results 
were not explained by a difference in response times for faces compared to cars or watches (see 
APPENDIX C). 
 An ANOVA on the K-max values across the different set sizes found a marginally 
significant effect of category, F(2,70)=2.66, p=.077.  A priori 1-tailed paired t-tests comparing 
K-max for each stimulus category across the different set sizes once again confirmed the 
advantage for faces over watches, t(35)=2.46, p=.0094, and cars, t(35)=1.86, p=.035. K-max for 
watches and cars did not differ from each other, t(35)=0.01, p=.990 (2-tailed). VSTM 
performance was generally lower than in Experiment 2, suggesting that participants in 
Experiment 2 who performed five times the number of trials per stimulus category compared to 
those in Experiment 3, benefited from the greater exposure to the task and stimuli. 
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Discussion 
Consistent with the proposed influence of face holistic processing mechanisms in 
increasing VSTM capacity, capacity for upright faces exceeded that for watches and cars with 
sufficient encoding time. Therefore, processing strategy was not only able to compensate for 
differences in complexity between stimulus categories, but it also resulted in an advantage for 
upright faces as long as sufficient time was allowed.  
The set size condition in which VSTM capacity peaked (i.e. K-max) varied across 
participants. VSTM appeared to peak at set sizes less than five for some participants, especially 
in the face condition, with performance dropping for set sizes that exceeded participants’ VSTM 
capacity. This is also reflected in the results of Experiment 2 where face VSTM “dipped” at 
larger set sizes (see Figure 4 A and B).  This result suggests that participants may have 
experienced more interference due to the presence of additional items beyond their VSTM 
capacity in trials with faces.  This effect could possibly arise from the reported ability of faces to 
grab attention (Vuilleumier, 2000). This difference between face and object processing provides 
a potential explanation for the larger difference between face and object VSTM for smaller set 
sizes, compared to that at larger set sizes; averaging k-values across individuals whose VSTM 
capacity peaked at different set sizes may have led to a reduction in the average K values for the 
Figure 6. (A) Estimated number of faces, watches or cars stored in visual short-term memory 
(VSTM) using Cowan’s (2001) formula for each of the different set sizes when the memory 
array was presented for 4000 ms, and (B) the maximum number of objects in VSTM (K-max) 
for each category. K and K-max values were larger for faces than for the non-face categories 
with this longer presentation duration. Error bars represent pooled standard error values. 
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larger face set size conditions.  Therefore, K-max may be a better measure for comparing VSTM 
performance for face and non-face categories. 
 
General Discussion 
Different classes of stimuli can recruit different processing strategies either through our 
experience with them or through innate biases. The holistic strategy recruited for face processing 
confers an advantage for face perception, making it less susceptible to irrelevant feature changes 
(e.g. hairstyle) and increases its sensitivity to subtle configural differences (Diamond & Carey, 
1977; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). The results from Experiments 1-3 suggest that such differences 
in processing strategy influence VSTM capacity, a consideration that has been unexplored until 
now. This benefit to upright face VSTM capacity cannot be explained by differences in image 
complexity, or by a general advantage for objects in a familiar orientation. The use of unfamiliar 
faces and of a concurrent articulatory suppression task also renders alternative explanations 
involving a contribution from verbal working memory unlikely. Long-term memory is also 
unlikely to explain these results: not only were the faces unfamiliar, but previous studies suggest 
that long-term memory traces created in the context of a VSTM task have limited impact on 
capacity (Olson & Jiang, in press). However, nonetheless this issue is explored further in the next 
chapter. 
A recent study proposed that for intra-category objects that cannot be easily labeled, 
VSTM capacity is only one object (Olsson & Poom, 2005). The authors argued that estimates of 
VSTM capacity are inflated by observers assigning verbal labels to objects that cross category 
boundaries and by the use of the change-detection paradigm, which allows relational coding. 
However, our stimuli were intra-categorical and did not have obvious labels. That is, at least the 
watches and faces should not be any more easily labeled than any discriminable intra-category 
objects, such as those used by Olsson and Poom (2005). The car labels may have been more 
familiar, but it is unlikely that our novice subjects could label most of our stimuli accurately. The 
stimuli in the studies reported in this chapter were also more complex than those used by Poom 
& Olsson (2005), which should have reduced capacity (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng et al., in 
press). However, VSTM capacity surpassed two items for cars or watches, and even reached 
three items for faces. Indeed, one factor not considered by Olsson & Poom (2005) is that intra-
category objects may require more encoding time than objects that cross category boundaries. 
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The results reported in this chapter and those of Eng et al. (in press) suggest that VSTM capacity 
for complex objects is underestimated when the memory array is presented  for only 500 ms 
because of encoding limitations. For example, it is possible that capacity for the geometrical 
objects used by Olsson & Poom (2005) could reach the same level that we found for watches 
given enough encoding time. 
The results reported in this chapter suggest that VSTM capacity is not a static feature of 
an object category, but instead can be influenced by both encoding time and processing strategy.  
This raises questions about the relationship between visual search rate and VSTM capacity 
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004): Under what conditions does visual search rate predict VSTM 
capacity? Results of a recent study suggest that search rate may predominantly reflect encoding 
limitations due to perceptual complexity (Eng et al., in press).  However, search rate can be 
influenced by differences between categories that do not differ in perceptual complexity, such as 
upright and inverted faces (Tong & Nakayama, 1999).  Further studies are needed to better 
understand the relationship between visual search rate and VSTM capacity.  
The recruitment of holistic processing mechanisms, generally linked with visual expertise 
(Gauthier & Tarr, 2002), may increase VSTM capacity by creating more efficient representations 
for storage. Existing work suggests that VSTM capacity for multi-featured items depends on the 
“binding” of features together (Delvenne & Bruyer, 2004; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). 
Similarly, holistic processing may bind the information within a face more effectively than the 
more feature-based strategies used for non-face objects, leading to a more detailed and/or more 
efficient representation for faces.  This would be consistent with the faster search rate for upright 
compared to inverted faces (e.g., Tong & Nakayama, 1999).  Alternatively, holistic 
representations for upright faces may be more robust and less susceptible to decay or interference 
than are the more feature-based representations created for inverted faces or objects. Further 
studies manipulating the similarity and relevance of different dimensions of the probe and study 
items may provide insight into the nature of the representations stored in VSTM for objects and 
faces. 
A recent study provides evidence against the possibility that holistic representations are 
simply more robust and less subject to decay or interference. If the VSTM advantage for faces 
arose due to holistic representation being more robust than more piecemeal representation, one 
would expect that the cost of inversion for VSTM performance would increase with increasing 
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delay intervals between study and test. However, Freire, Lee, and Symons (2000) found no effect 
of memory delay (1 s – 10 s) on the size of the inversion effect. This result suggests that the 
advantage for face VSTM is not a result of more robust representations and is consistent with a 
more qualitative difference between holistic and more featural representations.  
Thus far in the context of previous literature, the results suggest that not only do we 
perceive faces differently, but that this difference extends to our VSTM for this category. Indeed, 
more efficient perception of important categories in our environment would not be maximally 
adaptive if this advantage disappeared as soon as we lose sight of those objects. Interestingly, 
because holistic processing is also observed for objects of expertise (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; 
Gauthier & Tarr, 2002), the VSTM advantage reported for faces in this chapter may extend more 
generally to perceptual experts. If so, this would lead to an intriguing prediction: although 
practice on VSTM tasks has not been found to improve VSTM capacity substantially (Chen et 
al., in press), expertise training procedures that have been shown to increase holistic processing 
for objects might more likely impact VSTM. In addition, real-world experts, shown to 
demonstrate holistic processing for objects in their domain of expertise (e.g., cars among car 
experts) should also show increased VSTM capacity. This possibility is explored in CHAPTER 
III. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
COMPARING VISUAL SHORT-TERM MEMORY FOR UPRIGHT AND INVERTED 
FACES AND CARS AMONG CAR EXPERTS AND CAR NOVICES 
 
Introduction 
Visual experts with non-face categories recruit a holistic processing strategy not unlike 
that recruited for upright faces (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 2003; Gauthier & Tarr, 
2002). To review from CHAPTER I, classic holistic processing effects typically found with 
faces, such as sensitivity to inversion or configural changes, have been demonstrated among 
observers trained to become experts with a novel category ("greebles"; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). 
In addition, real-world car experts also show holistic processing effects, namely the difficulty 
processing only a part of a car when it is presented in the context of a whole car (Gauthier et al., 
2003). These results provide evidence that the holistic processing strategy recruited for faces is 
also associated with expert visual processing more generally. This suggests an interesting 
possibility: if the VSTM advantage for upright faces over inverted faces and non-face-objects 
(CHAPTER II) is a result of the more holistic processing style recruited for upright faces, visual 
experts with non-face categories should also demonstrate a VSTM advantage for objects within 
their domain of expertise. CHAPTER III explores this possibility.  
CHAPTER III consists of four experiments that compare VSTM capacity for upright and 
inverted faces and cars among groups of car experts and car novices. Experiment 4 compares 
VSTM for upright and inverted faces and cars under similar temporal encoding limitations as 
those used in CHAPTER II.  To anticipate the results, this study not only replicated the advantage 
for upright faces over inverted faces, but also found a similar inversion cost for cars among car 
experts but not novices.  Car experts also had a greater VSTM capacity for cars compared to car 
novices. The other three experiments in this chapter were conducted in order to evaluate 
alternative explanations, unrelated to holistic processing, for the VSTM advantage for objects 
within one’s domain of expertise. Experiment 5 tested whether verbal working memory 
contributed to car experts’ superior VSTM performance: The articulatory suppression load was 
increased to a level previously shown to cause a large reduction in the level of performance on a 
verbal short-term memory task (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Otani et al., 1997). The increase in 
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articulatory suppression load did not lead to any qualitative changes to the general pattern of 
results, with car experts still demonstrating a VSTM advantage for cars and a greater inversion 
cost to car VSTM compared to novices.  Experiment 6 explored whether LTM contributes to the 
VSTM advantage demonstrated for upright faces and upright cars among car experts.  In this 
experiment participants performed a number of VSTM trials with a small (10 item) stimulus set, 
allowing them to establish LTM memory representations for these 10 items. The stimulus set was 
then changed to 10 new items from the same category. VSTM performance for faces and cars 
among car experts was unaffected by the change in stimulus set, but there was evidence that 
VSTM for cars was reduced among car novices. These results suggest that the VSTM advantage 
for objects from one’s domain of visual expertise is unlikely to be a result of contributions from 
verbal short-term memory or LTM. Finally, Experiment 7 explored whether the VSTM advantage 
could result from a difference in eye-movement strategies employed to uptake the information 
from a study array.  Imposing a restricted eye-movement pattern failed to eliminate the VSTM 
advantage for upright faces, suggesting that this advantage does not rely on strategic difference in 
the physical pattern of eye-movements employed to encode a study array.  Together, the results 
reported in this chapter are consistent with a holistic processing account of the VSTM advantage 
demonstrated for objects of expertise. 
 
Experiment 4 
If the VSTM advantage for faces relies on the recruitment of specialized holistic 
processing mechanisms linked with visual expertise more generally (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002), 
experts with non-face object categories should show the same VSTM advantage as seen with 
faces. More specifically, car experts should experience a greater benefit to VSTM for cars with 
additional encoding time compared to novices.  In addition, VSTM capacity for cars should be 
greater among car experts than novices as long as sufficient encoding time is allowed, but VSTM 
for upright faces should be similar across the groups regardless of encoding time. VSTM for cars 
among car experts should also be disproportionately reduced by inversion compared to novices, 
whereas the cost due to inversion for faces should be similar across the two groups. 
Alternatively, the advantage gained by recruiting a holistic processing style may be specific to 
faces.  For example, it might be the result of an interaction between processing strategy and the 
perceptual features of faces, and thus not extend to other categories that recruit a holistic 
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processing strategy. It is also possible that the VSTM advantage for faces is a product of their 
evolutionary importance, with special mechanisms in place to increase VSTM for this category 
but no other, consistent with the suggestion by some that there is an innate module dedicated to 
processing facial stimuli (Kanwisher, 2000). Experiment 4 examines these possibilities by 
comparing VSTM capacity for upright and inverted cars and faces among participants who are 
car novices or car experts while manipulating the time allowed for encoding the items in VSTM. 
If the VSTM advantage for faces reported in CHAPTER II is associated with visual expertise 
rather than being specific to faces, VSTM for cars among car experts, but not novices, should 
show the same pattern of results as that found for faces. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 36 individuals who where employees, undergraduate students, or 
graduate students of Vanderbilt University, or members of the surrounding Nashville 
community. Participants were compensated $10 per hour for their time.  All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal vision and reported having a range of experience identifying cars, 
from very little to extensive. A self-report measure of participants’ car and bird expertise was 
obtained from each individual in the form of a rating on a scale of one to ten.  Participants were 
informed that “five” corresponded to average skill at identifying cars or birds whereas “ten” 
reflected perfect skill recognizing these categories.  
Due to differences in criteria across individuals, an objective test of their expertise was 
also obtained. Participants’ subordinate-level car expertise was quantified using a sequential 
matching task that has also been used in pervious studies (Gauthier, Curby, Skudlarski, & 
Epstein, 2005; Gauthier et al., 2003; Gauthier et al., 2000). In this task, participants were 
required to make a same/different judgment about different images of cars at the level of model, 
regardless of year (See APPENDIX D).  This task can be performed by all participants, 
regardless of their level of experience with cars, as it does not require knowledge of car names. 
To provide a baseline of their perceptual skills, participants who reported no expertise with birds 
also performed the same task with birds, in which they were required to make a same/different 
decision at the level of species about different images of passerine birds.  Participants with a d’ 
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for car trials greater than two and at least a d’ advantage of one unit for cars over birds6 (i.e. car 
d’ – bird d’ > 1), were classified as experts (Gauthier et al., 2000). 
Eighteen participants (11 males) met the criteria for car expertise (age, M = 22.28, SD = 
4.71, car d’ M = 2.55, bird d’ M = 0.87), while the remaining 18 (10 male) were classified as car 
novices (age, M = 20.64, SD = 2.42, car d’ M = 1.34, bird d’ M = 0.84).  One of the participants 
classified as an expert had a (car d’ – bird d’) less than one (0.83), but he was included in the car 
expertise group because he also reported having above average skills at recognizing birds, which 
likely resulted in the smaller difference between the d’ prime measures for these categories. Car 
expertise scores from the matching task were generally consistent with subjects’ self-report, with 
participants classified as novices reporting their car recognition skills at an average of 5.77/107; 
those who met criteria for car expertise rated their skills, on average, as 8.00/10.  
 
Stimuli. The stimuli were 72 grayscale faces (1.9° x 2.3°) from the Max-Planck Institute for 
Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany and 72 grayscale images of cars (2.3° x 1.5°, 
profile view).  The stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 3.  
 
Procedure.  For each participant, a selection of half the faces and half the cars appeared in the 
upright trials while the remaining images appeared in the inverted trials. Participants performed a 
delayed match-to-sample probe recognition task like that described in CHAPTER II (see Figure 
1). Participants performed a total of 1152 trials across four different one hour long sessions, each 
consisting of 8 alternating blocks (36 randomized trials/block) of upright and inverted images.  
Two sessions consisted of only face trials, while the other two sessions consisted of only car 
trials.  Participants either completed the two car sessions or the two face sessions first. The order 
of the sessions was counterbalanced both within and across expertise groups. In sum, across the 
experiment, there were 288 trials for each of the four stimulus categories (upright faces, inverted 
faces, upright cars, inverted cars).  Within these stimulus categories, there were 9 conditions (3 
set sizes x 3 presentation durations), each of which was presented 32 times.  
 
                                                
6Providing the participant did not also report expertise with identifying passerine bird species 
7 Self-ratings were not obtained from five participants who did not meet the criteria for expertise. 
However these participants were recruited as novices, not as experts. 
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Analysis.  Data from one participant were removed from the analysis due to poor performance 
(73%) in the auditory task. Accuracy for this component exceeded 90% for all other participants.  
For remaining participants, incorrect articulatory suppression trials were removed from further 
analyses. For each participant, hit rate and correct rejection rate were calculated for each 
condition.  These values were used to derive VSTM capacity using Cowan’s K, K= (hit rate + 
correct rejection rate - 1) * set size, an estimate of the number of objects successfully encoded in 
VSTM (Cowan, 2001). An additional participant was removed due to poor performance on the 
VSTM task (average capacity for upright faces less than 1).  These subjects were not included in 
the previous description of the participant groups to ensure that the descriptives reported reflect 
only those participants whose data was included in the statistics reported in the results section. 
The maximum K (K-max) was identified for each presentation duration regardless of set size. 
Since some participants tend to show a drop in performance in conditions where the set size 
exceeds their capacity, especially in the case with faces, VSTM capacity may be underestimated 
in the  larger set size conditions (Experiment 3).  To avoid this problem, all subsequent analyses 
were performed on the K-max values. In addition to the ANOVA analyses and the regression 
analyses exploring the relationship between level of car expertise and VSTM capacity, a series of 
planned t- tests were conducted to explore the specific predictions based on the proposed role of 
holistic processing in explaining the VSTM capacity advantage for faces found in CHAPTER II, 
that is (1) the presence of an inversion cost for cars among car experts but not novices, (2) 
greater VSTM for cars among car experts compared to novices, and (3) greater VSTM capacity 
for faces than cars among car novices, with sufficient encoding time. 
 
Results 
To summarize the results, VSTM for faces was similar across the two groups with 
inversion reducing face VSTM at all presentation durations (Figure 7A). In contrast, inversion of 
cars only impacted VSTM for cars among car experts and only when the presentation duration 
was long enough to allow sufficient encoding time (≥ 2500 ms) (Figure 7 B). In addition, while 
VSTM for faces was no different from that for cars among car experts regardless of the duration 
of the memory array presentation, car novices demonstrated an advantage for upright faces over 
upright cars at the longest presentation duration (4000 ms). Further confirming the importance of 
encoding time, car experts demonstrated greater VSTM for upright cars than novices only when 
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the presentation duration was sufficiently long (≥ 2500 ms) (Figure 7 B). Finally, highlighting 
the continuous, rather than binary, nature of perceptual expertise, a participant’s level of car 
expertise was correlated with the estimate of the maximum number of cars that that participant 
could successfully store in VSTM when the memory array was presented for 4000 ms (Figure 8 
A). These results were not explained by a difference in response times between upright and 
inverted faces and cars (see APPENDIX E). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Omnibus test. Before proceeding directly to more specific planned comparisons, the data were 
submitted to an omnibus ANOVA. A 2 (category: face, car) x 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) x 
3 (presentation duration; 500, 2500, 4000 ms) x 2 (car expertise group; novice, expert) ANOVA 
on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-max) revealed main effects of orientation, F(1,34)=82.81, 
Figure 7. The maximum number of objects (K-max) in visual short-term memory (VSTM) for 
500 ms, 2500 ms, and 4000 ms presentation durations for (A) upright and inverted faces and 
(B) upright and inverted cars among participants who were car experts and novices.  Not only 
was there a VSTM advantage for upright cars among cars experts similar in magnitude as the 
advantage for upright faces, but also car experts, but not novices, showed an inversion effect 
for cars. Error bars represent pooled standard error values. 
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p≤.0001, and presentation duration, F(2,68)=73.28, p≤.0001. The main effect of category also 
approached significance, F(1,34)=3.58, p=.067. These results suggest that VSTM was greater for 
upright items, longer presentation durations, and that a trend for a greater VSTM for faces 
compared to cars was also present. No interactions between presentation duration and any other 
variables were significant (all ps>0.253).  There was an interaction between orientation and 
category, F(1,34)=5.48, p=.025, with the effect of orientation in general being greater for faces 
than cars. There was no main effect of expertise (F<1), but there was an interaction between 
orientation and expertise, F(1,34) = 8.31, p = .0068, and between category and expertise, F(1,34) 
= 4.97, p = .032, suggesting that the VSTM advantage of car experts over car novices was 
limited to cars (i.e. it did not extend to faces) and that car experts also experienced a greater cost 
due to orientation compared to novices.  The three-way interaction between expertise, 
orientation, and category failed to reach significance, F(1,34)=1.45, p=.238. In order to better 
understand the patterns in these data, subsequent ANOVAs were performed separately for faces 
and cars as described below. 
 
Comparing maximum VSTM for faces among car experts and novices. A 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) x 3 (presentation duration; 500, 2500, 4000 ms) x 2 (car expertise group; novice, 
expert) ANOVA on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-max) for upright and inverted faces found 
main effects of orientation, F(1,34)=69.53, p≤.0001,  and duration,  F(2,68)=40.24, p≤.0001, but 
importantly there was no main effect (F<1), or interaction involving car expertise (all ps>.425). 
The interaction between orientation and duration failed to reach significance, F(2,68)=1.77, 
p=.178. Therefore, VSTM for faces was significantly greater for longer presentation durations 
and for upright compared to inverted faces, although, the effect of orientation did not differ 
depending on presentation duration (Figure 7 A). In addition, an observer’s expertise with cars 
did not impact VSTM for faces.   
 
Comparing maximum VSTM for cars among car experts and novices. A 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) x 3 (presentation duration; 500, 2500, 4000 ms) x 2 (car expertise group; novice, 
expert) ANOVA on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-max) for upright and inverted cars found 
main effects of orientation, F(1,34)=9.12, p=.0048,  and presentation duration,  F(1,34)=61.93, 
p≤.0001, although the interaction between orientation and presentation duration did not reach 
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significance (F<1). There was no main effect of car expertise, F(1,34)=1.95, p=0.172,  but there 
was an interaction between car expertise and orientation, F(1,34)=5.61, p=.024, with greater 
VSTM for upright but not inverted cars, among car experts compared to car novices. The 
interactions between presentation duration, and expertise and/or orientation failed to reach failed 
to reach significance, (all ps>.230). Therefore, in general, VSTM was greater for longer 
presentation durations and for upright compared to inverted items. Notably, consistent with the 
predictions, VSTM for upright cars, but not inverted cars, was significantly greater among car 
experts than novices (Figure 7 B).  
 
Planned comparisons. The specific predictions of the expertise account of the VSTM advantage 
for faces were generally confirmed by planned t-tests: maximum VSTM for cars was reduced by 
inversion for all presentation durations among experts (all ps<.022) but not novices (all ps>.206), 
while maximum VSTM for faces was reduced by inversion for all presentation durations among 
both expert and novice groups (experts, all ps<.010; novices, all ps<.0333). In addition, 
maximum VSTM for upright faces exceeded that for upright cars among car novices only when 
the presentation duration was sufficiently long (500 ms, t<1; 2500 ms, t(17)=1.48, p=.157; 4000 
ms, t(17)=2.87, p=.011),  however VSTM for cars and faces did not differ among car experts 
regardless of presentation duration (500 ms, t(17)=1.19, p=.251; 2500 ms, t(17)=1.16, p=.263; 
4000 ms, t(17)=1.17, p=.257). Consistent with the need for sufficient encoding time in order for 
novices to show an advantage for faces over cars, a VSTM advantage for cars among car experts 
compared to car novices also only emerged when the presentation duration was sufficiently long 
(500 ms, t<1; 2500 ms, t(34)=1.68, p=.103; 4000 ms, t(34)=3.05, p=.0044). 
 
Correlation between car expertise and maximum VSTM for cars and faces. There was a 
significant correlation between K-max for upright cars when the memory array was presented for 
4000 ms and participants’ sensitivity for cars in the car expertise measure (r=.388, p=.021). 
Notably, a participant’s level of car expertise was not correlated with their VSTM for upright 
faces (r=.132, p=.451) or inverted cars (r=.149, p=.393), suggesting that the correlation between 
car expertise and VSTM for cars cannot be attributed to a more general difference in visual 
skills. The difference between a participant’s sensitivity for cars and that for birds (i.e. car d’ – 
bird d’) may provide a better measure of a participant’s expertise-specific skill. On the other 
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hand, to the degree to which a participant’s sensitivity for birds is increased by their experience 
with this category, this measure may underestimate learning-related increases in car sensitivity.  
Despite this possibility, there was a significant correlation between participants’ delta d’ score 
(i.e. car d’ – bird d’) and K-max with 4000 ms encoding time for cars (r=.364, p=.032; Figure 8 
A), but once again not for upright faces (r=.032, p=.855; Figure 8 B) or inverted cars (r=.036, 
p=.838)8.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
As predicted based on the proposed influence of processing strategy on VSTM capacity, 
car experts demonstrated greater VSTM capacity for upright cars than car novices.  Similar to the 
VSTM advantage for faces demonstrated in CHAPTER II, this advantage also depended on 
sufficient encoding time.  In addition, inversion, believed to disrupt holistic processing, led to a 
reduction in VSTM capacity for cars among car experts but not novices. These results suggest 
that the VSTM advantage for faces is not due to a face-specific mechanism, as other objects 
within a domain of expertise can also demonstrate this advantage. These results are also 
                                                
8 The participant who reported above average skills with both cars and birds who had the reduced 
(car d’ – bird d’) expertise score was not included in the regression analysis. 
Figure 8.  Scatter plot of individuals’ car expertise scores (Car d’ – Bird d’) and their K-max  
for (A) upright cars and (B) upright faces when the memory array was presented for 4000 ms.  
There was a significant correlation between a participant’s level of car expertise and their 
VSTM capacity for cars, but not for faces. 
r = .364 
p = .032 
r = .032 
p = .855 
A) B) 
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consistent with the suggestion that the specialized holistic processing strategy, adopted for faces 
and by visual experts, may be the mechanism underlying this advantage. 
There was a considerable amount of variability in the data, which prevented some effects 
in the omnibus ANOVA from reaching significance.  This is not surprising given the numerous 
reports of robust individual differences in VSTM capacity among individuals (Todd & Marois, 
2005; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). Participants were grouped into experts and novices in order to 
reduce the impact of individual differences unrelated to expertise and to emphasize those specific 
to expertise, although perceptual expertise also falls on a continuum with some variability within 
the groups. Consistent with the presence of meaningful expertise-related individual differences 
within the groups, VSTM capacity for cars was correlated with level of visual expertise with 
cars. Sensitivity on this measure of car expertise has been previously shown to also correlate 
with behavioral measures of holistic processing (Curby & Gauthier, 2001; Gauthier et al., 2003) 
and also with a number of physiological markers typically associated with face processing, such 
as activation to cars in face-selective fusiform cortex (Gauthier et al., 2005; Gauthier et al., 2000) 
and the amplitude of a face-selective electrophysiological marker, the N170 potential, to cars 
(Gauthier et al., 2003). Therefore in the context of the findings from previous studies, the 
correlation between VSTM capacity for cars and participants’ level of car expertise not only 
strengthens the link between the VSTM advantage demonstrated for faces with that for cars 
among car experts, but it also provides consistent, but indirect, evidence for a common holistic 
processing mechanism for this advantage. 
The importance of sufficient encoding time to demonstrate an advantage of perceptual 
expertise is affirmed by the absence of many of the effects of expertise at short encoding times.  
For example, as in Experiment 3, an advantage for faces compared to upright cars among car 
novices was only present in the 4000 ms presentation duration condition.  In addition, car experts 
also only demonstrated greater VSTM for cars compared to novices when the memory array was 
presented for 4000 ms. The similar temporal constraints and magnitude of the face and car expert 
VSTM advantages also provide support for the notion of a common underlying mechanism 
supporting these abilities. 
One important difference between car experts and novices could provide another 
potential explanation for these results: they possess different degrees of knowledge and labels for 
the car stimuli.  This was not directly measured in Experiment 4, as knowledge of the car model 
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labels was not necessary to perform successfully on the measure of car expertise. It is likely 
although, that as a by-product of their experience with cars, participants in the expert group had 
more extensive knowledge of the labels of the models used in this experiment. There was 
anecdotal evidence consistent with this suggestion; upon completion of the study, car experts 
frequently and spontaneously mentioned some of the names of the cars that had appeared in the 
experiment. Therefore, it is possible that car expertise may facilitate performance on the VSTM 
task by allowing participants to verbally recode the study array items and thus benefit from a 
contribution from verbal short-term memory.  The relatively low articulatory suppression load 
used in Experiment 4 may have been insufficient to prevent experts from utilizing verbal short-
term memory stores (Marsh & Hicks, 1998). This strategy would have been less available to 
novices due to their more limited knowledge of the labels for these stimuli, and thus could 
potentially account for the difference in performance between the two groups.  It is important to 
note that this account cannot explain the advantage for unfamiliar faces over familiar non-face 
objects, although it is possible that there may be a different underlying cause for the VSTM 
advantage for faces and that demonstrated for cars by car experts.  If the VSTM advantage for 
cars among car experts relies on a contribution from verbal short-term memory, this advantage 
should be reduced, or even disappear entirely, if car experts’ ability to recruit verbal memory 
stores is reduced.  This possibility is tested in Experiment 5. 
 
Experiment 5 
 This experiment specifically aimed to address whether the VSTM advantage 
demonstrated by car experts depends on their being able to recruit verbal memory stores to 
supplement VSTM. Since car experts are likely to be highly familiar with the labels associated 
with the car stimuli, the recruitment of a verbal strategy could potentially account for the VSTM 
advantage demonstrated by car experts. The articulatory suppression load used in Experiment 4 
may have been insufficient to prevent a contribution from verbal short-term memory as previous 
work has demonstrated that participants can still perform a verbal memory task with reasonable 
accuracy (82%) with an articulatory suppression load equivalent to that used in Experiment 4 
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(i.e. two syllables) (Marsh & Hicks, 1998)9.  However, verbal working memory performance 
drops considerably (54%) if the articulatory suppression load is increased to six syllables. Based 
on these findings, increasing the articulatory suppression load from 2-3 syllables to 5-6 syllables 
should reduce the ability of participants to adopt a verbal strategy to facilitate VSTM 
performance. This increase in articulatory suppression load was implemented in Experiment 5 to 
test this prediction. In addition, to further discourage participants from using a verbal strategy, 
the articulatory suppression load was semantically meaningful; participants were required to 
rehearse three car model names during car trials and three person names during face trials. 
Therefore, not only should this articulatory suppression load fill a substantial portion, if not all, 
of a participant’s verbal memory, but it should further discourage the use of a verbal strategy due 
to the potential of the verbal load to semantically interfere with a verbal rehearsal strategy. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 31 employees, undergraduate students, or graduate students of 
Vanderbilt University, or members of the surrounding Nashville community. Participants were 
compensated $10 per hour for their time.  All participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision and reported having a range of experience identifying cars, from very little to extensive. 
Their car expertise was quantified using the same matching task as in Gauthier et al. (2000) and 
described in APPENDIX D. Fourteen participants (11 males) met the criteria for car expertise 
(age, M = 21.64, SD = 2.10, car d’ M = 2.72, bird d’ M = 0.93), while 17 (13 male) were 
classified as car novices (age, M = 22.41, SD = 3.02, car d’ M = 1.27, bird d’ M = 0.76). Once 
again, participants’ self-report of their skill at recognizing cars was generally consistent with 
their performance on the subordinate car matching task, with participants meeting the criteria for 
expertise on the task rating themselves an average of 8.43/10; those who were classified as 
novices rated their skills, on average, as 6.03/10. 
 
Stimuli. The visual stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 4. The auditory stimuli 
were changed as described below. 
                                                
9 This level of articulatory load is commonly used in VSTM studies and it is often assumed to be 
an adequate load to prevent verbal contamination of VSTM performance (Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel et al., 2001). 
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Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that participants were 
required to rehearse three car models (“Spectra”, “Blazer”, “Accord”, “Corvette”,  “Mustang”, 
”Jetta”, “Civic”, ”Tribute”, “Probe”, “Vibe”) or person names (“Leanne”, “Sarah”, “Alan”, 
“Cathryn”, “Amy”, “Andrew”, “Peter”, “Mark”, “Jane”, “Robert”) instead of the two digits.  
This resulted in 5-6 syllables being rehearsed compared to 2-3 in Experiment 1.  In addition, 
Experiment 2 also differed from Experiment 1 in that the probe for the auditory task was 
presented auditorily rather than visually. 
 
Analysis. The analysis was the same as used in Experiment 1. Three participants were removed 
from the analysis due to poor performance in the articulatory suppression task (<90%).  An 
additional two participants were excluded from the analysis due to poor performance in the 
VSTM with faces (average K for upright faces<1). In addition to the ANOVA analyses and the 
regression analysis exploring the relationship between level of car expertise and VSTM capacity, 
a series of planned 1-tailed tests were conducted to explore the specific predictions based on the 
results of Experiment 1, that is (1) the presence of an inversion cost for cars among car experts 
but not novices, (2) greater VSTM for cars among car experts compared to novices, and (3) 
greater VSTM for faces than cars among car novices. 
 
Results 
The results of Experiment 5, in general, provide a replication of those reported in 
Experiment 4. To summarize the results, VSTM for faces was similar across the two groups, 
with inversion reducing face VSTM at all presentation duration conditions (Figure 9 A). In 
contrast, inversion of cars only impacted VSTM among car experts but not novices (Figure 9 B). 
In addition, while VSTM for faces was no different from that for cars among car experts 
regardless of the presentation duration, car novices demonstrated an advantage for upright faces 
over upright cars when the presentation duration was sufficiently long (4000 ms). Further 
confirming the importance of encoding time, car experts also demonstrated greater VSTM for 
upright cars than novices only when the presentation duration was sufficiently long (≥ 2500 ms) 
(Figure 9 B). Finally, highlighting the continuous, rather than binary, nature of perceptual 
expertise, a participant’s level of car expertise was correlated with the estimate of the maximum 
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number of cars that that participant could successfully store in VSTM in 4000 ms presentation 
duration condition (Figure 10 A). These results were not explained by a difference in response 
times between upright and inverted faces and cars (see APPENDIX F). 
 
 
 
Omnibus test. Following the same procedure as with Experiment 4, before proceeding directly to 
more specific planned comparisons, the data were submitted to an omnibus ANOVA. A 2 
(category: face, car) x 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) x 3 (presentation duration; 500, 2500, 
4000ms) x 2 (car expertise group; novice, expert) ANOVA on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-
max) across the different set sizes revealed main effects of orientation, F(1,29)=34.35, p≤.0001, 
and presentation duration, F(2,58)=65.30, p≤.0001. The main effect of expertise also approached 
significance, F(1,29)=3.66, p=.066, but there was no main effect of category (F<1).  These 
results suggest that VSTM was greater for upright items, longer presentation durations, and that a 
trend for generally greater VSTM capacity among car experts compared to car novices. There 
Figure 9. The maximum number of items (K-max) in visual short-term memory (VSTM) for 
500 ms, 2500 ms, and 4000 ms presentation durations for (A) upright and inverted faces and 
(B) upright and inverted cars among participants who were car experts and car novices.  Not 
only was there a VSTM advantage for upright cars among cars experts similar in magnitude 
as the advantage for upright faces, but also car experts, but not novices, showed an inversion 
effect for cars. Error bars represent pooled standard error values.  
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was an interaction between orientation and expertise, F(1,29)=4.50, p=.043, and a trend for an 
interaction between expertise and presentation duration, F(1,58)=2.00, p=.144,  but no other 
interaction with expertise approached significance (all ps >.267). The VSTM advantage for 
expertise was greater for upright than inverted items, with experts also tending to experience a 
greater benefit due to additional encoding time. There was also a trend for an interaction between 
presentation duration and category, F(1,58)=2.434, p=.097,  but no other interactions with 
presentation duration approached significance (all ps>.269). There was an interaction between 
orientation and category, F(1,29)=7.91, p=.0087, with the effect of orientation in general being 
greater for faces than cars. In order to better understand the pattern of results in these data, 
subsequent ANOVAs were performed separately for faces and cars, as described below. 
 
Comparing maximum VSTM for faces among car experts and novices. A 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) x 3 (presentation duration; 500, 2500, 4000 ms) x 2 (car expertise group; novice, 
expert) ANOVA on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-max) for upright and inverted faces found 
main effects of orientation, F(1,29)=32.61, p≤.0001,  and presentation duration,  F(2,58)=40.79, 
p≤.0001, but importantly there was no main effect, F(1, 29)=2.12, p=0.156, or interaction 
involving car expertise (all Fs<1). There was no significant interaction between orientation and 
presentation duration (F<1). Therefore, VSTM for faces was significantly greater for longer 
presentation durations and for upright compared to inverted faces, although, the effect of 
orientation did not differ depending on presentation duration (Figure 9 A). In addition, an 
observer’s expertise with cars did not impact VSTM for faces. 
 
Comparing maximum VSTM for cars among car experts and novices. A 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) x 3 (presentation duration; 500, 2500, 4000 ms) x 2 (car expertise group; novice, 
expert) ANOVA on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-max) for upright and inverted cars found 
main effects of orientation, F(1,29)=11.24, p=.0022,  and presentation duration,  F(1,29)=33.59, 
p≤.0001.  The interaction between orientation and presentation duration did not reach 
significance, F(2,58)=1.10, p=.340. The main effect of car expertise did not reach significance, 
F(1,29)=2.71, p=0.110,  but importantly there were interactions between car expertise and 
orientation, F(1,29)=7.40 , p=.011, and car expertise and presentation duration, F(1,29)=3.64, 
p=.032, with car experts not only demonstrating greater VSTM for upright but not inverted cars 
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compared to car novices, but also a larger benefited from additional encoding time compared to 
novices. The interaction between presentation duration, expertise and orientation was not 
significant (F<1). Therefore, in general, VSTM was greater for longer presentation durations and 
for upright compared to inverted items. Notably, consistent with our predictions, VSTM for 
upright cars, but not inverted cars, was significantly greater among car experts than novices 
(Figure 9 B).  
 
Planned comparisons. Consistent with the above results our specific predictions were confirmed 
by planned 1-tailed t-tests: maximum VSTM for cars among car experts was reduced by 
inversion when the memory array was presented for 2500 ms, t(13)=3.47, p=.0021, or 4000 ms, 
t(13)=2.52, p=.0128, but not when it was presented for only 500 ms (t<1). In contrast, among car 
novices inversion failed to impact VSTM capacity for cars regardless of the presentation 
duration (all ts<1). VSTM for faces was reduced by inversion for all presentation durations 
among both expert and novice groups (although only marginally for 4000 ms among experts, all 
ps<.0519; novices, all ps<.0228). In addition, maximum VSTM for upright faces exceeded that 
for upright cars among car novices as long as the memory array presentation was sufficiently 
long (500 ms, t<1; 2500 ms, t(16)=1.27, p=.1121; 4000 ms, t(16)=2.09, p=.0265),  however 
VSTM for cars and faces did not differ among car experts regardless of presentation duration 
(500 ms, t<1; 2500 ms, t(13)=1.25, p=.117; 4000 ms, t<1). Consistent with the need for 
sufficient encoding time in order for novices to show an advantage for faces over cars, a VSTM 
advantage for cars among car experts compared to car novices only emerged with sufficiently 
long presentation durations (≥2500 ms) (500 ms, t<1; 2500 ms, t(29)=2.42, p=.011; 4000 ms, 
t(29)=3.90, p=.0003). 
 
Correlation between car expertise and maximum VSTM for cars and faces.  As in Experiment 1, 
there was a significant correlation between K-max for upright cars when the memory array was 
presented for 4000 ms and participants’ sensitivity for cars in the car expertise measure (i.e. car 
d’) (r=0.701, p≤.0001). Notably, a participant’s level of car expertise was not correlated with 
their VSTM for faces when the memory array was presented for 4000 ms (r=.202, p=.276) 
suggesting the correlation between car expertise and VTSM for cars cannot be attributed to a 
more general difference in visual skills. The correlation between VSTM for inverted cars and a 
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participant’s car expertise was significant (r=.389, p=.031), however this correlation was carried 
by two outliers (greater than 2 SD above the mean) and once these participants were removed the 
correlation dropped considerably (r=.131, p=.497).  The correlation also remained significant 
when the car sensitivity score was replaced with the delta d’ score (i.e. car d’ –  bird d’) (r=.575, 
p=.0007; Figure 10 A). In addition, consistent with the previous results the correlation between 
the delta d’ score and face VSTM (r=.001, p=.996; Figure 10 B) or inverted car VSTM (r=.327, 
p=.072; with the two outliers removed, r= -.027, p=.891) was not significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined analysis of Experiments 4 and 5 
To more directly assess the effects of the increase in articulatory suppression load on 
VSTM performance for faces and cars among both car experts and car novices ANOVA analyses 
were performed on the combined data.  A 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) x 3 (presentation 
duration; 500, 2500, 4000 ms) x 2 (car expertise group; novice, expert) x 2 (Experiment; 4, 5) 
ANOVA on the maximum VSTM capacity (K-max) for upright and inverted faces found a main 
effects of experiment, F(1,63)=7.62, p≤.0076,  with VSTM capacity generally larger in 
Figure 10.  Scatter plot of individuals’ car expertise scores (Car d’ – Bird d’) and their K-max 
for (A) upright cars and (B) upright faces with a 4000 ms presentation duration.  There was a 
significant correlation between a participant’s level of car expertise and their VSTM capacity 
for cars but not for faces. 
 
r = .575 
p < .001 
r = .001 
p = .996 
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Experiment 5 than in Experiment 4. There were also main effects of orientation, F(1,63)=95.12, 
p≤.0001,  and presentation duration,  F(2,126)=81.66, p≤.0001, but importantly there was no 
main effect, F(1, 63)=1.07, p=0.305, or interaction involving car expertise (all Fs<1.63, and 
ps>.206). There was also no significant interaction between orientation and presentation 
duration, F(2,126)=1.79, p=.172. Therefore, the results of the combine analysis on the K-max 
values for faces from Experiment 4 and 5 suggest that the increase in articulatory suppression 
load did not impact the qualitative pattern of results for upright and inverted faces, however there 
was a general increase in VSTM performance for faces in Experiment 5 relative to Experiment 4. 
A 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) x 3 (presentation duration; 500, 2500, 4000 ms) x 2 
(car expertise group; novice, expert) x 2 (Experiment; 4, 5) ANOVA on the maximum VSTM 
capacity (K-max) for upright and inverted cars found no main effect of, F(1,63)=1.07, p=.3052,  
or interaction with experiment (all Fs<.71, and ps>.496). There were main effects of orientation, 
F(1,63)=18.78, p≤.0001,  and presentation duration,  F(2,126)=91.67, p≤.0001, and car expertise, 
F(1, 63)=4.43, p=.039.  There were also interactions between orientation and expertise, F(1, 
63)=11.92, p=.0010, and presentation duration and expertise, F(2,126)=5.11, p=.007, with the 
expert VSTM advantage larger for upright items and for longer presentation durations. 
Therefore, the results of the combined analysis on the K-max values for cars from Experiment 4 
and 5 suggests that the increase in articulatory suppression load did not impact the general 
pattern of results for upright and inverted cars for either car experts and novices. 
 
Discussion 
Despite the increase in the articulatory suppression load from 2-3 syllables to 5-6 
syllables, an increase previously shown to significantly affect verbal short-term memory 
performance (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Otani et al., 1997), the VSTM advantage for faces and other 
objects of expertise remained intact. In fact, the results of this experiment are similar to those 
obtained in Experiment 4; car experts, when given sufficient encoding time, demonstrated a 
greater VSTM capacity and inversion effect for cars than did car novices.  Novice performance 
was also consistent across Experiments 4 and 5, with novices once again demonstrating greater 
VSTM for faces than cars when given sufficient encoding time. These results provide evidence 
that the greater VSTM capacity for faces among car experts does not rely on a contribution from 
verbal working memory.   
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The performance level in general was similar across Experiments 4 and 5 with the only 
difference being an increase in performance for upright and inverted faces, suggesting that there 
was no general cost to VSTM performance due to increasing the articulatory suppression load. 
The absence of a measurable effect of this manipulation on performance makes it difficult to 
ascertain if the manipulation actually impacted participants’ potential to utilize verbal working 
memory capacity. However, a number of findings in the literature suggest that this load 
manipulation should have impacted verbal working memory capacity (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; 
Otani et al., 1997).  In addition, the lack of an effect of this increase in verbal load on the VSTM 
task is predicted by Baddeley and Hitch’s model of working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974). Their model suggests that the only capacities shared by visual and verbal short-
term memory systems are at an executive level, and it is conceivable that rehearsing two digits 
compared to three words would not require a discernable difference in executive resources. 
Recent findings are consistent with a lack of a measurable cost to executive resources under 
some rehearsal load conditions (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Otani et al., 1997). Therefore, the absence 
of a measurable effect of the increase in articulatory suppression load on performance in the 
VSTM is not unexpected if participants are not utilizing verbal memory to aid their performance 
in the VSTM task. 
Interestingly, the correlation between an observer’s level of car expertise and their VSTM 
for cars with sufficient encoding time (4000 ms) was even stronger in this study compared to that 
reported in Experiment 4.  It is possible that a small proportion of participants in Experiment 4 
did adopt a verbal strategy and thus when this strategy was no longer available performance 
more strongly reflected the effects of one’s visual expertise with cars. 
It is important to note that it is possible that the knowledge of a label for a stimulus may 
change the manner in which it is processed in the VSTM task, regardless of whether or not the 
label is explicitly accessed or used to aid recall.  However, if one assumes a common underlying 
cause for the VSTM advantage demonstrated for faces and for cars among car experts, as 
suggested by the similar qualitative and quantitative nature of these two effects, then the 
presence of this advantage for unfamiliar faces with no known labels provides evidence against 
this account. Notably, since only familiar categories were used, all stimuli could be labeled at 
some level. For example, even car novice could label each of the cars as ‘car’, just as each of the 
unfamiliar faces could be labeled as ‘face’. However, even if one argues that the presence of the 
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VSTM advantage relies on the knowledge of individuating labels for the items, the presence of 
this effect for unfamiliar faces is inconsistent with this account. 
While the expert VSTM advantage does not appear to depend on a contribution from 
verbal short-term memory, it is possible that experts are better able to recruit LTM as an 
alternative resource. This could provide another potential explanation for their greater VSTM 
capacity compared to novices.  Car experts may be better able to recruit or establish LTM 
memory representations that can contribute to performance in VSTM tasks.  Experiment 6 
explores this possibility.  
 
Experiment 6 
Studies of expert memory with chess experts suggest that LTM can play an important 
role in the apparent increase in experts’ functional VSTM capacity for meaningful configurations 
of chess pieces (Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 1998). Chess experts were found to 
have a superior memory for chess positions, sometimes even recalling the position of entire 
chess boards (around 25 pieces) from briefly (5 seconds) presented games (Chase & Simon, 
1973).  However, they were only able to recall around five pieces from randomly arranged 
boards, which was no better than novices’ memory for chess pieces.  Gobet and Simon (1998) 
suggest that chess experts use LTM to support their apparently larger functional VSTM capacity 
by storing pointers in VSTM to larger “chunks” of pieces stored in LTM. This account of chess 
experts’ memory is similar to that describing expert memory more generally: Ericsson and 
colleagues suggested that the superior memory of experts depends on the deliberate recruitment 
of elaborate memory structures that allow for the chunking and indexing of information in LTM 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). This is proposed to allow for rapid and efficient retrieval of 
information from LTM in short-term memory tasks. With enough practice, functional short-term 
memory capacity can be increased by as much as 1000% (Ericsson et al., 1980). Therefore, the 
storage of larger memory chunks and the use of representations in long-term memory may allow 
experts to maximize the use of the limited object “slots” in VSTM by effectively increasing the 
amount of information that is associated with each slot (Vogel et al., 2001). 
The large stimulus sets (72 items per category) used in Experiments 4 & 5 may also have 
encouraged participants to rely on information in LTM. Each item would have appeared 
infrequently (less than once in every 10 trials), and thus the relative familiarity of the probe 
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could serve as a useful cue to aid performance. Therefore, the VSTM advantage for faces, and 
for cars among car experts, may rely on an interaction between LTM and expertise, with experts 
better able to utilize information about the familiarity of an item within the study. Such an 
interaction could result from experts’ superior ability at distinguishing exemplars, increasing the 
reliability of familiarity cues. Therefore, it is possible that if these familiarity cues were no 
longer useful the difference between expert and novice VSTM would be eliminated. 
It is important to note that an influence of LTM on expert performance, in at least some 
form, cannot be denied as expertise by its very nature is a product of long-term learning that 
likely affects many different levels of processing from perception to recognition. In addition, 
almost all models of working memory acknowledge that this system does not operate in isolation 
(Barnard, 1999; Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Kieras, Meyer, Mueller, & Seymour, 1999; 
Schneider, 1999; Young & Lewis, 1999), with numerous models even suggesting that the 
contents of short-term memory are merely the contents of LTM currently activated (Cowan, 
1999; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Lovett, Reder, & Lebiere, 1999; Norman, 1968; O'Reilly, 
Braver, & Cohen, 1999). However, an important question is whether the expert VSTM 
advantage demonstrated in the previous experiments in this dissertation depends on a more direct 
use of LTM such as described in the accounts of expert memory proposed by Ericsson and 
colleagues (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). Therefore, in addition to exploring the contribution of 
familiarity cues to the expert VSTM advantage, Experiment 6 also aims to address the question 
as the whether this advantage relies on the use of stimulus-specific representations in LTM. 
If the VSTM advantage for objects of expertise relies on a difference in familiarity 
between foils and true probes, this advantage should disappear when a small stimulus set is used, 
as the build-up of proactive interference should eliminate most, if not all, of a participant’s 
ability to rely on the relative strength of traces in LTM to distinguish foils from probes. That is, 
representations of all the items in the stimulus set should be similarly active in LTM, leading to 
confusion if one was to rely on familiarity cues from long-term memory to distinguish foils from 
true probes. In addition, if the VSTM advantage for faces, and cars among car experts, relies 
more generally on the creation of stimulus-specific LTM representations, then VSTM capacity 
should be reduced if the stimulus set is replaced by an entirely new set of items. These 
predictions are explored in Experiment 6, in which the stimulus set is reduced to just 10 items, so 
each stimulus would appear on average in a little more than once in every second trial, thus 
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providing conditions for a considerable build-up of proactive interference.  In addition, after 
participants complete two-thirds of the total number of trials the stimulus set is replaced by 10 
new items to explore the extent to which VSTM performance relies on stimulus-specific 
representations for items in the stimulus set.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 36 employees, undergraduate students, or graduate students of 
Vanderbilt University, or members of the surrounding Nashville community. Participants were 
compensated $10 per hour for their time.  All participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision and reported having either extensive or very little experience identifying models of cars.  
All participants completed an updated version of the subordinate-level car-matching task to 
measure their expertise with cars.  A version of the expertise measure with newer models cars 
(1998-2000 compared to 1995-1998 models used in the previous car expertise test) was used.  
This was done to better match the stimuli in the expertise test with those in the VSTM task. In 
every other aspect the expertise task was the same as that used for Experiment 1 and 2 in this 
chapter (see APPENDIX D).  Pilot data showed that the two car expertise measures were highly 
correlated.  Eighteen (13 male) participants (age M = 25.3, SD = 4.54, car d’ M =  2.84, bird d’ 
M = 1.02) met our criteria for car expertise, with the remaining 18 (8 male) classified as novices 
(age M = 27.2, SD = 8.36, car d’ M =0.70, bird d’ M = 0.83). Once again, participants’ self-
report of their skill at recognizing cars was generally consistent with their performance on the 
subordinate car matching task, with participants meeting the criteria for expertise on the task 
rating themselves an average of 8.42/10; those who were classified as novices rated their skills, 
on average, as 3.58/10. 
 
Stimuli. The stimuli were 40 images of faces (1.9° x 2.3°) and 40 profile views of modern cars 
(2.3° x 1.5°).  All images were grayscale, and cropped and scaled in the same way as those used 
in Experiments 2-5.  
 
Design & Procedure. The design and procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 2, except 
the set size was held constant at 5 items, the items were always upright, and only two different 
presentation durations (500 ms, 4000 ms) were used.  Participants performed 6 blocks of 36 trials 
 55 
for each category (faces, cars) resulting in a total of 432 trials. Trials for each category were 
performed in two separate (216 trial) sessions, with the order of the session counterbalanced 
across expert and novice groups. Twenty faces and 20 cars were randomly selected for each 
participant to appear in the VSTM task. Stimuli presented in the first 4 blocks of the VSTM task 
for each category were selected from a smaller set of only ten images.  After performing these 
trials the stimulus set was changed to a new set of ten images from the same category. As a result 
of the smaller stimulus set each item would appear on average in every one in two trials, and thus 
could even occur in sequential trials. Twenty of the faces and 20 cars were used as foils in a 
same/different recognition task completed at the end of session 2.  Participants performed this 
recognition task for only faces or cars depending on which session they completed last.  This was 
done to ensure that the recognition task was a surprise.  In this component, participants viewed a 
series of 40 faces or cars and made a key press to indicate whether or not the item appeared in 
the VSTM task.  Each image remained on the screen until the participant made a response.  
 
Analysis. The analysis procedure was similar to that used in Experiments 1 & 2.  Data from two 
participants were removed from the analysis due to poor performance in the auditory task. 
Accuracy for this component exceeded 91% for all other participants. The data from the first 
two-thirds of the experiment were grouped separately from the data from the last third for which 
a new stimulus set was used. For each participant, hit rate and correct rejection rate were 
calculated for each condition in each of these bins.  These values were used to derive VSTM 
capacity using Cowan’s K, an estimate of the number of objects successfully encoded in VSTM 
(Cowan, 2001). Data from one participant (novice) were excluded due to poor performance in 
the visual working memory task (K< 1 for faces).  This resulted in data from 18 novices and 18 
experts being included in the final analysis. Data from one participant in the recognition memory 
task were not used as there was a technical failure that occurred mid-way through this 
component. 
 
Results 
The use of a smaller stimulus set and the change of stimulus set failed to eliminate the 
VSTM advantage demonstrated for objects within one’s domain of expertise (Figure 11). To 
summarize the results, only performance among car novices in the long presentation duration 
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condition was impacted by the change in stimulus set, with VSTM for cars in this condition 
dropping significantly.  As in Experiment 4 & 5, VSTM capacity for faces exceeded that for cars 
among novices for both pre- and post-change stimulus sets, providing the presentation duration 
was long enough to allow sufficient encoding (4000 ms). Face and car VSTM did not differ 
among car experts in both pre- and post- change stimulus set conditions, regardless of 
presentation duration. In addition, the VSTM advantage for cars among car experts, compared to 
car novices, was apparent in the post-change stimulus set condition once the presentation 
duration was sufficiently long, although this difference failed to reach significance in the pre-
change stimulus set condition. Consistent with the stronger expertise effects in the post-change 
stimulus set condition, the correlation between a participant’s level of car expertise and their 
VSTM for cars when the memory array was presented for 4000 ms was only significant for the 
post-change stimulus set condition (Figure 11). These results were not explained by a difference 
in response times between upright and inverted faces and cars (see APPENDIX G). Performance 
in a surprise recognition test revealed better recognition memory in general for faces (Figure 12).  
In addition, consistent with the drop in performance for cars among novices after the stimulus set 
was changed, car novices had poorer memory for post-change cars, although equivalent memory 
for pre-change cars compared to car experts.  
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Comparing VSTM for faces and cars among car experts and novices.  To test for an increase in 
performance due to experience with the images, trials from the first 2/3s of the experiment were 
divided into two bins. A 2 (category; faces, cars) x 2 (presentation duration; 500 ms, 4000 ms) x 
2 (block; first 1/3, second 1/3) x 2 (car expertise groups; expert, novice) ANOVA found no main 
effect or interaction with order (all ps>.229). Data from the first two sections were combined for 
the subsequent analyses. 
A 2 (category; faces, cars) x 2 (presentation duration; 500 ms, 4000 ms) x 2 (stimulus set; 
pre-change, post-change) x 2 (car expertise groups; expert, novice) ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of presentation duration, F(1,34)=177.87, p≤.0001, and the effect of category, 
F(1,34)=3.47,p=.071, and expertise, F(1,34)=3.92, p≤.056, approached significance.  There was 
no main effect of changing the stimulus set (F<1). The interactions between expertise and 
category, F(1,34)=1.25, p=.272, expertise and presentation duration, F(1,34)=2.35, p=.135 were 
Figure 11. The maximum number of upright faces or cars (K-max) in visual short-term 
memory (VSTM) before and after a stimulus set change. Participants had performed 140 trials 
with the same small (10 item) stimulus set before the stimulus set was switched and they 
performed 70 additional trials. Participants were either car experts or novices and the memory 
array was presented for 500 ms or 4000 ms. Only novice VSTM performance with cars in the 
4000 ms presentation duration condition was influenced by the change in stimulus set. Error 
bars represent pooled standard error values. 
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not significant. However, consistent with the predicted results there was an interaction between 
category and presentation duration, F(1,34)=5.20, p=.029, and category, presentation duration 
and expertise, F(1,34)=6.89, p=.013, with the effect of presentation duration on VSTM capacity 
generally greater for faces than cars, although the effect of presentation duration on car VSTM 
was greater among cars experts than car novices. Interestingly, there was also an interaction 
between presentation duration, expertise, and stimulus set, F(1,34)=4.36, p=.044, with VSTM 
performance at the longest presentation duration decreasing after the stimulus set was changed 
among novices but not experts. The interaction between category, stimulus set and expertise 
approached significance, F(1,34)=3.34, p=.076, with novices tending to experience a reduction in 
car VSTM performance while VSTM performance among car experts appeared to be unaffected 
by the change in stimulus set. The interaction between category, duration, expertise group, and 
order was not significant F<1, nor was any other interaction with stimulus set (all ps>.313).  
 
Comparing VSTM for faces among car experts and novices. A 2 (presentation duration; 500 ms, 
4000 ms) x 2 (stimulus set; pre-change, post-change) x 2 (car expertise groups; expert, novice) 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of presentation duration, F(1,34)=135.50, p≤.0001, but no effect 
of stimulus set (F<1) or car expertise, F(1,34)=1.00, p=.324.  In addition, no interactions between 
presentation duration and/or expertise and/or stimulus set were significant (all ps>.1960). 
 
Comparing VSTM for cars among car experts and novices. A 2 (presentation duration; 500 ms, 
4000 ms) x 2 (stimulus set; pre-change, post-change) x 2 (car expertise groups; expert, novice) 
ANOVA revealed main effects of presentation duration, F(1,34)=73.39, p≤.0001, and car 
expertise, F(1,34)=4.30, p=.046, but no order (F<1).  In addition, there was an interaction 
between presentation duration and expertise, F(1,34)=8.19, p=.0.0072, with car experts only 
demonstrating a VSTM advantage for cars with a sufficiently long presentation duration. The 
interaction between presentation duration, expertise and stimulus set, F(1,34)=3.37, p=.075, 
approached significance,  with car novices VSTM performance dropping after the change in 
stimulus set while car experts performance showed a slight increase.  
 
Planned comparisons. Planned two-tailed t-tests exploring the effect of the change of stimulus 
set on VSTM capacity revealed that VSTM among car experts for both cars, 500 ms, t(17)=1.32, 
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p=.205, 4000 ms, t<1,  and faces, 500 ms, t(17)=1.28 p=.218, 4000 ms, t<1,  regardless of 
presentation duration, was unaffected by the change in stimulus set.  Among novices, VSTM 
performance was only reduced for cars at the long presentation duration, 4000 ms, t(17)=2.16 
p=.045, 500 ms, t<1, with face VSTM performance unaffected by the change in stimulus set 
regardless of presentation duration, 4000 ms, t<1, 500 ms, t(17)=1.21 p=.241.   
In addition, planned one-tailed t-tests assessing the presence of a VSTM advantage for 
experts revealed that VSTM for upright faces exceeded that for upright cars among car novices 
providing the presentation duration was sufficiently long (4000 ms) regardless of stimulus set 
(pre-change, 500 ms, t(17)=1.24 p=.883; 4000 ms, t(17)=2.08, p=.027; post-change, 500 ms, t<1; 
4000 ms, t(17)=3.18, p=.0027),  however VSTM for cars and faces did not differ among car 
experts for either stimulus set regardless of presentation duration (pre-change, 500 ms, 
t(17)=1.32 p=.103; 4000 ms, t<1; post-change, 500 ms, t<1; 4000 ms, t<1). Consistent with the 
need for sufficient encoding time in order for novices to show an advantage for faces over cars, a 
VSTM advantage for cars among car experts compared to car novices only emerged in the 4000 
ms presentation duration condition for the post-change stimulus set (500 ms, t<1; 4000 ms, 
t(34)=3.50, p=.0007). Surprisingly, this advantage for cars among car experts failed to reach 
significance regardless of presentation duration for the pre-change stimulus set (500 ms, t<1; 
4000 ms, t(34)=1.29, p=.103), although there was a trend for such an effect in the long 
presentation duration condition. 
 
Correlation between car expertise and VSTM for cars and faces. As in Experiments 1 & 2 there 
was a significant correlation between K-max for cars when the memory array was presented for 
4000 ms and participants sensitivity for cars in the car expertise measure, but only for the post-
change stimulus set (pre-change, r=.226, p=.185, post-change, r=.509, p=.0015). Notably, 
participants’ level of car expertise was not correlated with their VSTM for faces for either the 
pre- (pre-change, r=.014, p=.935, post-change, r=.053, p=.760) stimulus sets. The general pattern 
of results was the same for correlations between the delta d’ score (i.e. car d’ – bird d’) and K-
max with a 4000 ms presentation duration for cars (pre-change, r=.202, p=.236, post-change, 
r=.452, p=.006) (Figure 12 A and C) and  faces (r=.028, p=.870) or post- change (r=.074, 
p=.667) (Figure 12 B and D). 
 
 60 
 
 
Recognition memory performance. A 2 (Category; faces, cars) x 2 (stimulus set; old, new) x 2 
(car expertise group; expert, novice) ANOVA found main effects of category, F(1,31)=4.59, 
p=.040, but not stimulus set  (F<1) or expertise (F<1). There was also an interaction between 
category and expertise, F(1,31)=5.05, p=.032, with Scheffé tests revealing that car novices have 
better memory for faces than cars, while car experts’ memory did not differ across the categories. 
There was an interaction between category, expertise group, and stimulus set, F(1,31)=6.56, 
p=.016. Scheffé tests revealed that car novices, relative to car experts, had worse memory for the 
Figure 12.  Scatter plot of individuals’ car expertise scores (Car d’ – Bird d’) and their K-max for 
cars (A) pre- and (C) post- stimulus set switch and for faces (B) pre- and (D) post stimulus set 
switch with a 4000 ms presentation duration.  There was a significant correlation between a 
participant’s level of car expertise and their VSTM capacity for cars in the pre- but not post- 
stimulus switch condition. VSTM with faces was not correlated with level of car expertise, 
regardless of condition.  
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post-change cars (p=.001) but equivalent memory for the pre-change cars (p=.190), while they 
had better memory for the post-change faces (p=.0001) but equivalent memory for the pre-
change faces (p=.159), see Figure 13.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
In contrast with suggestions that LTM contributes heavily to expert VSTM performance, 
the expertise advantage was not eliminated by the build-up of proactive interference expected 
from the use of a small stimulus set.  This suggests that the expertise advantage does not rely on 
the more efficient use of familiarity information present when study items repeat infrequently. 
Further support for the limited role of LTM in contributing to the expert VSTM advantage is the 
absence of any detectable cost to expert performance when the stimulus set is replaced by an 
entirely different set of items after a period of learning. VSTM for cars among car novices at the 
longest presentation duration was the only condition to be significantly impacted by the change 
Figure 13. Recognition performance for cars and faces in the pre- and post- change stimulus 
sets among car experts and novices in the surprise old/new recognition task.  There was a 
general advantage for faces.  Car novices had worse memory for post-change cars, but better 
memory for post-change faces compared to experts.  However, car experts and novices had 
equivalent memory for faces and cars in the pre-change stimulus set. Error bars represent 
pooled standard error values. 
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in stimulus set. Therefore, these results suggest that the expert VSTM advantage does not depend 
on a contribution from LTM. 
Alternatively, it is possible that car experts do rely on LTM to support their VSTM 
advantage for objects within their domain of expertise, but they were not affected by the change 
in stimulus set in Experiment 6 because they already had establish LTM representations for the 
cars in both the pre- and post-change stimulus sets. In contrast, novices—who were presumably 
less familiar with the cars—were influenced by the additional exposure to the cars in the pre-
change set as it provided a greater opportunity to establish and rely on representations in LTM. 
Therefore, the drop in VSTM among novices reflects the extent to which the novices were 
relying on representation created during the first section of the experiment. However, this 
account would have predicted that VSTM for the unfamiliar faces would have incurred a cost 
due to the change in stimulus set, as participants could not have had pre-existing representation 
of these faces in LTM. This explanation would have also predicted that novice’s VSTM for cars, 
and also VSTM for the unfamiliar faces more generally, would have increased from the first to 
the second half of the pre-change trials, which it did not. Therefore, the use of pre-existing 
representations in LTM by experts cannot account for the pattern of results found in Experiment 
6. 
Another possibility is that experts can create LTM representations more rapidly than 
novices due to a more established representational space for exemplars within their domain of 
expertise (Palmeri, Wong, & Gauthier, 2004). More specifically, experts may be able to more 
optimally map objects onto learned categories or identities due to their extensive experience. If 
experts can rapidly establish LTM representations for new items, any cost due to the change in 
stimulus set may be minimal and washed out in the numerous trials (~30 per set size) required to 
calculate a reliable estimate of VSTM capacity. In contrast, if novices develop LTM 
representations more slowly, they would demonstrate a larger cost due to the change in stimulus 
set. This possibility is difficult to address due to the limited frequency at which VSTM 
performance can be sampled reliably, making the monitoring of changes in VSTM performance 
on a finer temporal scale almost impossible with this paradigm. However contrary to novices’ 
actual performance, this account would have predicted that their performance would have 
increased during the pre-change stimulus set condition. In addition, performance in the old/new 
recognition task also is inconsistent with this account of the results; memory for cars failed to 
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differ across the pre-change and post-change stimulus sets for either the expert or novice groups.  
This suggests that if there is a difference in the speed with which the two groups can establish 
LTM representations, it cannot account for the drop in performance among car novices for the 
post-change stimulus set.  
Despite the drop in VSTM performance for cars among car novices with the change in 
stimulus set, it is questionable whether this reflects a use of LTM representations to increase 
VSTM performance in the pre-change condition by novices. As mentioned above, participants 
failed to show the increase in VSTM performance after exposure to the items that would be 
expected if LTM representations were used to facilitate VSTM performance: Performance during 
the first 72 trials in the study, during which each of the 10 items appeared approximately 40 
times, did not differ from that during the second set of 72 trials with the same stimulus set. 
Instead, this cost to performance with the change in stimulus set might reflect interference from 
the previous set of stimuli. More specifically, consistent with the characteristic processing style 
of novices discussed in CHAPTER I, the cost incurred to novice VSTM performance may reflect 
the recruitment of a rigid feature-based strategy in which the cars are identified by a single 
salient feature. The salient feature chosen is likely to be task- and stimulus-specific, with the 
salience and relative usefulness of a feature as a memory cue critically depending on the features 
of the other items in the stimulus set. Such a strategy could be quite effective for a small specific 
stimulus set. However, a stimulus specific strategy would presumably show very poor transfer to 
a new stimulus set, thus providing a potential explanation for the cost to novice performance 
with the change in stimulus set. Costs due to similarly inflexible memory representations have 
been documented in the literature (Finke, 1989; Reed, 1974). In contrast, a more holistic strategy 
believed to be recruited for faces by both experts and novices, and for cars among car experts, 
would transfer equally well to a new stimulus set. Therefore, the drop in car VSTM performance 
among novices after the stimulus set was changed may reflect a cost due to interference rather 
than the elimination of facilitation from their experience with the items. 
Consistent with the benefits of a small stimulus set for novices, when the memory array 
was presented for 4000 ms VSTM for cars among experts and novices in the pre-change stimulus 
set did not differ significantly, nor was there a correlation between car expertise and VSTM 
capacity. These results are in contrast with those from Experiment 4 and 5 in which a 
considerably larger stimulus set was used. Therefore, the presence of an expert VSTM advantage 
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may depend on a sufficiently large stimulus set and/or minimal exposure to the items within a 
set, thereby preventing novices from using stimulus-specific compensatory strategies to increase 
their VSTM performance. 
It has been suggested that memory experts, such as digit span experts, may be able to 
overcome the influence of proactive interference by employing one of two strategies (Ericsson & 
Kintsch, 1995).  In some cases, the most recently stored item can be distinguished based on its 
temporal context. It is unlikely that this temporal information would be sensitive enough to be 
reliable under conditions such as those in Experiment 6; items frequently appeared in 
consecutive trials (a little more than a few seconds apart at times) and subjects performed 144 of 
such trials within a half hour period. Alternatively, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) suggested that 
experts can minimize proactive interference by generating multiple unique meaningful 
associations for the same chunk of information.  Once again, while the digits typically used in 
Ericsson’s studies can be easily encoded as a running time, a zip code, or a birthday, such 
reliable alternative encoding strategies that could differentiate unfamiliar faces at the individual 
level are unlikely to be as easy to implement. Presumably this would be especially true under 
conditions such as those in Experiment 6 where each stimulus repeats between 40 – 80 times, 
and thus a large number of different reliable alternative encoding strategies would have to be 
generated in order to avoid proactive interference. Therefore, it is unlikely that participants could 
have used the strategies suggested by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) to successfully overcome the 
effects of the build-up of proactive interference in Experiment 6. 
Experiments 5 & 6 have addressed the potential role of a contribution from other 
complex cognitive systems such as verbal or long-term memory, but have overlooked another 
alternative account for the differences in VSTM performance for expert and novice categories 
and for the greater benefit of additional encoding time for items within ones domain of expertise. 
A difference in the physical strategy (e.g., the pattern of eye-movements) employed to gather the 
information within a study array could potentially account for the performance of experts and 
novices and also the influence of encoding time on VSTM performance. Experiment 7 explores 
this possibility.  
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Experiment 7 
It is possible that the VSTM advantage for categories of expertise may rely on strategic 
differences unrelated to holistic processing, such as a difference in the eye movements strategies 
employed by expert and novice observers.  For example, a non-expert observer may make a 
rapid series of fixations to each of the stimuli in the study array and continue to repeat this 
sequences while the study array remains present.  This might be a strategy adopted when viewing 
multiple objects that are difficult to distinguish, as it is likely to facilitate the detection of 
differences between the stimuli. In contrast, the items may be easier to distinguish for an expert 
observer and thus they may view the items in the array more deliberately, maintaining fixation 
on a particular item until enough information is extracted for a complete representation. If true, 
this difference in eye-movement strategies would provide an alternative account for the data in 
Experiments 4 and 5: non-expert items would be advantaged at short presentation durations 
because more items could be viewed in the limited time. The representation of these rapidly 
viewed items might be less complete or robust compared to the representations created with 
longer viewing fixations of fewer items by expert observers. Longer presentation durations may 
allow expert observers to reap the benefits of longer fixations times, leading to an advantage for 
expert-category items when sufficient encoding time is allowed. The trade-off between fixation 
duration and the number of items viewed may favor short fixation durations for shorter 
presentations but longer fixation durations when encoding time is less limited. 
If this is the case, the advantage shown for faces should disappear when participants who 
are car novices are required to adopt the same pattern of eye movements for faces and cars. This 
prediction is tested in Experiment 7 by comparing VSTM for study arrays of faces and cars 
presented either simultaneously or sequentially. In addition to exploring the trade-off between 
fixation length and number of fixations for a given encoding time, two different sequential 
presentation conditions were also compared; items in the study arrays were either encoded 
during one or two separate fixations with the total presentation time held constant.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 29 (16 female) employees, undergraduate students, or graduate 
students of Vanderbilt University, or members of the surrounding Nashville community.  All 
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision (age M = 23.48, SD = 3.84). Participants 
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were compensated $10 per hour for their time. To ensure all subjects were novices, participants’ 
expertise with cars was measured as in Experiments 1. Two participants were excluded as they 
met the criteria for car expertise. 
 
Stimuli. Stimuli were 10 grayscale faces (1.9° x 2.3°) from the Max-Planck Institute for 
Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany and ten profile views of modern cars (2.3° x 
1.5°). 
 
Design & Procedure. The design and procedure were similar to that used in Experiment 6.  Once 
again the set size was held constant at 5 items and only upright faces and cars were displayed. 
Unlike Experiment 6, three different presentation durations (1000 ms, 2000 ms, 4000 ms) were 
used.  Participants performed 7 blocks of 36 trials for each category (faces, cars) resulting in a 
total of 504 trials.  Trials for each category were performed in two separate (252 trial) sessions, 
with the order of the sessions counterbalanced across subjects.  The study items were presented 
either simultaneously or sequentially.  If the items appeared sequentially, the items would appear 
in the same locations as in the simultaneous presentation conditions starting from the lower right 
location. Participants were informed of this order during the instruction period, and were told to 
move their eyes to each item as it appeared and to maintain their gaze there until the next item 
appeared (between 200 ms – 800 ms).  In the trials where the items appeared sequentially, this 
sequence was either presented once (‘Sequential 1’) or twice (‘Sequential 2’), with the total 
presentation time for the study array being equivalent to the presentation durations in the 
simultaneous conditions (i.e. 1000 ms, 2000 ms, or 4000 ms).   For example if the total 
presentation duration was 4000 ms, in the ‘Sequential 1’ condition the presentation interval for 
each item was 800 ms, whereas in the ‘Sequential 2’ condition each items appeared for two 400 
ms intervals. Due to the fundamental limitations of the visual system in terms of the time 
required to make a saccade, the ‘Sequential 2’ condition with a total duration of 1000 ms (100 
ms/item) was not included in the design. 
 
Analysis. The analysis procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1-6, where the hit rate 
and correct rejection rate were calculated for each condition to derive VSTM capacity using 
Cowan’s K. Data from three participants were removed from the analysis due to generally poor 
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performance for faces in the VSTM task (average K<1).  Accuracy for the auditory component 
exceeded 95% for all remaining participants.   
 
Results  
To summarize the results, the VSTM advantage for faces over cars among car novices 
was not affected by restricting participants eye-movements, as participants still demonstrated a 
VSTM advantage for faces, providing there was sufficient encoding time regardless of whether 
they viewed the items simultaneously, and thus were free to adopt any eye-movement strategy, 
or if the items were viewed sequentially in a fixed order and for a fixed amount of time (Figure 
14).  However, there was a general reduction in VSTM performance when participants viewed 
the items over two short fixations compared to one longer fixation equivalent in length to the 
sum of the two presentations. These results were not explained by a difference in response times 
between upright and inverted faces and cars (see APPENDIX H). 
To provide a stringent test of whether presentation format impacted the VSTM advantage 
for faces, the data from each presentation format condition were first analyzed separately in 
separate 2 (category; faces, cars) x 3 (presentation duration; 1000 ms, 2000 ms, 4000 ms) 
ANOVAs for the simultaneous and Sequential 1 conditions, and in a 2 (category; faces, cars) x 2 
(presentation duration; 2000 ms, 4000 ms) for the Sequential 2 condition. As expected from the 
results of Experiment 1 & 2, there was a main effect of category, F(1,28)=8.12, p=.0081,  and 
presentation duration, F(2,56)=23.54, p≤.0001,  and an interaction between category and 
presentation duration, F(2,56)=4.17, p=.021,  for trials in which the study array was presented 
simultaneously. Planned paired t-tests found no advantage for faces with 1000 ms (t<l), but an 
advantage with 2000 ms, t(28)=3.95, p=.025, and 4000 ms encoding time, t(28)=2.42, p=.022.  
Similarly, when the study array was presented sequentially just once, there was also a main 
effect of category, F(1,28)=4.40, p=.045,  and presentation duration, F(2,56)=24.35, p≤.0001,  
and an interaction between category and presentation duration, F(2,56)=4.13, p=.021. Planned 
paired t-tests found no advantage for faces with 1000 ms, t(28)=1.39, p=.018, but an advantage 
with 2000 ms, t(28)=2.4, p=.023, and 4000 ms encoding time, t(28)=2.31, p=.0283.  When 
presentation of the study array was divided into two sequential loops, there was still a main 
effect of presentation duration, F(1,28)=28.89, p≤.0001, however the main effect of category, 
F(1,28)=3.14, p=.087,  and interaction between category and presentation duration, 
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F(1,28)=3.15, p=0.087, approached significance. Planned paired t-tests found no advantage for 
faces with 2000 ms (t<1), but an advantage in the 4000 ms presentation duration condition, 
t(28)=2.36, p=.0253. The weakening of these effects for trials in which the study array 
presentation was divided over two loops may be due to the general drop in performance for both 
cars and faces in this condition.  
To explore possible interactions with presentation format, a 2(category; faces, cars) x 2 
(presentation duration; 2000 ms, 4000 ms) x 2 (presentation format: simultaneous, sequential 1) 
was conducted.  The sequential 2 condition was not included in this analysis as every condition 
was not represented in this presentation format. Main effects of category, F(1,28)=10.97, 
p=.0026, presentation duration, F(2,56)=57.94, p≤.0001, and presentation format F(1,28)=7.12, 
p=.0125, were observed,  with better VSTM performance for faces, longer total presentation 
durations, and for the simultaneous presentation format. There was no interaction between 
presentation format and category, F(1,28)=1.98, p=.170, or presentation duration (F<1). 
Importantly, there was an interaction between category and presentation duration, F(2,56)=6.86, 
p=.0022, although this did not interact with presentation format (F<1) suggesting that VSTM for 
faces was greater than that for cars regardless of presentation format providing there was 
sufficient encoding time.  
To more directly examine a potential trade-off between the number of fixations and the 
length of fixation an ANOVA comparing the sequential 1 and sequential 2 presentation formats 
(the 1000 ms presentation duration condition was not included in this analysis as there was not a 
corresponding presentation duration in the sequential 2 condition) found main effects of 
category, F(1,28)=14.11, p=.0008, presentation duration, F(1,28)=42.11, p≤.000, with better 
VSTM performance for faces and for longer total presentation durations. There was also a main 
effect of presentation format, F(1,28)=11.51, p=.0021, with a single longer fixation resulting in 
better performance than two shorter durations this appeared to be especially true with shorter 
total presentation duration although the interaction between total presentation duration and 
presentation format did not reach significance, F(1,28)=2.45, p=.129.  
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Discussion 
The finding of a VSTM capacity advantage for faces compared to cars among car 
novices, regardless of whether the study array was presented simultaneously or sequentially, 
suggests that the VSTM advantage for faces and other expert categories does not rely on a 
difference in the pattern of eye movements employed during the encoding of the study array. 
However, shortening the total presentation duration by requiring participants to make an 
additional set of saccades to each item did result in a general cost to performance.  This result 
suggests that if given the same total viewing time, an eye movement strategy that favors longer, 
but fewer, fixations would result in better VSTM performance providing the fixations were 
sufficiently short to still allow each object in the study array to be fixated.  
The approximately equivalent performance in the ‘sequential 1’ and simultaneous 
presentation conditions suggests that participants gain very little, if any, benefit from the 
Figure 14. The maximum number of faces or cars (K-max) in visual short-term memory 
(VSTM) for the 1000 ms, 2000 ms, or 4000 ms presentation duration conditions.  The study 
arrays were either presented simultaneously, in a sequential order once (sequential 1), or twice 
in the same sequential order (sequential 2). The VSTM advantage for faces was present 
regardless of whether the items were presented simultaneous or sequentially, however a single 
longer presentation generally facilitated better VSTM performance than two shorter fixations. 
Error bars represent pooled standard error values. 
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potential to encode multiple items in parallel. This is consistent with Rousselet and colleagues 
account of object encoding: Parallel processing occurs for a very brief amount of time after a 
stimulus appears to provide a crude analysis of the visual scene, but more detailed object 
processing occurs in a relatively serial fashion (Rousselet, Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2004).  The 
weak trend of a general cost in the ‘sequential 1’ compared to the simultaneous condition, may 
be due to a cost incurred by the inability to divide the encoding time to favor more difficult or 
less distinctive items that may require additional encoding time.  Therefore, these results support 
object recognition models suggesting that to extract the fine-level information required for 
identity judgments, objects must be encoded in serial. 
 
 General Discussion 
The four experiments in this chapter establish the presence of a VSTM advantage for cars 
among car experts, compared to car novices. This advantage is remarkably similar to that 
demonstrated for faces in CHAPTER II, and which is also replicated in this chapter; this 
advantage requires sufficient encoding time, is orientation-specific, and is similar in magnitude 
to the VSTM advantage for faces. In the context of the literature linking face perception with 
expert visual processing more generally, these findings are consistent with a general perceptual 
expertise mechanism underlying the VSTM advantage for faces. This advantage was not 
eliminated by the introduction of a verbal memory load previously demonstrated to have a 
significant impact on verbal short-term memory performance, suggesting that it does not rely on 
a contribution from verbal working memory (Experiment 5).  Nor was it eliminated by the use of 
a small stimulus set, which increased the potential for proactive interference, or a surprise change 
in stimulus set to eliminate advantages due to previous exposure to the images (Experiment 6).  
Finally, the VSTM advantage for objects within ones domain of expertise, in this case faces, was 
also still present when participants were required to adopt a restricted pattern of eye movements 
to encode the items in memory (Experiment 7).  Therefore, this effect is robust and evidence 
suggests that it does not depend on the recruitment of additional capacity from other memory 
systems such as verbal or long-term memory. 
The correlation between VSTM for cars and sensitivity on an established measure of 
visual expertise with cars is also consistent with a perceptual locus of the superior VSTM of car 
experts (Gauthier et al., 2003). In addition, this correlation provides indirect evidence that the 
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locus of this effect may lie more specifically with the specialized holistic processing strategy 
recruited for faces and other objects within one’s domain of expertise: this behavioral measure of 
perceptual expertise with cars is correlated with measures of holistic processing of cars (Gauthier 
et al., 2003). This measure is also correlated with the level of activity for cars in functionally 
defined face-selective cortex in the fusiform gyrus in the temporal lobe (Gauthier et al., 2000).  
Activation in these areas has also been linked to holistic processing measures (Gauthier & Tarr, 
2002). In addition, the orientation specific nature of the expert VSTM advantage is also 
consistent with a contribution from holistic processing mechanisms: the inversion effect for faces 
is a result of the disruption of access to configural information critical for holistic processing 
(Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Bruce et al., 1991; Collishaw & Hole, 2002; Kemp et al., 1990; Leder 
& Bruce, 1998, 2000; Leder et al., 2001; Murray et al., 2000; Rhodes et al., 1993; Searcy & 
Bartlett, 1996; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Thompson, 1980). Therefore, many aspects of the 
VSTM advantage for objects from one’s domain of expertise are consistent with the locus of this 
effect being with the holistic encoding strategy recruited by visual experts. 
The influence of specialized expert encoding mechanisms may also impact VSTM 
capacity by mediating which information gets retained (Olson et al., 2005). Alvarez & Cavanagh 
(2004) suggest that there is a core set of features that form the minimal representation of object 
identity, and which are always encoded regardless of task demands.  Presumably, this core set of 
features would depend on the level at which an object is first identified, for example, a vehicle 
can be identified as a car, a sedan or a Honda Accord 2002.  The level at which one first 
identifies an object shifts with experience from a basic level (e.g. car) to a subordinate level (e.g. 
Honda Accord) (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).  Conceivably, the set of core features encoded may 
change depending on one’s experience.  For example, a person who possesses expertise 
recognizing different model cars may have a core set of features that includes more diagnostic 
information than that of someone who has very little experience identifying cars.  Therefore, 
expert representations for objects could support more reliable recognition than the less diagnostic 
novice representations, providing a potential account for the difference in VSTM capacity 
between novices and experts. Future studies should probe the nature of the representations 
created by experts and novices by systematically manipulating different dimensions of the target 
and probe items. 
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In addition, holistic encoding may also result in the tighter binding of the information in 
an object representation, potentially impacting VSTM in a number of ways. Holistic 
representations may serve to better “chunk” object features together at a perceptual level and 
thus reduce the number of information units that must be stored for a given object. The 
differential impact of a face-like configuration on feature and conjunctive target searches is 
consistent with this possibility; when observers searched through triplets of up or down arcs 
organized either to form schematic faces or meaningless patterns, the face-like configuration 
facilitated the conjunction search (Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1995).  This advantage for conjunctive 
searches was only present for upright, but not inverted face configurations. Notably, the face 
configuration slowed search in the feature search condition. Therefore, holistic processing 
appears to group the constituent features into a unitized representation facilitating their 
processing as a unit, but rendering the individual features less accessible to rapid parallel search 
mechanisms (Treisman, 1982; Treisman & Gelade, 1980).   
Holistic encoding may also impact VSTM by reducing the impact of limitations in 
attentional mechanisms, required to bind information together within an object, on VSTM 
capacity.  Feature-based theories of attention suggest that VSTM is limited not only by the 
capacity of independent feature stores, but also by the capacity of attentional mechanisms 
required to maintain the binding between these features. For example, a holistic representation of 
the shape of a face may fill less shape feature ‘slots’ than a more piecemeal representation of the 
same shape information, such as that which might be used by a novice observer. Holistic 
representations may also require little or no attentional resources to maintain binding information 
compared to representations in which the features are represented more independently. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, holistic processing has been reported to occur equally well with 
and without attention (Boutet, Gentes-Hawn, & Chaudhuri, 2002), however there may be a limit 
to the number of faces that can be holistically processed simultaneously (Palermo & Rhodes, 
2002). Therefore, VSTM for faces and other objects of expertise might be less susceptible to 
attentional capacity limits rendering performance less prone to errors due to mismatching of 
features across items. 
It is important to note that the proposed advantage due to holistic processing is unlike that 
suggested to support the greater functional VSTM capacity of chess experts for meaningful chess 
configurations. An important difference between the “chunking” of information and holistic 
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processing is that the former operates over multiples objects (i.e. chess pieces) while the later 
operates within an item (e.g. a car). Similarly, Ericsson’s digit span experts develop “chunking” 
strategies that bind multiple digits together. Importantly, there is no evidence that participants are 
chunking different faces together in memory, as this would be expected to result in a large 
increase in VSTM capacity in the magnitude of that demonstrated by chess experts or digit span 
experts.  In addition, the items within chunks require ‘semantic glue’ to hold them together, for 
example one of Ericsson’s digit span experts utilizes semantic knowledge about running times to 
chunk digits together (Ericsson et al., 1980).  Consistent with the need for semantic knowledge in 
order to chunk items together in LTM, chess experts VSTM advantage breaks down for 
meaningless chess configurations (Chase & Simon, 1973). In contrast, the holistic binding that 
occurs within objects of expertise operates on unfamiliar exemplars, presumably with no or at 
most very few semantic associations, providing they fall within the domain of one’s expertise. 
Therefore, holistic processing, unlike the chunking used by Ericsson’s memory experts, operates 
more at a perceptual level rather than a semantic level and has a far more restricted range, 
operating within and not between objects.  
The difference in magnitude of the VSTM advantage demonstrated for faces, and cars 
among car experts, compared to that exhibited by Ericsson and colleagues’(Ericsson et al., 1980) 
memory experts is one of the most convincing piece of evidence suggesting that these two 
effects of expertise are qualitatively different. More specifically, while visual expertise increased 
VSTM for faces and cars among car experts by about 20-25%, Ericsson’s memory experts 
increased their functional VSTM capacity by 1000% (Ericsson et al., 1980).  Notably, the VSTM 
capacity of visual experts remains within the range of typical VSTM limits for simple objects 
(Vogel et al., 2001).  If car experts were recruiting LTM resources, Ericsson’s account would 
predict that their capacity should be far greater, easily exceeding normal VSTM capacity limits. 
Therefore, I suggest that the VSTM advantage demonstrated for items within one’s domain of 
visual expertise reflect the impact of expert perceptual processes on VSTM. In contrast, the 
VSTM advantage reported by Ericsson reflects the use of deliberate and explicit strategies 
relying on semantic information to chunk and LTM to store, what would otherwise be, 
independent objects together (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).  
An interesting question is why the advantage for faces in VSTM capacity only appears at 
presentation durations longer than 500 ms, given that differences between the neural response to 
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upright faces and inverted faces or objects occur as early as 170 ms after presentation (see 
Rossion & Gauthier, 2002 for a review). One possibility is that holistic processing already has an 
effect at 500 ms, but that its contribution cannot overcome perceptual limitations under these 
conditions (Eng et al., in press).  Alternatively, because consolidation into VSTM is capacity 
limited, it may not have sufficient time to store more objects of expertise even if more are 
perceived (Jolicoeur & Dell' Acqua, 1998). Thus, the advantage for upright faces, and upright 
cars among car experts, may only appear when there is sufficient time to complete consolidation. 
Estimates of consolidation time have been inferred to be as large as 500 ms per item (Chun & 
Potter, 1995; Jolicoeur & Dell' Acqua, 1998; Ward, Duncan, & Shapiro, 1996), although it could 
be as little as 50 ms for very simple objects (Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, in press). It is unknown 
how perceptual processing efficiency influences consolidation mechanisms—this would be a 
worthy topic for future research. However, a first step to better understand the results reported in 
this chapter would be to explore the temporal dynamics of holistic processing as it is possible 
that holistic processing may follow a different time-course than that of more feature-based 
encoding strategies. CHAPTER IV will explore this issue. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EXPLORING THE TIME-COURSE OF ENCODING UPRIGHT AND INVERTED FACES 
AND UPRIGHT CARS AMONG CAR EXPERTS AND NOVICES  
 
Introduction 
The capacity of information processing is limited at several stages along the visual 
processing pathway.  For instance, we are limited in the amount of information we can select for 
processing, the speed with which we can process and respond to this information, and the 
amount of information we can maintain in conscious awareness without external stimulation. A 
processing limitation at any one of these stages could lead to an apparent capacity difference at 
later stages. Capacity limitations at a perceptual level may be especially important, as limitations 
at this level could potentially have a cascading effect on functions in many other systems, such 
as VSTM.  For example, limitations at a perceptual level could limit both the amount of 
information that is processed in parallel and also the rate at which the information is processed.  
The studies reported in CHAPTERS II and III focused on VSTM capacity—the limitation 
of maintaining visual information in awareness in the absence of external input.  The results from 
these chapters suggest that VSTM storage is influenced by the manner in which an item is 
perceptually encoded earlier in the visual information processing pathway.  More specifically, 
the studies in CHAPTERS II and III demonstrated that a VSTM advantage exists for objects 
within one’s domain of expertise.  These studies provide consistent, but indirect, evidence that 
the specialized holistic encoding style recruited for these objects may benefit VSTM capacity.  
Crucially, it appears that the VSTM advantage for objects of expertise emerges only with 
a sufficient encoding duration.  An open question is whether the different processing strategies 
recruited by expert and novice observers result in a difference in the time-course of encoding. 
More specifically, do holistic and more feature-based encoding strategies require different 
amounts of time? One may expect expert encoding to be faster, given the superior performance 
of experts compared to novices under a wide range of conditions. However, the requirement of 
sufficient encoding time to demonstrate an expert VSTM advantage might be indicative of a 
more capacity demanding perceptual processing strategy for objects of expertise, and thus, 
counter-intuitively, encoding by experts may be slower than encoding by novices.  A third 
 76 
alternative could be that the rate of encoding does not differ between experts and novices.  This 
would suggest that the additional encoding time required by experts is merely a consequence of 
their ability to store more objects in VSTM.  That is, if experts and novices have a similar rate of 
encoding, experts would need more encoding time to reach their VSTM capacity. If a differential 
time-course exists for expert and novice encoding, it could provide insight into the underlying 
cause for the dependence of the expert VSTM advantage on sufficiently long encoding time and 
also the nature of expert processing more generally.  
This chapter first outlines the current state of knowledge about the time-course of 
processing for face and non-face objects and the factors that influence it. After the review of this 
literature, the results of two experiments comparing the time-course of expert and novice object 
encoding and recognition are reported. The results of these studies will be discussed in terms of 
the possible implications for our understanding of the temporal dynamics of expert perceptual 
processing. 
 
Time-course of object and face processing 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the term “time-course of processing” refers to the 
temporal dynamics of object processing from the moment the stimulus is presented to an 
individual to the point where recognition performance asymptotes. By its nature, this time-course 
incorporates both the time necessary for perceptual encoding and the time necessary for non-
perceptual mechanisms underlying recognition performance (e.g. semantic processing).  If one 
were interested in post-perceptual mechanisms, an appropriate design might be to keep stimulus 
presentation durations constant while varying the time limit within which participants need to 
respond. However, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the early encoding phase of this 
processing time-course. Thus, the current design will manipulate stimulus presentation duration 
rates. Since we do not have a behavioral performance measure that would give us direct access to 
this encoding stage, inferences will instead be made based on the impact of different encoding 
manipulations on subsequent object recognition performance. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the “onset time” of recognition is the encoding time required before recognition 
performance exceeds chance-level.  More specifically, this point reflects the minimum encoding 
time to detect a behavioral marker of successful encoding of an object.  Another important aspect 
of the time-course of processing is the rate at which performance approaches asymptote. This 
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rate can be inferred to reveal differences in the rate at which task-relevant information is 
accumulated.  A difference in rate may reflect either more efficient use of perceptual information 
or a faster rate of encoding.  
 
Factors that can influence the time-course of object processing 
Visual categorization tasks that require different levels of specificity have been reported 
to follow different time-courses (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 
1984; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Tanaka, Luu, Weisbrod, & Kiefer, 
1999).  However, although one might expect that more specific categorization judgments require 
more time than do less specific categorization judgments, the speed with which an item can be 
identified cannot be predicted based only the specificity of the judgment to be made; objects are 
identified first at a particular level of abstraction which is typically neither the most general nor 
the most specific possible (Rosch et al., 1976).   For example, Rosch et al. (1976) reported that 
observers are faster to label an image as a ‘dog’ (basic-level), than to say more specifically that it 
is a ‘beagle’ (subordinate-level), or more generally that it is an ‘animal’ (superordinate-level). 
This categorization level is referred to as the basic-level, and reflects the level at which most 
knowledge is organized (Rosch et al., 1976). 
According to Rosch et al. (1976), the basic-level is not arbitrary, but instead is strongly 
influenced by the structural properties of the stimulus. The basic-level is defined as the level of 
categorization at which a single mental image can be formed, category members share similar 
shape, and similar motor actions are used to interact with category members (Rosch et al., 1976).  
It has been proposed that these basic-level representations have a privileged status being the 
point of first contact for perceptual categorization judgments (Jolicoeur et al., 1984). 
Empirically, this point is referred to as the “entry-point” of recognition, as it appears to be where 
the perceptual stimulus first makes contact with representations in memory (Jolicoeur et al., 
1984).   
The slower categorization of objects at more specific (subordinate) and at more general 
(superordinate) levels than the basic-level appears to reflect limitations in different processing 
mechanisms or stages. The response time of participants to provide more superordinate labels 
than the "entry point" (e.g. ‘animal’) was related to the degree of association between the "entry 
point" concept and the superordinate label.  This was demonstrated by showing that the time to 
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provide a superordinate label after reading a basic level word was positively correlated with the 
time to provide the same superordinate-category label for the corresponding picture (Jolicoeur et 
al., 1984). Therefore, the longer processing time for superordinate categorizations appears to 
reflect limitations at a semantic, rather than perceptual, level. Consistent with the suggestion that 
the slower response times for superordinate categorizations, relative to basic-level 
categorizations, was not due to additional perceptual processing, manipulating the presentation 
duration had no effect on the time difference between verifying a basic-level and a 
superordinate-level categorization of a picture (Jolicoeur et al., 1984). In contrast, providing 
more subordinate labels (e.g. beagle) than that corresponding to the entry point of categorization 
was affected by encoding duration limitations (Jolicoeur et al., 1984). Thus, the slower response 
times for subordinate-level categorizations appear to reflect limitations at a perceptual level, as 
such categorizations require more detailed perceptual analysis. Therefore, the time-course of 
object encoding is influenced by the increasing perceptual demands that are associated with 
increasingly specific categorization judgments.  In contrast, the time-course of later post-
encoding stages of object processing, especially for superordinate judgments, appear to be 
influenced by the accessibility of semantic information. 
Neurophysiological evidence is consistent both with the suggestion of a different 
underlying cause for the increased response time for categorizations at subordinate and 
superordinate levels and with the greater perceptual demands of subordinate level 
categorizations, relative to more general categorizations.  A recent study that recorded 
electrophysiological responses while participants made visual categorization judgments at 
different levels of specificity reported that superordinate-level categorizations, compared to 
basic-level categorizations, were associated with increased amplitude of relatively late frontal 
potentials associated with the retrieval of semantic information (Tanaka et al., 1999). In addition, 
consistent with suggestions that subordinate-level categorizations require additional perceptual 
analysis, this study also reported that subordinate-level categorizations were associated with 
increased amplitude of early posterior potentials associated with visual processing, namely the 
N1 potential, relative to basic-level categorizations.  These results provide further evidence of 
the greater demands placed on perceptual mechanisms during subordinate level categorizations, 
relative to those during both superordinate- and basic-level categorizations. 
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Another factor that might affect the time-course of object processing is experience.  
However, Fabre-Thorpe et al. (2001) explored the influence of stimulus-specific experience on 
the time-course of encoding and argued against this possibility. In this study, participants were 
extensively trained with a set of images in a categorization task in which the stimuli appeared in 
a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream.  Participants were required to detect the 
presence of an animal in a briefly flashed (20 ms) scene.  In this experiment, Fabre-Thorpe et al. 
(2001) found that performance increased for only the sub-set of trained images that were difficult 
to classify at the beginning of training. However, despite this limited improvement in behavioral 
performance, across all stimuli the stimulus-specific training did not influence indices of the 
time-course of object processing at a neurophysiological level, as the ERPs in response to trained 
and novel stimuli were indistinguishable (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001). Electrophysiological 
responses to target and non-target trials could be distinguished after as little as 150 ms, 
replicating the results a previous study in which participants were not trained (Thorpe, Fize, & 
Marlot, 1996). Notably, this time frame of 150 ms approaches the hypothetical lower bound (130 
ms) for the time-course of object recognition, even if one assumes a purely feed-forward scheme 
(Allison, Puce, Spencer, & McCarthy, 1999). The authors suggested that experience could not 
compress the mechanisms and/or the time-course of visual processing.  
It is important to note that this study, as well as others that suggest a 150 ms time-course 
for object recognition, is limited by its use of a superordinate-level categorization task (finding 
an “animal” or “human” face in the picture) (e.g., Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001; Thorpe et al., 1996). 
As described above, previous work suggests that superordinate categorizations requires less 
perceptual processing than subordinate categorizations where the items have to be individuated, 
such as in the types of tasks commonly performed by visual experts. It is possible that a more 
perceptually challenging recognition task (e.g., a subordinate- rather than a superordinate- or 
basic-level categorization task that places additional demands on perceptual encoding processes) 
is required to reveal experience-based changes to the time-course of object recognition.  
In sum, the time-course of object processing has been shown to be influenced by the level 
at which objects must be identified in categorization tasks.  Participants can more readily access 
information at a basic-level, as such categorizations are not only faster than more general 
superordinate-level categorizations, but they are also faster than more specific subordinate-level 
categorizations. The slower time-course for subordinate-level categorizations reflects costs 
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associated with the greater amount of perceptual information that needs to be extracted for more 
specific recognition tasks.  Stimulus-specific training does not appear to influence the time-
course of object processing for categorizations at a superordinate-level, but previous studies have 
shown that categorizations at this level rely more on semantic information, and less on 
perceptual information, than those at the subordinate level. The full potential for experience to 
influence the time-course of object processing is unclear because, although studies using simple 
categorization tasks show little impact of experience, more perceptually demanding tasks and 
more extensive training may be required to reveal the benefits of experience. Consistent with this 
suggestion, the next section discusses evidence that experience can impact the time-course of 
more specific subordinate-level categorizations. 
 
Visual expertise and the time-course of object processing 
Although Rosch et al. (1976) emphasized the importance of structural information in 
determining the basic-level categorization of an object, they also suggested that experience may 
influence this basic-level.  They reported that one of their participants, an expert plane mechanic, 
appeared to recognize planes at a more subordinate-level.  Tanaka and Taylor (1991) explored 
this possibility further in groups of real-world experts, namely bird experts and dog experts. 
Consistent with Rosch et al.’s (1976) observation with the plane mechanic, in a category 
verification task, car and bird experts were as fast to categorize objects from their domain of 
expertise at the subordinate-level as they were to categorize these objects at the basic-level.  The 
authors suggested that the entry point of recognition may shift with expertise to a level that is 
more subordinate than the typical basic-level demonstrated among novice observers.  Thus, 
expertise appears to impact the time-course of subordinate-level categorizations. 
Equally fast subordinate- and basic-level categorization performance is considered a 
hallmark of visual expertise (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tanaka, 2001; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).  In 
fact, it has been used in expertise training paradigms as a benchmark of successful training: 
Individuals participating in lab-based expertise training paradigms with novel objects, such as 
“greebles”, are considered experts when they are as fast at identifying greebles at a basic-level 
(family) as they are at identifying them at a more subordinate-level (individual) (Gauthier & 
Tarr, 1997, 2002; Gauthier et al., 1999). Notably, lab-trained experts who have achieved this 
benchmark of visual expertise show many other general characteristics associated with real-
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world expertise (Gauthier et al., 2003; Gauthier et al., 2000), such as the greater difficulty 
recognizing aligned, relative to mis-aligned, halves of greebles or the differential recruitment of 
functionally defined face-selective areas of the brain (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et al., 
1999). 
As a test of the expertise theory of face recognition (outlined in detail in Chapter I), 
Tanaka (2001) explored the speed with which typical observers can categorize faces at 
superordinate- (“living thing”), basic- (“human”), or subordinate-levels (“Bill Clinton”).  
Consistent with an expertise account of face processing, the entry point of face recognition was 
shifted to a more subordinate level. In fact, observers were faster to verify that a face was “Bill 
Clinton” than to verify that it was “human”.  In a paradigm similar to that used by Jolicoeur et al. 
(1984), Tanaka (2001) verified that the accuracy of subordinate-level categorizations of dogs and 
birds (among novices) were substantially impacted by a reduction in encoding time (75 ms 
compared to 950 ms).  However, this same manipulation failed to impact subordinate-level 
categorizations of faces. This result provides evidence that sufficient perceptual information can 
be extracted during the first 75 ms of encoding to access identity-level representations of faces, 
but not for categories of objects for which an observer has less experience. These results were 
interpreted as reflecting the development of specialized “perceptual routines” by visual experts 
that permit them to rapidly analyze objects from the domain of expertise (Tanaka, 2001).  
The earlier availability of identity-level information for faces compared to other 
categories suggests that face processing has a temporal advantage over the processing of non-
face stimuli.  Therefore, face processing may follow a different time-course compared to the 
processing of other categories, at least in the early stages of processing. The difference in the 
amplitudes of the peaks of the N170 potentials evoked by faces and those evoked by non-face 
objects suggests that there may be important differences in relatively early perceptual processing 
stages between face and non-face object processing (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & et al., 
1996).  However, the absence of a difference in the timing of the peaks of the N170 potentials 
appears to suggest that the time-course of face and object processing do not differ.  However, 
when faces are inverted, the peak of the N170 is delayed (~10 ms) compared to that for upright 
faces (Rossion et al., 2000).  Importantly, this delay is not present for the N170 in response to 
upright relative to inverted objects, ruling out accounts of the delay involving a general cost due 
to processing images in non-canonical orientations. However, inconsistent with an expertise 
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account of this temporal advantage for upright faces, this study found no evidence of a similar 
delay for upright non-face processing relative to upright face processing. 
However, a recent ERP study using a more sensitive analysis technique provided 
evidence of a temporal advantage for face processing, relative to the processing of upright non-
face objects (Caldara et al., 2003).  This analysis involved a spatio-temporal segmentation 
procedure that aimed to define intervals where surface ERP map topographies remain stable for a 
period of time, and the points in time where they change from one stable configuration into 
another. These segments are believed to reflect different functional stages in the brain (Brandeis 
& Lehmann, 1986; Michel, Henggeler, & Lehmann, 1992).  Notably, this analysis found 
evidence that the stable segment that contained category-specific responses for face and non-face 
object stimuli occurred about 25 ms earlier for faces relative to non-face stimuli, a result not 
previously detected in analyses based only on the peak of the N170 potential (Caldara et al., 
2003).  Therefore, there is evidence that processing of non-face objects is also delayed relative to 
that for faces, although previous methods were not sensitive enough to reveal this delay. 
However, as with all comparisons between different categories of stimuli, a role of featural 
differences in producing this delay in the electrophysiological response cannot be ruled out. 
In sum, there is evidence that visual expertise may change the time-course of object 
processing resulting in faster subordinate-level categorizations of objects of expertise, relative to 
typical objects.  Given that subordinate-level categorizations require additional perceptual 
processing compared to less specific categorizations (Tanaka et al, 1999; Jolicoeur et al., 1984; 
Tanaka, 2001), the effect of expertise on subordinate-level categorizations may more specifically 
reflect an influence of expertise on the time-course of perceptual encoding. Neurophysiological 
evidence from studies recording ERPs is also consistent with expert processing being associated 
with a temporal advantage (Caldara et al., 2003; Rossion et al., 2000). However, it is unclear 
from studies demonstrating a temporal advantage for faces and object of expertise what 
processes underlies this temporal advantage. One possibility is that there is a general difference 
in the rate with which recognition approaches asymptote, whereas a second possibility is that 
there is a delay in when recognition of non-face objects begins.  Unfortunately, current 
interpretations of the influence of experience on the time-course of encoding are limited by 
temporal sampling that is too coarse (75 ms, 950 ms; Tanaka, 2001), or more general problems 
associated with comparisons across stimulus categories (Caldara et al., 2003).  A more thorough 
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mapping of the time-course of object processing, from the onset of a stimulus to when 
performance asymptotes, for both expert and novice performance, is required to better 
understand the impact of expertise on the temporal dynamics of object processing.  
The experiments in CHAPTER IV address the questions raised above regarding the 
underlying cause for the temporal advantage for face processing reported in previous studies; 
they explore whether this temporal advantage occurs at an encoding level, and if so, whether it is 
the result of a difference in the onset of recognition or rate of performance increase.  Finally, 
they explore whether patterns are similar for face and non-face objects of expertise. The studies 
in this chapter use a “structural” backward masking paradigm, where masks share features with 
the object and are presented so that they cover the location of the original object. Varying 
stimulus-mask-onset-asynchronies are used to manipulate the time available to encode a 
stimulus. The essence of these studies is to vary the time that participants are given to encode the 
study item and then to measure how performance changes as a function of the pre-mask 
encoding duration.  
To anticipate, performance in the experiments in CHAPTER IV followed an exponential 
function, with participants at chance performance at the shortest presentation duration (12 ms) 
and reaching asymptote by the longest presentation duration (1000 ms). A shifted exponential 
curve with three parameters was fitted to the data to better quantify the resulting performance 
function (Wickelgren, 1977; Wickelgren & Corbett, 1977).  The three parameters estimated from 
the data were: the intercept, or time at which the curve first rises above chance; the asymptote, or 
ultimate performance level; and rate, or rate at which the asymptote is reached (see Figure 15).  
The choice of a shifted exponential curve to fit the data was theory-neutral, although its 
parameters provided a description of aspects of performance that were of specific interest to the 
aims of this study.  
The first experiment in this chapter, Experiment 8, compared how performance varies 
with encoding time for upright and inverted faces. To anticipate the results, recognition of 
upright faces required less encoding time to exceed chance-level than did inverted faces. In 
addition, the time-course functions for upright and inverted faces could be distinguished quite 
early in processing. The exponential curve fitted to these data suggested that these differences in 
the time-course of processing for upright and inverted faces were a result of a difference in the 
onset time of recognition rather than a difference in the rate of performance increase. To 
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ascertain whether these differences between upright and inverted faces were the result of a more 
general stimulus load difference between the encoding of objects in canonical and non-canonical 
views, Experiment 9 compared the performance/encoding time function for upright cars among 
car experts and car novices. The behavioral results of Experiment 9 were strikingly similar to 
those in Experiment 8. In addition, similar to the results of Experiment 8, the exponential curves 
fitted to the data from Experiment 9 were also more consistent with a different onset time of 
recognition for cars among car experts and novices, rather than a difference in the rate of 
increase in performance. This chapter concludes by discussing possible explanations and 
mechanisms for how learning may influence the time-course of object recognition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate 
Figure 15. Diagram of a shifted exponential curve.  This type of curve 
will be fitted to the data in this chapter to estimate the asymptotic 
performance level, intercept or performance onset, and the rate of growth 
of performance. 
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Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 maps the time-course of encoding for upright and inverted unfamiliar faces 
in order to explore whether the dependence of experts’ greater VSTM performance on sufficient 
encoding time (Experiments 1-7) might be rooted in differences at perceptual encoding stages. 
More specifically, Experiment 8 aims to test if the temporal advantage for upright over inverted 
faces detected in electrophysiological recordings, specifically the N170 component, is due to a 
difference in the time-course of encoding between upright and inverted faces (Rossion et al., 
2000).  If so, this same advantage should be detected in a behavioral backward masking 
paradigm in which temporal encoding limitations are manipulated across eight different 
stimulus-mask onset asynchronies. If an advantage is detected for upright relative to inverted 
faces, the fine sampling of performance under different encoding limitations should also provide 
insight into the source of this advantage, namely whether it is an earlier onset of recognition or a 
faster rate of performance increase with additional encoding time. Alternatively, the temporal 
advantage suggested by previous studies may reflect an advantage at later stages of processing, 
as the N170 occurs later than some estimates of the time-course of object processing (Fabre-
Thorpe et al., 2001; Thorpe et al., 1996).  If so, it is conceivable that experts may even 
demonstrate a greater cost to the rate of performance increase than novices do when encoding 
time is limited (although the asymptotes will likely be higher).  Holistic encoding may be more 
burdensome on perceptual processing mechanisms compared to more feature-based encoding 
strategies. This pattern of results could provide a potential account for the greater influence of 
encoding time on experts’ VSTM performance, relative to novices’.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 34 undergraduate students at Vanderbilt University enrolled in 
Psychology classes (age, M=18.94, SD=3.25, 25 females).  All participants reported having 
normal or corrected to normal vision.  Participants received course credit for their participation 
in this study. 
 
Stimuli. Stimuli were 320 grey-scale, front-view images of faces in both upright and inverted 
orientations, resulting in a total of 640 images. Images were obtained from the Max-Planck 
Institute for Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany, the Harvard Face database, Stirling 
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face data base (http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk/), Nottingham scans face database 
(http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk/), and the Belgian face database. There were 240 different facial 
identities, with the additional images including a modified copy of 80 of the faces. The adjusted 
faces were cropped differently around the outer edge and the overall luminance was adjusted 
(Figure 16). Images subtended 3.5 x 4.7 degrees. 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure. The task was presented using a 19” monitor (1024 x 768 pixel resolution, 85 Hz 
refresh rate) driven by Matlab (Mathworks, Inc) together with Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 
1997) on a 450 or 733 MHz G4 Macintosh computer. Normal overhead lighting illuminated the 
testing room. Participants’ heads were stabilized at a fixed distance (75-cm) from the screen 
using a standard chin-rest before they performed the sequential matching task in which the first 
images were backward masked. A between subjects design was used, in which participants were 
randomly allocated to an upright or inverted face condition.  A between subjects design was used 
due to stimulus limitations, as the same faces could not appear in both the upright and inverted 
conditions.  Seventeen participants performed in each of the upright (age, M= 19.29, SD=1.83, 
11 female) and inverted (age, M= 18.59, SD=0.94, 14 female) conditions. Participants initiated 
each trial by a space-bar press, which proceeded as follows: an image of a face appeared for 
Figure 16. Examples of pairs of stimuli that appeared in Experiment 8 for which 
the correct response was “different” (right) and “same” (left).  The stimuli used in 
the “same” trials were cropped differently and the overall luminance was changed. 
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either 12-, 47-, 82-, 118-, 153-, 235-, 494-, or 1000 ms. This was followed by a mask that 
appeared for 494 ms. Finally, a second image of a face appeared and remained on the screen 
until the participant made a key-press indicating if the faces had the same or different identities 
(Figure 17). Participants were told to respond as accurately and as fast as they could. All images 
were presented centrally with a small random jitter of 0, +/- 5, or +/- 10 pixels vertically or 
horizontally. Participants performed 160 trials, which consisted of 20 trials for each of the 
different presentations times with an equal number of trials in which the correct response was 
“same” and “different”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The faces in “same” trials were always different in some superficial ways, such as the 
way the outer edge of the face was cropped, the lighting in the image, or the general luminance. 
These differences between images in same trials were included deliberately in order to 
discourage participants from using a strategy in which they based their decision on a specific 
diagnostic feature of the image (e.g. the outer edge of the face) rather than the identity of the 
Figure 17. The sequence of events that occurred in each trial in Experiment 8. Participants 
were first presented with an upright or inverted face image that was masked after a 12, 47, 82, 
118, 153, 235, 494, or 1000 ms. The masked remained on the screen for 494 ms after which a 
second face image appeared and remained until participants made a key press indicating 
whether the two faces had the same or different identities. 
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face. Participants were instructed to ignore any superficial difference between the face images 
(e.g., a general difference in luminance, or the way the outer edge of the face was cropped from 
its background) and to base their decision solely on the identity of the face. In addition, faces in 
the different trials were matched together in such a way that similar looking faces appeared 
together to further discourage subjects from adopting a strategy based on salient low-level 
features. 
 
Sensitivity and response time analysis. Trials with a response time less than 200 ms or greater 
than 4000 ms were removed from the data set (2.6%). For each participant, sensitivity (d’) and 
response time were calculated for each presentation duration condition for the upright and 
inverted orientations. An omnibus ANOVA was performed on both the response time and 
sensitivity data. In addition, planned t-tests were performed to identify the encoding time 
conditions in which sensitivity differed from chance (i.e. chance d’ = 0) for upright and inverted 
faces (providing an estimate of the onset of performance), and to also compare sensitivity for 
upright and inverted faces to identify for which encoding conditions upright face performance 
could be distinguished from that for inverted faces. 
 
Curve fitting. In order to compare the dynamics of upright and inverted face encoding, a shifted 
exponential function were fitted to the averaged d’ values at each time point (Wickelgren & 
Corbett, 1977): 
 
! 
ˆ d '= A 1 " exp "R t " I( )[ ]{ } for t > I , otherwise 
! 
ˆ d  =  0.              (1) 
 
Here, A is the asymptote, R is the rate of approach to asymptote, I is the intercept, and t is the 
stimulus presentation duration.  The inverse of the rate, 1/R, is expressed in seconds.  
The eight possible models derived from this exponential function, which differed in the 
number of free parameters, were fitted to the 16 (2 stimulus types x 8 presentation durations) 
data points, 
! 
d
i
.   More specifically, the models differ in whether the intercepts, rates of approach 
to the asymptote, or the asymptotes were the same or different for the curves fitted to the 
observed data.  This was notated with a 1 or 2 respectively (e.g. 2I, 1R, 2A). The least 
constrained model (6 parameters; 2 I, 2 R, 2 A), allowed different intercepts, rates of approach to 
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the asymptote, and asymptotes for the performance functions for upright and inverted faces. 
Three models in which one parameter was constrained were also tested (5 parameters) where the 
intercept (1 I, 2 R, 2 A), the rate (2 I, 1 R, 2 A), or asymptote (2 I, 2 R, 1 A), could not vary 
between upright and inverted faces.  Three models in which 2 parameters were constrained were 
also tested (4 parameters) where the intercept and rate (1 I, 1 R, 2 A), intercept and asymptote, (1 
I, 2 R, 1 A), or rate and asymptote (2 I, 1 R, 1 A), could not vary between upright and inverted 
faces.  The most constrained model possible (3 parameters; 1 I, 1 R, 1 A), assuming equivalent 
intercept, rate, and asymptotes for upright and inverted faces, was also tested. Fits were 
calculated for the group averaged sensitivity values to increase power as the individual data were 
quite variable due to the relatively small number of trials (20) contributing to each data point.   
Data fitting was implemented in Matlab (Mathworks) using a simplex hill-climbing 
function to iteratively adjust parameters to maximize the value of the variance accounted for (r2). 
These fits were replicated using Microsoft Excel Solver (Mircrosoft Corp., Redmond, WA). The 
range of values from which the starting point of the curve fitting functions could be selected 
were limited as follows: intercept, 0.01 - 0.5, growth rate 0.01 – 10.0, asymptote, 0.1 - 5.0). To 
increase the plausibility of the resulting best fit models, the fitting procedure was restricted so 
that the asymptote parameter for novices could not exceed that for experts. Two thousand 
iterations were performed per model to fit the data. Goodness of fit was assessed by calculating 
r2 values (equation 2).  
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Nested models (whose parameters are proper subsets or super-sets) were statistically 
compared by application of a F-test comparing a full (greater number free parameters) to a 
reduced model (fewer number of free parameters) as follows in equation 3: 
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     (3) 
 90 
 
where df1 = k full – k reduced, and df1 = N - k full.  The k’s are the number of free parameters in each 
model, and N is the number of predicted data points. This F-test incorporates an adjustment for 
the number of free parameters. The resulting F-values were converted to a t-value to evaluate the 
nested models.  This conversion was done so that a one-tailed test could be applied.  A one-tailed 
test is most appropriate because, logically, the fit of the nested model (i.e. the model with less 
free parameters) must be lower than, or at best equal to, that for the less constrained model.  
Goodness of fit was also evaluated by comparing—between models— the r2adjusted, which 
is the proportion of variance accounted for after it is adjusted for the number of free parameters, 
k (Reed, 1976).   
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where N is the number of data points 
! 
d
i( ) , 
! 
ˆ d 
i
 is the value predicted by equation 1, k is the 
number of free parameters, and  
! 
d  is the overall mean.   
 
Results 
To summarize the results, given sufficient encoding time, sensitivity (d’) for upright faces 
was greater than that for inverted faces. Recognition sensitivity (d’) for upright and inverted 
faces was significantly different with as little as 83 ms presentation (Table 1). In addition, 
sensitivity for identifying upright faces differed from chance by the 48 ms presentation duration 
condition, while 118 ms was required before the identification of faces in an inverted orientation 
differed from chance (Figure 18 A, Table 2). These effects were not explained by differences in 
response times for trials with upright and inverted faces (Figure 18 B). The exponential curve 
that best fit these data was one in which the rate of approach to the asymptote with increasing 
presentation duration was the same for upright and inverted faces (Figure 19, Table 3).  In this 
model, the presentation duration required for performance to exceed chance-level (i.e. the 
intercept value), as well as the asymptote value, differed for upright and inverted faces. This 
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model predicted that the onset for upright face performance was 33 ms earlier than that for 
inverted faces.  
 
 
 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis. A 2 (orientation; upright, inverted) x 8 (presentation duration; 12 ms, 48 ms, 
83 ms, 118 ms, 153 ms, 236 ms, 495 ms, 1000 ms) ANOVA performed on the sensitivity 
measures (d’) found main effects of presentation time, F(7,224)=30.85, p≤.0001, and orientation, 
F(1,32)=30.09, p≤.0001.  Sensitivity was greater for longer presentation durations and for 
upright compared to inverted faces. There was an interaction between orientation and 
presentation duration, F(7,224)=3.25, p=.0027, with the benefit of longer presentation durations 
being greater for upright than inverted faces.  Increased presentation duration led to a rapid 
increase in performance, although the rate of increase started to slow with approximately153 ms 
presentation duration as performance neared the asymptote.  
Planned t-tests (Table 1) revealed that sensitivity for the upright and inverted trials could 
only be distinguished at a minimum of 83 ms presentation duration. Although sensitivity differed 
from chance with as little as 48 ms presentation duration for upright faces, while 118 ms 
presentation duration was required for sensitivity in the matching task to increase above chance 
for inverted faces (Table 2). 
Figure 18. (A) Sensitivity (d’) and (B) response time as a function of presentation duration in 
the backward masked sequential (identity) matching task with upright and inverted faces in 
Experiment 8.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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Response time analysis. A 2 (orientation; upright, inverted) x 8 (presentation duration; 12 ms, 48 
ms, 83 ms, 118 ms, 153 ms, 236 ms, 495 ms, 1000 ms) ANOVA performed on the response time 
data found main effects of presentation duration, F(7,224)=9.03, p≤.0001, and orientation, 
F(1,32)=4.75, p=.0369.  Response times were faster for longer presentation duration conditions 
and for judgments about upright faces than inverted faces. There was no interaction between 
orientation and presentation duration (F<1). Increased encoding led to a relatively uniform 
Condition Upright Inverted df t p 
12 ms .086 -.047 32 .66 .5150 
48 ms .264 .022 32 1.35 .1851 
83 ms* .879 .119 32 2.69 .0113 
118 ms 1.092 .381 32 3.65 .0009 
153 ms 1.318 .660 32 3.02 .0049 
236 ms 1.384 .781 32 3.53 .0013 
495 ms 1.775 .931 32 3.70 .0008 
1000 ms 1.995 .787 32 6.20 ≤.0001 
Condition df t p  Condition df t p 
Upright faces  Inverted faces 
12 ms 16 .55 .5880  12 ms 16 -.36 .7205 
48 ms * 16 2.38 .0300  48 ms 16 .16 .8750 
83 ms 16 4.38 .0005  83 ms 16 .60 .5571 
118 ms 16 7.85 .0001  118 ms * 16 2.80 .0130 
153 ms 16 8.69 ≤.0001  153 ms 16 4.23 .0006 
236 ms 16 10.40 ≤.0001  236 ms 16 7.32 ≤.0001 
495 ms 16 10.78 ≤.0001  495 ms 16 5.90 ≤.0001 
1000 ms 16 15.13 ≤.0001  1000 ms 16 5.49 ≤.0001 
Table 1. Statistical comparisons (t-test) between sensitivity (d’) for 
upright and inverted faces at each presentation duration. 
*  shortest presentation duration at which a difference in performance can be 
distinguished for upright and inverted faces using one-tailed planned t-tests. 
Table 2. Statistical comparison of sensitivity (d’) for upright (left panel) and inverted (right panel) 
faces at each encoding duration to determine the shortest presentation duration required for 
performance to differ from chance. 
*  shortest presentation duration at which performance can be distinguished from chance (0 d’) using one-tailed 
planned t-tests. 
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reduction in response time until the 153 ms presentation duration condition after which mean 
response times started to plateau for both upright and inverted faces. 
 
Curve fitting. Table 3 and Figure 19 shows the best fits to the average sensitivity measure across 
the subjects within each group for the eight models tested. Constraining the rate parameter (2 I, 1 
R, 2 A) so that it was the same for both upright and inverted faces did not result in a significant 
drop in the variance accounted for across the two groups, relative to the full model (2 I, 2 R, 2 
A), t(10)=1.48, p=.084. However, constraining the intercept parameter (1 I, 2 R, 2 A), 
t(10)=2.48, p=.0164, or the asymptote (1 I, 2 R, 2 A), t(10)=6.78, p<.0001,  so they were the 
same for both upright and inverted faces did result in a significantly worse fit relative to the full 
model (2 I, 2 R, 2 A). Therefore, the data were best described by a model in which the asymptote 
and intercept, but not the rate of approach to asymptote, differed for upright and inverted faces. 
This model suggests that not only is there a considerable difference in the asymptote level of 
performance between the two groups (.92 d’ difference), but also that the onset of recognition 
performance for upright faces occurs approximately 33 ms before that for inverted faces. 
However, recognition performance for upright and inverted faces with increasing presentation 
duration approached asymptote at the same rate.  
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Figure 19. The curves that best fit the observed average d’ values for upright and inverted 
faces for each of the eight possible models derived from the shifted exponential function.  The 
models differed in terms of whether the intercept (I), rate of approach to asymptote 
performance level (R), and the asymptote (A) parameters were fixed or free to vary (notated as 
a 1 or 2, respectively) for the curves fitted to the performance for upright and inverted faces 
across the different presentation duration conditions. 
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            Table 3.  Best Fits of the Exponential Function in Experiment 8 
 
Condition Intercept Rate Asymptote r2(adjusted) 
2 I, 2 R, 2 A     
Upright .021019 8.4211 1.8752  
Inverted .07364 15.6659 .86014  
    .98127 (.971905) 
1 I, 2 R, 2 A     
Upright .029894 9.7598 1.8469  
Inverted .029894 7.6219 .89059  
    .96979 (.95880) 
2 I, 1 R, 2 A     
Upright .027290 9.8626 1.8306  
Inverted .060108 9.8626 .90636  
    .97715(.96884) 
2 I, 2 R, 1 A     
Upright .025273 9.8246 1.7877  
Inverted 2.6365e-012 1.2332 1.7877  
    .89528(.8572) 
1 I, 1 R, 2 A     
Upright .029074 9.0355 1.8778  
Inverted .029074 9.0355 .8499  
    .96796(.95995) 
1 I, 2 R, 1 A     
Upright .0054576 7.3429 1.8398  
Inverted .0054576 1.1811 1.8398  
    .89050(.86313) 
2 I, 1 R, 1 A     
Upright .007568 10.929 1.401  
Inverted .096323 10.929 1.401  
    .77408(.7176) 
1 I, 1 R, 1 A     
Upright .034286 9.3891 1.369  
Inverted .034286 9.3891 1.369  
    .64415(.58940) 
 
 
 
Note: The models differed in terms of whether the intercept (I), rate of approach to 
asymptote performance level (R), and the asymptote (A) parameters were fixed or free 
to vary (notated as a 1 or 2, respectively) for the curves fitted to the performance for 
upright and inverted faces across the different presentation duration conditions. 
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Discussion  
The results of Experiment 8 suggest that recognition performance for upright and 
inverted faces not only differs in magnitude, but that they also follow different time-courses to 
reach these different levels of performance. As expected based on the widely reported face 
inversion effect, sensitivity for matching upright faces was projected to reach a higher 
asymptotic level than that for inverted faces. More notably, the onset time for recognition 
performance for inverted faces was delayed relative to that for upright faces, as inverted faces 
required additional encoding time to exceed chance-level compared to the recognition of upright 
faces. However, the absence of a difference in the rate of increase in performance suggests that 
the temporal advantage for upright faces found in previous studies may be a result of a more 
qualitative difference in processing, rather than a general “speeding up” of performance. 
Notably, the longer response times in the inverted face condition, relative to the upright face 
condition, is inconsistent with the possibility that the temporal advantage for upright over 
inverted faces relies on additional post-perceptual processing for upright faces, but not inverted 
faces, and thus is consistent with the difference arising from early stages of processing. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the initial delay in the performance onset 
in the inverted face condition relative to the upright face condition.  One possibility is that this 
delay reflects the need to perform an additional process for inverted, but not upright, faces before 
they can be processed for recognition. For example, observers may apply some transformation to 
the inverted faces, such as mentally rotating them. This may be a cost experienced more 
generally when encoding inverted objects. Alternatively, the difference in the onset times for 
upright and inverted faces may be driven by an especially rapid onset of processing of upright 
faces rather than a slowed onset for inverted face processing, relatively to the processing of other 
upright or inverted object categories. For example, faces may have privileged access to capacity-
limited attention necessary for guiding processing. Consistent with this possibility, some suggest 
that faces can capture attention (Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, in press; Vuilleumier, 2000).  In 
contrast, others suggest that holistic face processing can occur in the absence of attention (Boutet 
et al., 2002). Therefore, the processing of inverted faces may be delayed relative to the 
processing of upright faces due to the need to trigger processes that may occur automatically for 
upright faces, or due to attentional limitations not experienced for upright processing. This 
advantage, whether it be the absence of a need for attention or ability to preferentially capture 
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attention compared to inverted faces, may be specific to upright faces.  Alternatively, this 
temporal advantage may be acquired as a by-product of our extensive experience with faces and 
thus may generalize to non-face objects of expertise. Experiment 9 explores these possibilities.   
 
Experiment 9 
If the early advantage for upright, relative to inverted, face recognition judgments found 
in Experiment 8 reflects an acquired advantage due to our extensive experience with faces, car 
experts should show a similar “head start” relative to car novices, for similar recognition 
judgments about cars. However, if the difference in performance onset between upright and 
inverted faces instead reflects a general disadvantage for processing mis-oriented items, the 
processing of cars among both experts and novices should follow the same time-course pattern as 
that for faces. Therefore, two possible accounts of the temporal advantage for upright faces 
compared to inverted faces are proposed; the temporal advantage for upright faces may be a by-
product of our extensive experience with upright faces or a more general advantage for 
processing objects in their canonical orientation. These different explanations for the temporal 
advantage for upright relative to inverted faces can be delineated by comparing the temporal 
dynamics of encoding among car experts and car novices. Experiment 9 uses the same general 
paradigm as Experiment 8 to map the time-course of car recognition among car experts and 
novices.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 38 (29 male) employees, undergraduate students, or graduate 
students of Vanderbilt University, or members of the surrounding Nashville community. 
Participants were compensated $10 per hour for their time.  All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision and reported having either extensive or very little experience 
identifying models of cars. Their level of car expertise was quantified using the same task as 
used by Gauthier, et al. (2000) and described in detail in APPENDIX D. Nineteen participants 
(15 males) met the criteria for car expertise (age, M = 24.37, SD =5.02, car d’ M = 2.78, bird d’ 
M =  0.94), while 19 (14 males) were classified as car novices (age, M = 23.42, SD = 3.55, car d’ 
M =  0.99, bird d’ M = .90). Participants’ self-reports of their car recognition skill were generally 
consistent with their performance on the subordinate car matching task, with participants 
 98 
meeting the criteria for expertise on the task rating themselves an average of 8.45 on a scale of 
10; those who were classified as novices, on average, rated their skill as 4.97 on a scale of 10. 
 
Stimuli. Stimuli were 320 grey-scale profile images of cars. There were 240 different car models, 
with the additional images including a modified copy of 80 of the car models. Similar to the 
duplicate face images used in Experiment 8, the overall luminance and/or shade of grey of the 
car panels and/or the tinting of the windows were adjusted (Figure 20). All the wheel-covers on 
the cars were replaced with one of six different kinds in such a way that cars appearing within 
the same trial always had the same wheel-covers. Images subtended 2.9 x 6.7 degrees of visual 
angle at the fixed viewing distance of 70-cm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 8, except that images of cars, 
instead of faces, were used as stimuli, and all participants viewed the cars in an upright 
orientation.  Once again, the images in the “different” trials were paired together in such a way 
as to maximize their similarity.  In addition, the cars in “same” trials were always different in 
Figure 20. Examples of pairs of stimuli that appeared in Experiment 9 for which the 
correct response was “different” (right) and “same” (left).  The tinting of the 
windows and the overall luminance was changed for stimuli appearing in “same” 
trials. 
 
 99 
some superficial ways that were similar to the non-diagnostic differences found between the 
different model cars in “different” trials.  For example, cars in “same” trials could differ in terms 
of the degree of tinting of the windows, the lighting in the images, and/or the color (shade of 
grey once the images were converted to grayscale) of the car. Once again, participants were 
instructed to ignore any superficial differences between the cars and to base their decision solely 
on the model of the car.   
 
Analysis. Analysis was the same as that used in Experiment 8. Data from one participant in the 
novice group whose average performance did not exceed chance (50%) were excluded from 
further analysis. In addition, response times were found to differ between the expert and novice 
groups, with experts responding more slowly than novices.  This introduced a potential 
confound.  The five novices with the fastest average response times were excluded from the 
analysis and as a result there was no longer a significant difference in the response times between 
the two groups. This also resulted in an equal number of participants in the novice and expert 
groups.  
 
Results 
To summarize, the pattern of behavioral performance for cars among car experts relative 
to that among car novices in Experiment 9 was strikingly similar to that for upright faces relative 
to inverted faces in Experiment 8. Sensitivity for the expert and novice groups could be 
distinguished in the 48 ms presentation duration condition, which is slightly earlier than that 
found for upright and inverted faces (Table 4). If the presentation duration is sufficient, 
sensitivity for the matching judgments among car experts was greater than that among car 
novices. Car experts’ sensitivity differed from chance by the 48 ms presentation duration 
condition, however novices required 118 ms before their performance differed from chance 
(Figure 21 A, Table 5). This mirrors the results found for upright and inverted face trials in 
Experiment 8.  These effects were not explained by a differential trade-off between response 
time and recognition performance among car experts and car novices (Figure 21 B). There 
appeared to be a trade-off between the rate and intercept parameters in accounting for the 
observed performance among car experts and car novices: the observed performance was best 
explained by either a model in which the rate of approach to asymptote was the same for experts 
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and novices, but the intercept and asymptote parameters differed for experts and novices (Figure 
23, Table 7), or a model in which the intercept was the same for the two groups, but there was a 
difference in the rate and asymptote parameters (Figure 21, Table 6). However, when the fit was 
restricted to the earlier part of the function, the model that allowed the intercept parameter to 
vary could better explain the performance of experts and novices when the plausibility of the 
parameter estimates and the relative fit (adjusted for the number of free parameters) of the 
different models was considered.  
 
 
.  
 
 
Sensitivity analysis. A 2 (group; expert, novice) x 8 (presentation duration; 12 ms, 48 ms, 83 ms, 
118 ms, 153 ms, 236 ms, 495 ms, 1000 ms) ANOVA performed on the sensitivity measure (d’) 
found main effects of presentation duration, F(7,252)=49.13, p≤.0001, and expertise group, 
F(1,36)=58.43, p≤.0001.  Sensitivity was greater among car experts than car novices and was 
also greater for longer presentation durations. There was also an interaction between expertise 
group and presentation duration, F(7,252)=3.71, p=.0008, with the benefit of longer presentation 
durations being greater for car experts than car novices. Increased presentation duration led to a 
rapid increase in performance, although the rate of increase started to slow with 
approximately153 ms presentation as performance approached the asymptote.  
Figure 21. (A) Sensitivity (d’) and (B) response time as a function of presentation duration in the 
backward masked sequential matching task with cars among groups of car experts and car 
novices in Experiment 9.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Planned t-tests revealed that sensitivity for the upright and inverted trials could only be 
distinguished at 48 ms and greater presentation durations (Table 4). However, sensitivity differed 
from chance with as little as 48 ms presentation duration for upright faces, while 118 ms was 
required for car novices’ sensitivity to increase above chance (Table 5).  
 
 
Condition Expert Novice df t p 
12 ms -.025 -.128 36 .0023 .9982 
48 ms* .434 .097 36 2.09 .0440 
83 ms .774 .134 36 3.12 .0035 
118 ms 1.093 .421 36 3.25 .0025 
153 ms 1.405 .635 36 3.47 .0014 
236 ms 1.799 .690 36 4.45 ≤.0001 
495 ms 2.193 1.116 36 5.57 ≤.0001 
1000 ms 2.500 1.348 36 5.06 ≤.0001 
 
 
 
Condition df t p  Condition df t p 
Car Novices  Car Experts 
12 ms 18 -1.042 .3112  12 ms 18 -.225 .8244 
48 ms 18 .7431 .4670  48 ms* 18 3.059 .0068 
83 ms 18 .9144 .3726  83 ms 18 5.213 ≤.0001 
118 ms* 18 3.405 .0032  118 ms 18 6.540 ≤.0001 
153 ms 18 3.324 .0038  153 ms 18 9.266 ≤.0001 
236 ms 18 4.861 ≤.0001  236 ms 18 9.643 ≤.0001 
495 ms 18 9.163 ≤.0001  495 ms 18 15.14 ≤.0001 
1000 ms 18 8.441 ≤.0001  1000 ms 18 19.04 ≤.0001 
 
 
 
Response time analysis. A 2 (group; expert, novice) x 8 (presentation duration; 12 ms, 48 ms, 83 
ms, 118 ms, 153 ms, 236 ms, 495 ms, 1000 ms) ANOVA performed on the response time data 
Table 4. Statistical comparisons (t-test) between sensitivity (d’) for 
cars among car experts and car novices at each presentation duration. 
* shortest presentation duration at which performance can be distinguished for 
car experts and novices using one-tailed planned t-tests. 
. 
Table 5. Statistical comparison (t-test) of sensitivity (d’) for cars among car novices (left) and 
car experts (right) at each presentation duration to determine the shortest encoding time 
required for performance to differ from chance. 
* shortest presentation duration at which performance can be distinguished from chance (0 d’) using one-tailed 
planned t-tests. 
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found a main effect of presentation duration, F(7,252)=12.58, p≤.0001, but no main effect of 
expertise, F<1.  There was also no interaction between expertise and presentation duration, 
F(7,252)=1.48, p=.174.  Therefore, although response times were faster with longer presentation 
durations, they did not differ across the expert and novices groups.  Increased encoding led to a 
reduction in response time until the 153 ms presentation duration condition after which the mean 
response times appeared to plateau for both experts and novices. (Figure 21 B). 
 
Curve fitting. Table 6 and Figure 22 show the best fits to the averaged sensitivity measures 
across the subjects within each group, for all eight models tested. Constraining the asymptote (2 
I, 2 R, 1 A), t(10)=4.99, p=.00025, resulted in a significantly worse fit relative to the full model 
(2 I, 2 R, 2 A). Constraining the intercept parameter (1 I, 2 R, 2 A), t(10)=1.02, p=.167,  or the 
rate parameter (2 I, 1 R, 2 A), t(10)=1.46, p=.087, so that they were the same for both upright 
and inverted faces did not significantly effect the fit relative to the full model (2 I, 2 R, 2 A). 
However, constraining both the rate and intercept parameters within the same model (1 I, 1 R, 2 
A), t(11)=3.51, p=.0025,  resulted in a significant impact on the fit relative to the full model (2 I, 
2 R, 2 A).  This suggests that the intercept and rate parameters traded-off in their ability to 
account for the difference in performance between car experts and novices. 
From observing the fits to the intercept constrained (I, 2 R, 2 A) or rate constrained (2 I, 1 
R, 2 A) models it appears that a trade-off may be occurring between different stages in the time-
course or object processing, namely the earlier versus the later stages of the time-course (see 
Figure 22). The intercept constrained model appeared to better account for the longer 
presentation durations while the rate constrained model appeared to better account for the shorter 
presentation durations. A similar reduction in fit to the early data points was observed for the 
intercept constrained (1 I, 2 R, 2 A) model in Experiment 8 (see Fig 19). Given that the focus of 
this study was on the early encoding stage of the time-course of object processing, the curves 
were re-fitted only to the shorter presentation durations where performance was still rising 
sharply (12 ms, 48 ms, 83 ms, 118 ms, and 153 ms) to see if the rate and intercept constrained 
model could be distinguished on the basis of their ability to account for performance when 
presentation duration was more limited.  The curve resulting from the model in which the rate 
was controlled, so that it could not vary across the expert and novice groups (2 I, 1 R, 2 A), fitted 
equally well as the curve resulting from the full model, t(4)=.17 p=.436 (Figure 23, Table 7).  
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However, the reduction in the fit of the curve that assumed that the intercept was the same for car 
experts and novices (1I, 2 R, 2 A), relative to the curves that assumed all three parameters 
differed across the groups (2I, 2 R, 2 A), approached significance, t(4)=1.77 p=.076. In addition, 
to achieve this fit, the intercept constrained model equated the asymptote parameters for experts 
and novices, which is not consistent with the behavioral performance of the two groups.  
Notably, the equivalence of the asymptote parameters for the functions describing expert and 
novice performance is a consequence of the restriction placed on the fitting procedure that the 
asymptote parameter for novices could not exceed that for experts (Table 7).  This was done to 
increase the plausibility of parameters that fit the data best. Therefore, if the fitting procedure 
were restricted so that the asymptote parameter for experts actually exceeded that for novices, 
consistent with the observed performance, the fit would presumably be reduced further.  This 
could possibly even push the reduction in fit, relative to the full model, into significance.  In 
addition, once the fits for the models were adjusted for the number of free parameters (r2adjusted), 
the model in which the intercept and asymptote varied across experts and novices, but not the 
rate, was associated with the highest r2adjusted value, even exceeding that for the full model (Table 
7).  This model of performance with the greatest r2adjusted suggested that the onset of performance 
for car experts starts approximately 53 ms earlier than that among novices.  It also suggested that 
asymptotic level of performance among experts is 1.14 d’ units greater than that among novices.  
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Figure 22. The curves that best fit the observed average d’ values for recognition of cars 
among car experts and novices for each of the eight possible models derived from the 
shifted exponential function.  The models differed in terms of whether the intercept (I), 
rate of approach to asymptote performance level (R), and the asymptote (A) parameters 
were fixed or free to vary (notated as a 1 or 2, respectively) for the curves fitted to the 
performance for experts and novices across the different presentation duration conditions. 
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Table 6. Best Fits of the Exponential Function in Experiment 9 
 
Condition Intercept Rate Asymptote r2(adjusted) 
2 I, 2 R, 2 A     
Expert .013643 5.8004 2.4456  
Novice .032692 3.9518 1.3608  
    .99275 (.989125) 
1 I, 2 R, 2 A     
Expert .016935 6.027 2.4354  
Novice .016935 3.3353 1.4023  
    .99200 (.98909) 
2 I, 1 R, 2 A     
Expert .012 5.5949 2.4635  
Novice .055204 5.5949 1.2775  
    .9912 (.98800) 
2 I, 2 R, 1 A     
Expert .015669 6.1544 2.393  
Novice 5.7412e-012 1.1273 1.1273  
    .97473 (.96554) 
1 I, 1 R, 2 A     
Expert .016085 5.3392 2.5189  
Novice .016085 5.3392 1.1863  
    .98303 (.97879) 
1 I, 2 R, 1 A     
Expert .012 5.9316 2.3967  
Novice .012 1.1644 2.3967  
    .97322(.966525) 
2 I, 1 R, 1 A     
Expert 1.524e-012 6.3054 1.9143  
Novice .098398 6.3054 1.9143  
    .82224 (.7778) 
1 I, 1 R, 1 A     
Expert .018276 5.0317 1.8956  
Novice .018276 5.0317 1.8956  
    .71004(.66543) 
 
 
 
Note: The models differed in terms of whether the intercept (I), rate of approach to 
asymptote performance level (R), and the asymptote (A) parameters were fixed or free to 
vary (notated as a 1 or 2, respectively) for the curves fitted to the performance for cars 
among car experts or novices across the different presentation duration conditions. 
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Figure 23. The curves that best fit the observed average d’ values from the five shortest 
encoding durations for cars among car experts and novices for each of the eight possible 
models derived from the shifted exponential function.  The models differed in terms of 
whether the intercept (I), rate of approach to asymptote performance level (R), and the 
asymptote (A) parameters were fixed or free to vary (notated as a 1 or 2, respectively) for 
the curves fitted to the performance for experts and novices across the different 
presentation duration conditions. 
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              Table 7. Best fits of the Exponential Function to the Five Shortest Presentation    
              Durations in Experiment 9. 
Condition Intercept Rate Asymptote r2(adjusted) 
2 I, 2 R, 2 A     
Expert 0.012 3.5268 3.5595  
Novice .067961 7.4053 1.3589  
    .98782 (.972595) 
1 I, 2 R, 2 A     
Expert .018135 4.9857 2.8545  
Novice .018135 1.5943 2.8545  
    .97832 (.96098) 
2 I, 1 R, 2 A     
Expert .012 3.6029 3.4985  
Novice .065146 3.6029 2.3628  
    .98773(.977914) 
2 I, 2 R, 1 A     
Expert .012 3.5876 3.5105  
Novice .063987 2.2743 3.5105  
    .98766 (.977788) 
1 I, 1 R, 2 A     
Expert .012 1.2238 9.0337  
Novice .012 1.2238 3.4476  
    .97579(.963685) 
1 I, 2 R, 1 A     
Expert .018135 4.9857 2.8545  
Novice .018135 1.5943 2.8545  
    .97832 (.96098) 
2 I, 1 R, 1 A     
Expert .0049202 .01305 73.3167  
Novice .076013 .01305 73.3167  
    .97618 (.96427) 
1 I, 1 R, 1 A     
Expert .014067 .046848 155.3646  
Novice .014067 .046848 155.3646  
    .64008(.53725) 
 
 
 
Note: The models differed in terms of whether the intercept (I), rate of approach to 
asymptote performance level (R), and the asymptote (A) parameters were fixed or free to 
vary (notated as a 1 or 2, respectively) for the curves fitted to the performance for cars 
among car experts or novices across the different presentation duration conditions.  
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Discussion and combined analysis of Experiments 8 and 9 
The striking similarity between the pattern of behavioral results for cars among car 
experts and novices in Experiment 9, and that for upright and inverted faces in Experiment 8, is 
consistent with an expertise account of the difference in the processing time-course between 
these groups (i.e. the shorter encoding duration required for recognition performance to exceed 
chance for objects of expertise). In neither experiment was there evidence for a difference in the 
rate of approach to the asymptote.  Thus, expertise selectively impacted the general level of 
performance that can be reached (asymptote) and the onset time of performance.  However, 
expertise did not influence the rate of performance increase that took performance between these 
two points in the time-course of object processing. These results are consistent with the temporal 
advantage among visual experts, relative to novices, previously demonstrated in subordinate-
level recognition tasks by Tanaka and colleagues (Tanaka, 2001; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) and 
suggest that this advantage occurs relatively early in the time-course of processing.  
Distinguishing between the fits of the curves generated by alternative models of the time-
course of expert and novice processing to the observed data was complicated by the large 
difference between the general level of performance between experts and novices. These large 
differences in later parts of the curves caused smaller, but important, differences in earlier parts 
of the curves to have a reduced impact on the overall fit of the curve to the data.  In other words, 
detecting a difference between the onset times between the expert and novice groups was 
hindered by the fact that the difference in asymptote accounted for the largest portion of 
variability between the two groups.  This made it difficult to distinguish models that constrained 
other important aspects of the time-course. For example, the curve resulting from the model in 
which experts and novices are assumed to have the same rate of approach to the asymptote, but 
different asymptote and onset times, could not be distinguished from the model in which experts 
and novices had the same performance onset time, but different rates of approach to asymptote 
and different asymptotes. It was only once the fit was limited to the shorter presentation 
durations, before performance started to plateau, that the fit of these two models started to 
diverge, allowing the models to be distinguished based on the plausibility of the parameter 
estimates and the fit of the curve adjusted for the number of free parameters.  
The impact of the difference in the performance onset time among car experts, compared 
to car novices, may also be reduced by averaging the data across participants with a range of 
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perceptual expertise with cars, as the level of car expertise varies considerably within the two 
groups broadly classified as “experts” and “novices”.  More specifically, if the delay in 
performance onset is associated with visual expertise with a particular category of objects, the 
degree that performance onset is delayed would be expected to vary with the level of perceptual 
expertise of the observer.  However, since the level of expertise with cars varies considerably 
within the two groups this may serve to blur the sudden onset assumed by the shifted exponential 
function fitted to the data (Van Zandt & Ratcliff, 1995). This provides a potential explanation for 
the greater difficulty in distinguishing the rate and intercept constrained models in Experiment 9 
compared to those in Experiment 8, as there is likely to be a clearer distinction between 
participants’ level of expertise with upright and inverted faces. 
Unfortunately, the data from Experiment 9 was too noisy at the individual level to 
explore the relationship between participants’ level of expertise with cars and the onset time of 
their performance. The noise at the individual level was a result of the relatively small number of 
trials (20) contributing to each data point.  This was a necessity of the current design, as the 
potential stimulus pool within a typical car experts’ domain of expertise (i.e., different models of 
modern cars readily available in North America) is too limited to support more than 20 trials per 
encoding condition without repeating stimuli. Future studies could overcome these limitations to 
explore the relationship between performance onset time and level of expertise by either using 
fewer encoding conditions (thus allowing for a greater number of trials per condition) or by 
using a different domain of expertise with a less limited set of potential stimuli.  
 
Combined analysis. To explore the extent of the similarity in the results from Experiments 8 and 
9, an analysis was performed on the combined data.  The main aim of this combined analysis 
was to determine if the effect of expertise (or orientation for the case of faces) differed across the 
recognition of faces and cars. To do this, data from Experiments 8 and 9 were pooled: 
participants in the inverted face condition were re-classified as novices, and those in the upright 
face condition were classified as experts. A 2 (Category; face, car) x 2 (Group; expert, novice) x 
8 (presentation duration; 12-, 47-, 82-, 118-, 153-, 235-, 494-, or 1000 ms) ANOVA found a 
main effect of expertise, F(1,68)=83.89, p≤.0001, and presentation duration, F(7,476)=77.63, 
p≤.0001, but not category, F(1,68)=2.29, p=.092.  There was an interaction between category and 
presentation duration, F(7,476)=2.26, p=.029, and expertise and presentation duration, 
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F(7,476)=6.34, p≤.0001, but notably there was no interaction between category and expertise 
(F<1) or expertise, presentation duration, and category, (F<1). Therefore, although car 
recognition across both experts and novices benefited more from additional encoding time 
compared to that for faces, there was no other difference between the recognition of faces and 
cars.  Most importantly the effect of expertise (or inversion for faces) did not differ for cars and 
faces. The results of this combined analysis are consistent with a common expertise-related 
source for the different recognition time-courses between upright and inverted faces and for cars 
between car experts and novices. Possible underlying mechanisms for this time-course difference 
between expert and novice recognition are addressed in the general discussion. 
 
General Discussion  
The studies in this chapter provide evidence that visual expertise results in a difference in 
the time-course of encoding. The temporal advantage demonstrated by experts is generally 
consistent with findings from previous behavioral and electrophysiological studies (Caldara et 
al., 2003; Rossion et al., 2000; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). More specifically, the difference in the 
time-course of processing for expert and novice observers appears to stem from the delayed 
onset of novice processing relative to expert processing. The difference in the onset time of 
performance in the observed data for expert (upright faces, and cars among car experts) and 
novice (inverted faces, and cars among car novices) categories suggests that experts experience a 
“head start” to encoding over that for novices. Notably, this finding of a delayed onset of 
performance is also captured by the shifted exponential curve fitted to the data from trials with 
inverted faces, or cars among car novices, relative to those with upright faces, or cars among car 
experts. This finding extends previous work not only by providing a more thorough mapping of 
the time-course of expert and novice object processing, but also by demonstrating that the 
temporal advantage demonstrated previously in electrophysiological and response time studies is 
a result of an earlier onset of performance among experts, relative to novices, rather than a more 
general difference in processing rate between the groups. This section will address some 
potential limitations and also speculate about the underlying cause of the difference between the 
time-course of expert and novice processing. 
 
 111 
The choice of a shifted exponential function to fit to the observed data was theory-neutral 
and thus the possibility remains that the observed performance may be better characterized by a 
different performance function. The almost perfect fits (> 98% of the variance account for) 
obtained with the full models in both Experiments 8 and 9, though, suggest that this function 
could adequately explain most of the variability in performance between experts and novices. 
However, given that this curve was used only to provide a quantitative description of the 
relationship between encoding duration and recognition performance among experts and novices, 
the interpretation of the data relies on both the results of the model and the statistical analyses 
performed directly on the behavioral data.  Convergence of the results from the curve fitting 
procedure (Tables 3, 6, and 7) with those from the statistics performed directly on the observed 
data (Tables 1, 2, 4, and 5) serves to strengthen the somewhat weaker results from the curve 
fitting procedure, especially those in Experiment 9. 
The results of the experiments in this chapter also provide some insight into the reliance 
of experts’ greater VSTM performance on sufficient encoding time reported in the previous 
chapters of this dissertation. One of the goals of this chapter was to explore whether the VSTM 
advantage comes at a cost in the form of an additional burden on perceptual encoding 
mechanisms, serving to slow down the rate at which experts, relative to novices, can encode 
objects of expertise.  This proposal was inconsistent with the faster response times of experts’ for 
subordinate-level recognition judgments reported by Tanaka & Taylor (1991), which suggests 
instead that experts may process items at a faster rate.  However, the results reported in this 
chapter are inconsistent with both of these possibilities, but rather suggest that expert and novice 
encoding proceeds at a similar rate (as inferred from the rate of increase in performance with 
increasing encoding duration). Therefore, the reliance on sufficient encoding time for the VSTM 
advantage of experts relative to novices is likely due to limitations at other processing stages 
involved in storing objects in VSTM (e.g., the capacity-limited mechanisms responsible for 
consolidating items in VSTM; Jolicoeur & Dell' Acqua, 1998). 
More generally, a noteworthy implication of the results in this chapter is that the rate of 
approach to the asymptote with increasing encoding time is unaffected by the general costs 
incurred when processing objects in unfamiliar orientations (Yin, 1969).  Taken together, the 
results of Experiments 8 and 9 also suggest that the rate of performance increase is unaffected by 
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any benefits associated with visual expertise. Therefore, both expert and novice encoding rate 
may be limited by the same hard-wired physiological constraints of the visual system. 
The earlier onset of performance for subordinate recognition of objects of expertise, 
compared to objects from categories for which one does not possess expertise, is intriguing.  As 
discussed in the opening section of this chapter, previous studies have found evidence of a 
general temporal advantage for expert processing, but until now there was no clear evidence to 
specifically suggest that this advantage may be rooted in a difference in the encoding time 
required for recognition to begin. Tanaka (2001), when explaining the faster reactions times for 
subordinate-level categorization for objects of expertise relative to typical objects, suggested that 
an important consequence of visual expertise is the development of specialized “perceptual 
routines” that allow for the rapid analysis of domain-specific objects. Unfortunately, the nature 
of this “perceptual routine” and how it differs from that used for typical object processing was 
not elaborated. Insights might be gained by considering how such routines might relate to the 
differences in recognition onset time revealed here. Four alternative accounts of the effect of 
expertise on the onset time of recognition performance will be discussed in the remaining part of 
this chapter.  
The first possibility is that this difference in onset reflects a cost among novices due to 
implementing a processing mechanism that occurs automatically among experts. Expertise may 
rely on highly specialized patterns of attentional allocation that allow for the extraction of the 
most diagnostic information, whether it be the precise configuration of features within a face or 
the subtle contours of a car. Recent work by Waszak and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that 
objects are influenced by their processing history, leading to the relatively automatic processing 
of items in a manner consistent with this history. Therefore, it is possible that this attentional 
weighting of diagnostic features may be performed automatically for objects of expertise as a 
result of the extensive expertise identifying these objects at a subordinate level. The automatic 
triggering of an optimal attentional pattern may underlie the temporal advantage of expert 
performance when compared to that of novices, who may have to effortfully establish an 
attentional set to selectively process or weight diagnostic features for each new object. 
Therefore, a learned pattern of attention to the information in faces and other objects of expertise 
may provide a temporal advantage in the form of a “head start” on encoding for processing 
objects within one’s domain of expertise.  
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Alternatively, the delay in the onset of performance for inverted faces, and for cars 
among car novices, may reflect a cost associated with the categorization of these items at a basic-
level before categorization at the more subordinate level required for the task in Experiment 8 
and 9 (Liu, Harris, & Kanwisher, 2002).  The basic-level has been shown to be the ”entry-point” 
of recognition among novices, and thus novices may be obliged to first categorize the item at this 
level before categorizing the object at more subordinate levels.  This obligatory categorization at 
the basic-level first may be costly as the information that is most diagnostic for categorizations at 
different levels of specificity is likely to vary considerably. For example, in order to recognize 
that an object is a car, an important feature that should be weighted heavily for this recognition 
judgment might be the wheels.  However, in order to recognize that the object is a Honda 
Accord, heavily weighting the wheels will be of little value, and weighting other features such as 
the contours of the hood is necessary for categorization at this more subordinate level. Therefore, 
obligatory categorization at the basic-level by novices may result in a delay in performance in 
subordinate categorization tasks. In contrast, visual experts may be able to more directly encode 
the perceptual information required to identify objects from their domain of expertise at a 
subordinate-level, as these levels have been shown to be equally accessible to experts, and thus 
experts should not experience the same delay (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991; Tanaka, 2000). This 
would lead to the empirically testable prediction that the difference in the onset of performance 
between car experts and novices should no longer be present for basic-level categorizations. 
Future studies should test this prediction. 
A third explanation for the difference in the time-course between expert and novice 
object recognition is a greater influence of top-down mechanisms on perception. More 
specifically, participants with considerable experience recognizing cars may benefit more from 
higher-level areas acting on earlier areas responsible for the encoding of visual sensory 
information in anticipation of the stimulus. This could be in the form of expectations serving to 
prime areas responsible for expert object recognition, although this would have had to occur at a 
very general level, as no stimulus was repeated during the experiment. Consistent with this 
possibility, Johnson and Olshausen (2005) suggest that top-down facilitation could lead to 
different onsets in performance, such as that found in Experiment 8 and 9: information may 
accumulate faster if an observer has a top-down template to which the incoming sensory 
information can be compared. The use of a template could serve to lower thresholds involved in 
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perceptual decisions, or to amplifying the response to information in the template, thereby 
providing a temporal advantage to the accumulation of information for expert object recognition. 
However, one might expect that a top-down template would also result in a difference in the rate 
of performance, which was not found in Experiments 8 and 9. One aspect of the potential 
influence of top-down mechanism on the earlier performance onset among experts could be 
explored by comparing performance in conditions where trials with objects of expertise were 
blocked, compared to those where they were randomly intermixed with stimuli from other (non-
expert) object categories, thereby reducing participants ability to anticipate the stimulus.  
Finally, experience may influence the time-course of object recognition through less 
transient influences on the object perception system.  Experience can bias population selectivity 
of neurons so that more cells respond to the more familiar stimuli and views (Ashbridge, Perrett, 
Oram, & Jellema, 2000) or influence the selectivity of neurons (Booth & Rolls, 1998; Kobatake, 
Wang, & Tanaka, 1998; Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995; Sheinberg & Logothetis, 2001).  
This could provide an account of the results in Experiment 8 and 9– by integrating both category 
and orientation biases – if one assumes that greater numbers of active neurons increase the speed 
with which a threshold could be reached to trigger recognition. However, this account might also 
predict that a faster rate of increase in performance would follow the earlier onset, not found in 
Experiments 8 and 9.   Further studies should explore the possible influence of these changes at a 
neural level on the time-course of object processing. 
In summary, these studies provide a window into the temporal dynamics of expert visual 
processing.  Most notably, the results reported in this chapter extend previous work by 
suggesting that the expert temporal advantage suggested by previous behavioral and ERP studies 
relies on a difference in the onset time of performance rather than a faster rate of approach to the 
asymptote performance level. These results also suggest that the reliance on sufficient encoding 
time for the expert VSTM advantage to emerge is not a result of experts’ encoding objects more 
slowly.  More specifically, the results of the two experiments reported in this chapter suggest that 
expert visual processing has approximately a 35-55 ms “head start” over novice processing. Four 
alternative explanations for this difference in the time-course of expert and novice recognition 
were suggested, which serve to provide a springboard for many exciting future research 
directions and thus they also provide a fitting end to the last empirical chapter in this dissertation. 
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These future directions and their more general implications will be discussed in more detail in 
the concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR 
EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE ON CAPACITY 
LIMITATIONS 
 
Summary and overview 
The aim of this dissertation was to augment our understanding of the determinants of 
VSTM capacity for complex objects.  In particular, the focus was on the influence of encoding 
biases that arise through the development of visual expertise, namely the tendency to process 
objects holistically rather than in a more feature-based manner. This was a unique approach as 
previous studies have not considered the influence of encoding strategy on VSTM capacity, and 
they have focused mainly on stimulus-based rather than observer-based effects on VSTM 
capacity. Expertise-related changes to the way objects are encoded may be especially influential 
because of their potential to have a cascading effect on the performance of other systems, such as 
VSTM, that rely on the output from early perceptual processing. 
Face perception is often compared to expert perception of other objects (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 2003), both of which involve holistic encoding as well as 
advantages such as rapid identification of objects at the individual level (Tanaka, 2001).  Holistic 
encoding is believed to confer an advantage to the perception of faces, making face processing 
less susceptible to feature changes like a new hair style or the use of disguises and increasing our 
sensitivity to minute configural differences between faces (Diamond & Carey, 1977; Tanaka & 
Sengco, 1997). The results presented here suggest that holistic processing also leads to a greater 
VSTM capacity as long as there is sufficient time to encode the items.  
This dissertation began (CHAPTER 1) by building an important bridge between the 
VSTM literature and the literature on the role of holistic processing in the perception of faces 
and objects of expertise (Gauthier et al., 2003; Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; 
Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997). This bridge provided the motivation for investigating the 
consequence of encoding strategy on VSTM capacity.  Although some previous studies have 
suggested that expertise influences VSTM, such effects have been thought to arise from changes 
in the ability to store and use information in long-term memory as well as the use of explicit 
mnemonic strategies (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). However, these strategies are limited in their 
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utility to increase VSTM capacity, relying on the ability to “chunk” independent items together 
with semantic information, and thus they are generally useful only for familiar items between 
which meaningful connections can be made.  In addition, the advantage gained by utilizing these 
strategies is believed to arise from the contributions of other systems and thus does not reflect a 
change within the VSTM system itself. The work in this dissertation differed from previous work 
by focusing on how the changes at earlier perceptual levels, specifically those that result from 
the development of visual expertise, impact VSTM capacity. 
To explore the influence of encoding strategy on VSTM capacity, CHAPTER 2 
compared VSTM for holistically encoded upright faces to that for more featurally encoded 
inverted faces and upright non-face objects. VSTM for faces experienced a cost due to inversion, 
an advantage over non-face categories, and greater sensitivity to encoding time limitations.  
These results provided evidence that the specialized orientation-specific encoding strategies 
recruited for faces provide an advantage to VSTM.  In addition, the greater sensitivity to 
encoding time limitations for upright face VSTM raised the possibility, explored in CHAPTER 
4, that these qualitatively different encoding strategies follow different processing time-courses. 
To provide a stronger test of the hypothesis that perceptual encoding strategy can 
influence VSTM capacity, CHAPTER 3 compared VSTM for upright and inverted faces and cars 
among car experts and novices.  The similarity between the pattern of results for cars among car 
experts and that for faces was notable, with car experts showing not only a VSTM advantage 
similar in magnitude to that found with faces, but also an inversion cost and a need for sufficient 
encoding time to demonstrate these effects.  Importantly, car novices did not show an inversion 
cost for cars, providing strong evidence against the possibility that this effect on VSTM is due to 
a more general cost to processing objects in non-canonical orientations rather than a change in 
encoding strategy.  In addition, a participant’s VSTM for cars was correlated with their visual 
expertise with this category. Therefore, the results reported in Chapter 3 not only replicated the 
finding of a VSTM advantage for objects of expertise; they also were consistent with the 
possibility of a holistic processing account of this advantage.   
It must be noted that the implications of the results of Chapter 3, in terms of a holistic 
processing account of the expert VSTM advantage, are limited in the sense that they provide 
indirect evidence that a holistic encoding style may increase VSTM capacity. A more direct test 
of the role of holistic processing in increasing VSTM for objects could have manipulated the 
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encoding strategy recruited, rather than manipulating the object (inversion) or comparing 
between observers (experts vs. novices). However, there are many difficulties associated with 
trying to manipulate a viewer’s encoding strategy, especially that for faces and other objects of 
expertise. For example, numerous paradigms have demonstrated that expert encoding strategies 
tend to be impervious to task instructions.  Despite asking viewers to make a same/different 
judgment based on only a part of a face, or car in the case of car experts, viewers are unable to 
ignore the rest of the object (Boutet et al., 2002; Farah et al., 1998; Gauthier et al., 2003; Young 
et al., 1987).  
One example of an attempt to manipulate encoding strategy more directly comes from 
Farah, Tanaka, and Drain (1995), who attempted to manipulate an observers’ processing strategy 
to encourage either more holistic or more featural encoding of faces. To do so they changed the 
format of the faces; participants studied upright faces in one of two conditions, either in an intact 
(holistic inducing) format or a format where the features were spatially separated to induce a 
more feature-based encoding style. The authors suggested that the format in which the items 
were studied influenced the level of holistic processing and thus influenced the size of the 
inversion cost in face performance. However, this study is unique in the literature and may be 
open to alternative explanations.  
The results of Farah, Tanaka, and Drain (1995) are also, to some extent, inconsistent with 
data from other studies.  For example, Gauthier, Tanaka, & Brown (submitted) found that even 
gross distortions to the format of a face (e.g. placing the top and bottom halves of faces side by 
side) during the initial study phase had little effect on the level of holistic processing of faces, 
providing that the face appeared intact during the test phase. This finding contradicts the results 
of Farah, Tanaka, & Drain (1995), which had suggested that study format can influence holistic 
processing of faces. Therefore, it is questionable whether it is truly possible to manipulate (at 
least in any robust manner) the holistic processing of upright faces or other object of expertise by 
encoding format and/or task instructions.  
The expertise manipulation used throughout this dissertation also better addresses the 
dissertation’s specific aims.  One particular goal was to investigate whether the changes in 
processing strategy resulting from the development of visual expertise lead to a domain specific 
VSTM advantage. Therefore, it was necessary to recruit (or train) participants with extensive 
visual expertise.  In addition, the use of a strategy manipulation like Farah and colleagues’ 
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requires manipulating the actual stimuli to induce the change in strategy.  Given the recent 
studies highlighting the importance not only of object complexity (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; 
Eng et al., in press), but also of object form (Xu, 2002a) in determining VSTM capacity for 
objects, it was important to hold the stimuli constant.  Otherwise, any interpretation of the results 
in terms of encoding strategies would be confounded by the physical differences between the 
stimuli in the different conditions.  
Comparing experts and novices, known from previous work to recruit different encoding 
strategies, provided numerous advantages over designs where the strategy of observers might be 
manipulated by changing the encoding format. Not only did it allow for interpretations of the 
influence of encoding strategy on VSTM to extend to real-world expertise, but it also eliminated 
alternative explanations based on object structure or complexity.  In addition, this design also 
allowed for stronger testing of the hypothesized role of holistic encoding by regarding level of 
expertise—and thus degree of holistic encoding (Gauthier et al., 2003)—as a continuous variable 
among the observers within the sample. In contrast, although strategy manipulations are also 
likely to vary in effectiveness across individuals, it would be difficult to harness this variability 
in such a way that it could be used to test specific predictions about the relationship between 
holistic encoding and VSTM capacity.  In addition, more transient strategy manipulations, when 
successful, are likely to be smaller and less stable compared to the strategy differences developed 
between experts and novices over the course of many years. Therefore, an expertise 
manipulation rather than a more direct manipulation of encoding strategy was not only necessary 
to address the specific aims of this dissertation, but was also a more reliable and powerful 
method of exploring the influence of encoding strategy on VSTM capacity. 
Before any strong conclusions could be made about the role of encoding strategy in 
influencing VSTM capacity, alternative accounts for the greater VSTM capacity among experts, 
compared to novices, needed to be addressed.  The control studies conducted in CHAPTER 3 
were able to eliminate three alternative explanations; a contribution from stimulus-specific 
representations in long-term memory, a contribution from verbal short-term memory, and a 
difference in the eye movement strategies employed to encode the items in VSTM. Therefore, 
based on the data in this dissertation, the well-documented differences in cognitive encoding 
strategy employed by experts and novices appears the most likely account for the VSTM 
advantage demonstrated by experts. 
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Following up on the evidence provided in CHAPTERS 2 and 3 that the expert VSTM 
capacity advantage depends on sufficient encoding time, CHAPTER 4 more closely compared 
the time-course of object recognition for upright and inverted faces and for cars among car 
experts and novices. The strong reliance of expert VSTM performance on sufficient encoding 
time had suggested that the temporal dynamics of holistic and more feature-based encoding 
strategies might differ.  The studies reported in this chapter revealed an initial delay of 
approximately 35- 55 ms before performance rose above chance-level for more featurally 
processed items (i.e. cars among car novices or inverted faces) compared to more holistically 
processed items (i.e. cars among car experts and upright faces). This finding suggests that 
experts experience a “head start” over novices.  This head start may underlie the generally 
superior performance of visual experts in many perceptual tasks, however it cannot account for 
the dependence on sufficient encoding time to demonstrate a VSTM advantage.  
It is possible that the emergence of the expert VSTM advantage only with sufficient 
encoding time may reflect a bottleneck at another stage of processing.  For example, Jolicoeur 
and Dell’ Acqua (1998) demonstrated that the process of consolidating items into VSTM is also 
capacity-limited.   If visual expertise selectively benefits the efficiency of perceptual 
representations for objects of expertise, but not other capacity-limited processes such as those 
responsible for consolidating information into VSTM, experts may experience a greater 
bottleneck at consolidation due to the increased number of objects of expertise that need to be 
consolidated into VSTM.  Further studies should explore this possibility. 
 
Implications, speculations, and future directions 
 
Visual short-term memory 
The question explored in this dissertation—whether visual expertise and the resulting 
change in encoding strategy influences VSTM capacity—has important consequences not only 
for our understanding of the nature of expertise, but also for our understanding of VSTM more 
generally.  A potential influence of encoding strategy on VSTM capacity has far reaching 
consequences. Previous accounts of VSTM have suggested that VSTM capacity is determined by 
a hard-wired limit, with the variability in this limit arising from inherent differences between 
individuals (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004).  In contrast, the demonstration 
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that experience, possibly through a change in encoding strategy, can impact VSTM suggests that 
VSTM is flexible depending partly on the outputs of other systems. Therefore, VSTM capacity 
not only differs across categories (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004), individuals (Todd & Marois, 
2005; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), and with task constraints (Eng et al., in press), but also with 
experience-based perceptual skill. 
One of the implications of these findings is that there is potential for training to benefit 
this central cognitive function. Although practice on VSTM tasks has not been found to improve 
VSTM capacity substantially (Chen et al., in press, as discussed in CHAPTER I), the results in 
this dissertation suggest that expertise training procedures that have been shown to increase 
holistic processing (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) are more likely to impact our VSTM capacity within 
the trained domain. Thus, future studies should explore whether VSTM capacity changes, along 
with markers of holistic processing, over the course of lab-based expertise training programs. 
One possibility suggested by the results of these studies is that the development of visual 
expertise may, in effect, reduce the perceived perceptual complexity of objects of expertise.  In 
this way, visual experts may be able to circumvent the limitations involved in encoding and 
storing complex objects in VSTM. The lower VSTM capacity for faces compared to non-faces 
objects (i.e. cars and watches) at short encoding times, which was demonstrated in Experiment 2 
(CHAPTER 2), suggests that the faces had a greater information load than the cars or watches 
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004). Consistent with demonstrations that extending encoding duration 
can, in part, reduce the effect of perceptual complexity for more complex items (Eng et al., in 
press), additional encoding time eliminated the disadvantage for faces relative to the other 
categories. When encoding time was extended even further (Experiment 3, CHAPTER 2), 
VSTM for faces exceeded that for the other categories of objects.  Notably, the capacity for faces 
was in the range of that reported for very simple objects, such as colored dots. Consistent with 
the suggestion that expertise may serve to reduce the impact of perceptual complexity on VSTM 
capacity, the benefits of expertise for VSTM capacity never allowed it to exceed that for simple 
objects, for which VSTM capacity is presumably not limited by perceptual complexity. This 
finding suggests that expertise provides an additional benefit over that experienced with 
extended encoding time for objects outside one’s domain of expertise.  This allows VSTM for 
complex objects of expertise to approach that for more simple objects, such as colored dots.  
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An important consideration is that the information load or complexity of an object is at 
least in part determined by the context within which it appears.  Increased homogeneity between 
items in a search array increases visual search rate and thus the information load of the items 
within the array (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989).  Therefore, expertise may serve to reduce the 
information load/complexity of objects of expertise by decreasing the perceived level of 
homogeneity between the items within the memory array. This possibility could be explored in 
further studies by manipulating the level of homogeneity between items within the study array 
and measuring the resulting impact on expert and novice performance. 
It is important to acknowledge that although these results have promising implications for 
the flexibility of VSTM and even suggest specific ways to increase VSTM capacity, they do not 
provide a “magic bullet” for VSTM capacity limitations.  Expertise training paradigms require 
hours of practice and the changes that result are not only domain-specific, but also orientation-
specific.  In addition, such training would be expected to reduce the effects of object complexity, 
and thus only allow an observer to maximize the use of their inherent VSTM capacity. Hence, 
training would be expected to have a reduced effect on VSTM for very simple objects that can 
easily be distinguished, as capacity for these objects should not be limited by object complexity 
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004). Therefore, the inherent object or ‘slot’ based limit of VSTM likely 
provides an upper limit to the benefits of a holistic encoding strategy (Luck & Vogel, 1997). 
The studies in this dissertation extend insights about VSTM for complex objects. Much 
of the work exploring VSTM capacity has used very simple objects such as colored dots (Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Todd & Marois, 2004), and it has been unclear how well such findings extend to 
VSTM for more complex items, such as faces or other real-world objects. Such limitations were 
partly addressed by Alvarez and Cavanagh (2004), who used line drawings of familiar objects as 
stimuli.  However, they only used brief stimulus presentation durations (500 ms) and thus did not 
consider the importance of sufficient presentation time for allowing encoding of complex 
information. 
Recently, Eng and colleagues (in press) included complex objects, e.g. pictures of three-
dimensional faces, as stimuli in their study comparing VSTM across categories. These 
researchers focused on the role of presentation time in reducing the effect of object complexity 
on VSTM capacity reported by Alvarez and Cavanagh (2004), but they did not consider the role 
of encoding strategy in influencing this effect. The studies in the current dissertation demonstrate 
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that VSTM not only differs across orientations of the same object category, but also within 
orientations and object categories depending on the experience of, and thus the encoding strategy 
used by, the observer. Therefore, they extend the findings of previous studies by demonstrating 
that differences in VSTM are not entirely determined by perceptual complexity; they also differ 
due to experience.  
The results reported in this dissertation also provide an alternative to the recent claim that 
the ‘true’ capacity of VSTM, free from contamination by LTM, verbal memory, or contexual 
information is limited to one object (Olsson & Poom, 2005). Olsson & Poom (2005) found that 
with 500 ms of encoding time, participants had a VSTM capacity for intra-categorical geometric 
shapes (e.g., ovals with varying aspect ratios) of only a single item.  Based on this finding, they 
suggest that the performance in previous VSTM studies reporting a VSTM capacity of 3-4 objects 
(e.g. Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001) was facilitated by categorical structures in LTM. 
Specifically, they suggest that such a benefit arises from the use of stimuli in such studies that 
cross category boundaries (e.g. a red and a yellow square cross a color boundary). One factor that 
was not considered in this study is that, when multiple objects need to be retained, objects within 
the same category may require more time to be encoded into VSTM than objects that cross 
category boundaries. Notably, the studies in this dissertation not only used a match-to-sample 
paradigm, but the faces used were unfamiliar and thus had no known labels and shared the same 
category boundary.  Therefore, according to Olsson and Poom (2005), observers should have had 
a capacity of only a single face under such conditions. One possible reason for this inconsistency 
is the limited encoding time in the Olsson and Poom (2005) study; the findings of this dissertation 
and those of Eng et al. (in press) suggest that VSTM capacity for complex objects is 
underestimated with 500 ms of encoding time because of perceptual encoding limitations. 
Consistent with this possibility, in this dissertation, VSTM capacity for faces with 500 ms 
encoding time was found to be a little over one.  It is possible that capacity for the geometrical 
objects used by Olsson & Poom (2005) could reach that reported for watches, for instance, given 
enough encoding time. 
This dissertation has important implications for developmental studies of VSTM 
capacity.  In particular, the results offer an explanation for conflicting findings in the literature 
with respect to developmental changes in VSTM capacity. While a number of studies have 
demonstrated adult-like VSTM capacity (3-4 objects) in infants by the time they reach 10-12 
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months old (Rose et al., 2001; Ross Sheehy, Oakes, & Luck, 2003), others report changes in 
VSTM in school age children (Meyler & Breznitz, 1998). It is possible that these different 
studies may be measuring different aspects of VSTM capacity. The adult-like limit reported in 
infants may reflect the hard-wired limit of VSTM, whereas developmental differences in VSTM 
capacity among school-aged children might reflect the benefits of experience for the encoding 
and storage of complex information.  Consistent with this suggestion, studies reporting adult-like 
VSTM capacity in infants either used very simple objects, such as colored squares (e.g. Ross 
Sheehy et al., 2003), or real-world objects from different categories that differed along many 
dimensions and thus typically require encoding of only a single dimension to be distinguish 
(Rose et al., 2001). In contrast, studies reporting developmental changes in VSTM performance 
used more complex tasks such as the Bead Memory Subtest of the Standford-Binet Intelligence 
Scale (Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986), which requires participants to reproduce bead 
patterns from memory.  The use of a more complex task to measure VSTM performance may 
allow for a greater role of developmental change and/or experience to influence the efficiency of 
encoding. According to this account, VSTM for faces may also be expected to change over the 
first decade or so of life because markers of holistic processing, such as the effect of inversion or 
configural effects, are not at adult like-levels until up to 14 years of age (Carey et al., 1980; 
Mondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2003). Although experience may not change the absolute 
capacity of VSTM, the development of more efficient encoding strategies could result in the 
smaller influence of stimulus complexity or homogeneity seen among visual experts, thus 
accounting for the developmental changes reported in school age children. Therefore, the 
apparent inconsistency between the different developmental studies may arise because the 
studies are actually tapping into different aspects of VSTM capacity limitations, the hard-wired 
limit versus the flexibility in the manner in which complex information can be stored in VSTM. 
The demonstration of an influence of encoding style on VSTM capacity opens up many 
possibilities. For example, how much do other encoding strategies influence VSTM? Is there an 
encoding strategy that could produce a domain general change to VSTM capacity? For example, 
could a contextual encoding strategy, that is, a strategy in which individual items are encoded 
predominantly in terms of their relations with their environment, impact VSTM? It is unlikely 
that holistic processing is unique in its ability to influence VSTM capacity, and other changes to 
the way information is encoded in VSTM could potentially impact VSTM capacity. Consistent 
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with this possibility, it has been reported that there is a bi-directional relationship between 
learning to read and VSTM: not only is learning to read facilitated by good pre-reading VSTM 
scores, but it also helps VSTM to develop (Meyler & Breznitz, 1998).  These findings provide 
further evidence for the role of learning and experience in facilitating VSTM capacity. 
In summary, the results presented in this dissertation suggest that although VSTM has an 
inherent upper limit, within these bounds encoding time, perceptual complexity, and visual 
expertise act in concert to determine the capacity of VSTM. Most importantly these findings 
highlight the dependency of VSTM on earlier perceptual processes, which in themselves can be 
influenced by visual expertise.  Expertise might reduce the effects of perceptual complexity on 
VSTM by increasing the efficiency of storage of information; such mechanisms would 
presumably provide less of a benefit for more simple items that can be easily distinguished, as 
there would be minimal flexibility for such information to be further compressed.  
 
Visual expertise and the time-course of object recognition 
The results reported in this dissertation are consistent with the notion that face processing 
and the processing of non-face objects of expertise have many properties in common (Diamond 
& Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 2003; Gauthier et al., 2000; Tanaka, 2001; Tanaka & Curran, 
2001; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991; Xu, 2005).  For example, VSTM for upright faces, relative to 
inverted faces, and cars among car experts relative to car novices, not only demonstrated a 
VSTM capacity advantage that was similar in magnitude, but this advantage also emerged only 
with sufficient encoding time (4000 ms) in both cases. The results support the possibility of a 
cascading effect, where expertise-related changes at a perceptual level impact other cognitive 
functions involving objects of expertise, namely VSTM.  
Despite the relationship between the VSTM advantage among experts and level of visual 
skill at identifying cars, it is important to acknowledge that such findings cannot speak to the 
issue of causality. In addition, even though previous studies have found a relationship between 
the same measure of skill at recognizing cars and holistic processing measures for cars, this can 
only be interpreted as suggesting that they are somehow related. It is possible that they both have 
a common underlying cause rather than a causal relationship (Gauthier et al., 2003; Gauthier et 
al., 2000).  There are also some obstacles to linking holistic processing for cars and the expert 
VSTM advantage even though both are correlated with visual expertise with cars, as it is possible 
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that they account for different aspects of an individual’s expertise with cars. Therefore, a link 
between these two aspects of expert performance is hypothesized with some caution. Futures 
studies could examine this proposed relationship by more directly measuring the correlation 
between the level of holistic processing of cars and the VSTM capacity for cars.  
The results of this dissertation do, however, provide direct evidence relevant to a major 
current debate in the literature. Specifically, McKone and colleagues (McKone & Kanwisher, 
2005; McKone & Robbins, 2005) have argued against the expertise account of face processing, 
particularly against evidence for an inversion effect for objects of expertise.  They suggest that 
previous studies demonstrating such an effect were either flawed (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986) 
or that the inversion was too small compared to that for faces to warrant the supposition of a 
common underlying mechanism (Gauthier et al., 2000; Rossion, Gauthier, Goffaux, Tarr, & 
Crommelinck, 2002). In addition, a recent study by McKone and Robbins (2005) failed to 
replicate Diamond and Carey’s (1986) original finding of a larger inversion effect for dogs 
among dog experts compared to dog novices. However, in CHAPTER 3, a large cost of inversion 
to the recognition for cars among car experts, but not novices, was demonstrated and replicated.  
Importantly, the effect of inversion differed reliably across categories for novices but not experts 
in both Experiments 4 and 5.10 Therefore, the studies in this dissertation provide evidence for the 
existence of a large inversion effect similar in magnitude to that demonstrated for faces, refuting 
McKone and Kanwisher’s (2005) suggestion that such an effect does not exist for objects of 
expertise.  
The work in this dissertation not only provides evidence relevant to this major debate, but 
it also provides additional insights into the nature of face and non-face object expertise.  Most 
notably, CHAPTER 4 provides evidence that expertise selectively influences certain aspects of 
the time-course of object processing: whereas the onset of recognition performance occurred 
earlier for experts than novices, the rate of increase in performance was unaffected by a 
participant’s expertise.  This potentially provides important constraints for explanations of the 
temporal advantage previously demonstrated for the processing of objects of expertise. 
One interesting possibility is that the difference in the time-course of processing for 
objects of expertise, relative to those for which a participant does not possess expertise, is rooted 
                                                
10 Experiment 4; novices, F(1,17)= 5.2868, p = .0344, experts, F < 1 ; Experiment 5; novices, 
F(1,16) = 13.848, p = .0019, experts, F<1) 
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in fundamental differences in the nature of visual information processing. More, specifically, 
there is evidence that processing different spatial frequency information follows different time-
courses. The lower resolution visual information carried by low spatial frequencies is believed to 
be processed more rapidly relative to the higher resolution visual information carried by high 
spatial frequencies. For example, under speeded conditions, recognition performance is better for 
images containing only low spatial frequency information than for those containing only high 
spatial frequency information (Hughes, Nozawa, & Kitterle, 1996; Robertson, 1996; Shulman, 
Sullivan, Gish, & Sakoda, 1986). Notably, face recognition relies more on relatively low spatial 
frequencies (8-16 cycles per face) (Parker & Costen, 1999; Schyns & Oliva, 1999). Conceivably, 
the difference between the performance onset times for experts and novices may reflect a 
difference in the ability to utilize information from lower spatial frequencies, which may 
dominate the output from earlier processing stages.  The time-course of novice processing may 
be handicapped due to novices’ relative inability to use this coarser information available in the 
early stages of processing. Although speculative, this notion raises intriguing possibilities for 
future research 
Indeed, a recent study provided some insight into the role of high (fine-detail) and low 
(coarse) spatial frequency information in contributing to expert performance. This study explored 
the relative response in functionally defined face-selective areas of cortex in the fusiform gyrus 
to images of faces and cars containing only high and low spatial frequency information (Gauthier 
et al., 2005).  The participants in this study had a range of visual expertise with cars, ranging 
from very little to extensive. Results failed to show a bias for high or low spatial frequency 
filtered images, but they suggested that both types of information contribute to expert 
performance.  Consistent with previous studies showing an increase in FFA for cars among car 
experts, activation in the FFA for cars relative to faces for both high and low spatial frequency 
filtered images was correlated with a participants level of visual expertise with cars.  Yet, these 
activation measures for the high and low spatial frequency filtered images were not correlated 
with each other.  These results suggest that the processing of both low and high spatial frequency 
information make important, but independent, contributions to expert performance. One 
possibility is that the independence of the contribution of high and low spatial frequency to 
expert performance may arise because they influence different stages of encoding.  Further 
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studies should explore the differential contributions of high and low spatial frequency 
information and their relation to the temporal processing advantage for objects of expertise.   
The earlier onset for subordinate-level categorizations for objects of expertise might also 
be a result of privileged access to processing resources, whether it be directly though the 
presence of more neurons tuned to objects of expertise or indirectly through automatic 
attentional allocation.  A sub-cortical area of the brain known as the amygdala is believed to play 
an important role in allocating attention to highly arousing visual information (Anderson & 
Phelps, 2001), particularly when the motivational significance of such information has been 
learned (Holland, Han, & Gallagher, 2000). It is possible that objects of expertise preferentially 
receive attention due to signals from this sub-cortical area, as objects of expertise—such as cars 
for car experts—are likely to be more arousing than typical objects, such as chairs. Consistent 
with this possibility, the amygdala is believed to be crucial for the development of visual 
expertise with faces; abnormalities in the function of this area are believed to contribute to the 
failure of individuals with autism to develop expertise with faces (Schultz, 2005).  Providing 
further support for the role of this area in the development of expertise is the presence of 
amygdala activation for “Digimon” cartoon characters, but not faces, in a boy with autism who 
has considerable skill at identifying these creatures (Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002). 
Interestingly, the amygdala has also been shown to respond more strongly to the low spatial 
frequency information in faces, once again suggesting that this coarse level information available 
first to perceptual processing mechanisms may play an important role in expertise. Future studies 
should explore the role of the amygdala in the development of visual expertise among normal 
observers. 
 
Final Conclusions 
The studies in this dissertation highlight the potential of perceptual expertise to impact 
numerous cognitive functions that rely on output from specialized perceptual mechanisms.  In 
particular, face and non-face expert encoding appear to share common underlying mechanisms 
that, in turn, affect VSTM.  The potential for experience, possibly through a change in encoding 
strategy, to influence VSTM reveals plasticity in this system.  Results from prior literature 
suggest that VSTM capacity is determined by a number of factors, including stimulus complexity 
and inherent individual differences.  The results of this dissertation add to the list of such factors 
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by revealing important roles of task constraints and observers’ level of experience with a given 
object category.  Taken together, such demonstrations challenge accounts of VSTM that appeal 
only to hard-wired capacity limits (Luck & Vogel, 1997). This dissertation also provides 
intriguing insights into the differences between expert and novice encoding, such as the initial 
“head-start” that characterizes expert recognition performance. This raises interesting and 
empirically testable hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying the typically superior 
performance of experts more generally. The results of this dissertation can serve as a catalyst for 
studies probing the nature of holistic representations and the impact of such representations on 
higher-level cognitive functions. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Comparison of response times from Experiment 1 
A 2 (orientation; upright, inverted) x 3 (duration; 500 ms, 1500 ms, 2500 ms) x 5 (set 
size; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) found main a effect of orientation, F(1,23) = 20.240, p=.0002, with response 
times longer for trials with inverted, compared to upright, faces.  There was also a main effect of 
set size, F(4,92) = 119.21, p<.0002, with response times longer for larger set sizes. The main 
effect of duration, F(2,46) = 1.9824, p=.1493,  nor the interactions between any of the factors 
reached significance (all ps >.2522).  Therefore, the larger VSTM for upright, relative to inverted 
faces, cannot be explained by a trade-off with response time as this account would have 
predicted that responses to trials with upright faces would be slower, rather than faster, than 
those to trials with inverted faces. 
 
Table A. Comparison of Response Times for Upright and Inverted Faces in Experiment 1 
Condition Set Size 1 Set Size 2 Set Size 3 Set Size 4 Set Size 5 Mean 
Upright       
500 ms 754(29) 888(30) 959(34) 1007(42) 1074(40) 936 
1500 ms 753(31) 895(27) 988(33) 1018(36) 1073(37) 946 
2500 ms 742(34) 916(36) 962(29) 1047(40) 1061(36) 946 
Mean 750 900 970 1024 1069 943 
       
Inverted       
500 ms 803(36) 953(29) 994(40) 1077(59) 1089(51) 983 
1500 ms 808(43) 946(33) 1030(41) 1061(53) 1133(59) 995 
2500 ms 826(35) 973(36) 1064(38) 1076(45) 1094(44) 1007 
Mean 812 957 1029 1071 1105 995 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Comparison of response times from Experiment 2 
A 2 (category; face, watch, car) x 3 (duration; 500 ms, 1500 ms, 2500 ms) x 5 (set size; 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5) found main a effect of set size, F(4,80) = 158.45, p≤.0001, with response times longer 
for trials with a larger number of items. No other main effects or interactions between any of the 
factors reached significance (all ps >.2995).  Therefore, the larger benefit of additional encoding 
time for VSTM capacity for faces, relative to that for watches or cars, cannot be explained by a 
trade-off with response time as this account would have predicted that responses to trials with 
upright faces would be slower, particularly in trials with a longer presentation duration for the 
study array, which is not supported by the results of this analysis of the response time data. 
 
Table B. Comparison of Response Times for Faces, Watches, and Cars in Experiment 2 
Condition Set Size 1 Set Size 2 Set Size 3 Set Size 4 Set Size 5 Mean 
Faces       
500 ms 731(40) 873(44) 964(41) 997(49) 1014(40) 916 
1500 ms 762(42) 845(40) 945(43) 1025(52) 1046(47) 924 
2500 ms 746(44) 861(41) 943(39) 994(53) 1011(44) 911 
Mean 746 859 951 1005 1024 917 
       
Watches       
500 ms 748(42) 865(43) 940(57) 987(47) 1017(50) 911 
1500 ms 762(45) 865(49) 916(51) 973(47) 1044(57) 912 
2500 ms 746(43) 875(48) 923(52) 1005(60) 1047(52) 919 
Mean 752 868 926 988 1036 914 
       
Cars       
500 ms 710(49) 841(55) 890(58) 932(52) 999(57) 875 
1500 ms 696(46) 831(48) 887(50) 970(52) 986(55) 874 
2500 ms 684(49) 838(52) 895(50) 924(52) 974(58) 863 
Mean 697 837 891 942 987 871 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Comparison of response times from Experiment 3 
A 2 (category; face, watch, car) x 3 (set size; 3, 4, 5) found main a effect of set size, 
F(2,70) = 16.555, p≤.0001, with response times longer for trials with a larger number of items. 
No other main effects or interactions between any of the factors reached significance (all ps 
>.5685).  Therefore, the larger VSTM capacity for faces, relative to that for watches or cars, 
cannot be explained by a trade-off with response time as this account would have predicted that 
responses to trials with upright faces would be slower than that for watches and cars. 
 
 
Table C. Comparison of Response Times for Faces, Watches, and Cars in Experiment 3 
Condition Set Size 3 Set Size 4 Set Size 5 Mean 
Faces 1085(42) 1112(40) 1151(41) 1116 
Watches 1082(43) 1115(47) 1152(52) 1116 
Cars 1071(45) 1072(45) 1139(50) 1094 
Mean 1079 1100 1147 1109 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Description of the car expertise measure 
Participants matched sequentially presented (256 x 256) grayscale images of cars and 
birds on the basis of their model or species, respectively. One-hundred and twelve images of cars 
and birds in viewpoints varying from front to profile were used. Each participant performed 224 
trials, with 112 from each category. The first image was presented for 1000 ms, followed by a 
mask for 500 ms, and then the second image was presented and remained on the screen until 
participants made a key press to indicate of the two cars were the same or different model or the 
two birds with the same or different species, or 5000 ms had passed.  The trials were blocked by 
category, with four blocks of each bird and car trials.  Matching stimuli were not physically 
identical, but were different exemplars of the same bird species or the same make/model of car 
from different years.  
 
 
 Figure D. Diagram illustrating the trial sequence in the car expert measure. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Comparison of response times from Experiment 4 
A 2 (category; faces, cars) x 3 (duration; 500 ms, 2500 ms, 4000 ms) x 2 (Category; face, 
car) x 2 (orientation; upright, inverted) x 2 (expertise group; expert, novice) found a main effect 
of expertise, with car experts responding more slowly in general compared to car novices, 
F(1,34)=4.801, p=.0354.  Notably, there was no interaction between expertise group and any 
other factor (all ps>.2046).  There was also main effect of orientation, F(1,34)=31.979, p≤.0001, 
and duration, F(2,68)=9.9319, p=.0002, with slower response for trials with inverted items and 
also longer presentation durations.  There was also an interaction between orientation and 
duration, F(2,68)=3.5366, p=.0346, with responses slowing more with longer durations for 
inverted than upright stimuli. There was also an interaction between category and duration, 
F(2,68)=4.6943, p=.0123, with responses slowing more with longer durations for cars than faces.  
No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps>.1241).  Importantly, the general 
slowing of responses among car experts cannot account for the larger VSTM capacity for upright 
cars among experts but not novices.  A sensitivity (d’) / response time trade-off account of the 
expert VSTM advantage would have predicted that experts would be slower only for upright 
cars, but not inverted cars or upright and inverted faces, relative to car novices.  
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Table E. Mean Response Times for the Conditions in Experiment 4 
Condition Expert Novice 
Face   
Upright   
500 ms 1042(39) 956(36) 
2500 ms 1049(36) 924(32) 
4000 ms 1044(38) 928(29) 
Mean 1045 936 
   
Inverted   
500 ms 1066(36) 962(33) 
2500 ms 1072(32) 987(35) 
4000 ms 1105(37) 998(34) 
Mean 1081 982 
   
Car   
Upright   
500 ms 1085(33) 931(35) 
2500 ms 1094(30) 955(35) 
4000 ms 1144(38) 973(37) 
Mean 1108 953 
   
Inverted   
500 ms 1116(33) 979(41) 
2500 ms 1120(28) 994(37) 
4000 ms 1193(36) 1014(38) 
Mean 1143 996 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Comparison of response times from Experiment 5 
A 2 (category; faces, cars) x 3 (duration; 500 ms, 2500 ms, 4000 ms) x 2 (Category; face, 
car) x 2 (orientation; upright, inverted) x 2 (expertise group; expert, novice) found main effects 
of orientation, F(1,29)=79.130, p≤.0001, and duration, F(2,58)=4.6984, p=.0128, similar to that 
found in Experiment 5, with slower response for trials with inverted items and also longer 
presentation durations. There was an interaction between category and orientation, 
F(1,29)=4.6666, p=.0392, with faster responses for upright, but not inverted, faces relative to 
cars. There was also a trend for generally slower response times among car experts compared to 
car novices, F(1,29)=3.1232, p=.0877, and for an interaction between expertise group, 
orientation and duration, F(1,58)=2.5258, p=.0888, with car experts tending to show slower 
response times with longer presentations for inverted items but not for upright items.  Finally, 
there was a 4-way interaction between orientation, duration, expertise group, and category, 
F(2,58)=4.5586, p=.0145.  This interaction was due to a greater increase in response times for 
longer presentation durations for inverted cars among cars experts.  No other interactions 
between any of the factors were significant (all ps>.2046). Importantly, the trend for a general 
slowing of responses for among car experts and also the slower response times among experts 
for trials with inverted cars presented for longer presentation durations cannot explain the larger 
VSTM capacity for upright cars among experts but not novices.  A sensitivity (d’) / response 
time trade-off account of the expert VSTM advantage would have predicted that experts would 
be slower for upright cars, but not inverted cars or upright and inverted faces, relative to car 
novices.  
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Table F. Mean Response Times for the Conditions in Experiment 5 
Condition Expert Novice 
Face   
Upright   
500 ms 1018(52) 880(31) 
2500 ms 1012(47) 881(30) 
4000 ms 1020(50) 910(36) 
Mean 1016 890 
   
Inverted   
500 ms 1078(51) 942(36) 
2500 ms 1091(52) 966(32) 
4000 ms 1132(52) 966(38) 
Mean 1100 958 
   
Car   
Upright   
500 ms 1063(45) 926(31) 
2500 ms 1050(45) 961(31) 
4000 ms 1098(55) 935(30) 
Mean 1070 941 
   
Inverted   
500 ms 1081(47) 984(34) 
2500 ms 1120(46) 962(32) 
4000 ms 1153(51) 999(35) 
Mean 1118 982 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Comparison of response times from Experiment 6 
A 2 (category; faces, cars) x 2 (duration; 500 ms, 4000 ms) x 2 (Stimulus set; pre-switch, 
post-switch) x 2 (expertise group; expert, novice) found no main effects or interaction with 
expertise group (all ps>.2083).  There was however a main effect of stimulus set, 
F(1,34)=32.462, p ≤.0001, with generally faster response times for the post-switch stimulus set.  
This is consistent with a generalized practice effect with participants responding faster towards 
the end of the experiment.  There was also an interaction between stimulus set and presentation 
duration, F(1,34)=7.7019, p =.0089, with a larger drop in response time between the pre- and 
post-switch stimulus sets for shorter presentation durations.  There was a trend for response 
times for trials with cars to be lower than those with faces, F(1,34)=2.5718, p =.1180. No other 
effects were significant (all p>.2001). 
 
Table G. Mean Response Times for the Conditions in Experiment 6 
Condition Stimulus Set Expert Novice 
Face    
500 ms Pre-switch 1242(59) 1204(67) 
 Post-switch 1080(63) 1037(43) 
    
4000 ms Pre-switch 1227(58) 1155(56) 
 Post-switch 1148(69) 1058(49) 
    
Car    
500 ms Pre-switch 1222(61) 1261(91) 
 Post-switch 1151(52) 1057(59) 
    
4000 ms Pre-switch 1253(45) 1255(77) 
 Post-switch 1183(50) 1138(60) 
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APPENDIX H 
 
Comparison of response times from Experiment 7 
A 2 (category; faces, cars) x 3 (duration; 1000 ms, 2000 ms, 4000 ms) x 3 (Presentation 
format; simultaneous, sequential 1, sequential 2) ANOVA performed on the response time data 
found no main effects or interactions between any of the variables (all ps>.2761). 
 
Table H. Mean Response Times for the Conditions in Experiment 7 
Condition 
Presentation 
Format 
Response 
Times (SE) 
Face   
1000 ms   Simultaneous 1207(44) 
 Sequential 1 1175(51) 
 Sequential 2  
   
2000 ms   Simultaneous 1170(38) 
 Sequential 1 1168(44) 
 Sequential 2 1171(44) 
   
4000 ms   Simultaneous 1178(38) 
 Sequential 1 1179(42) 
 Sequential 2 1166(35) 
   
Car   
1000 ms   Simultaneous 1201(54) 
 Sequential 1 1207(59) 
 Sequential 2  
   
2000 ms   Simultaneous 1202(51) 
 Sequential 1 1208(57) 
 Sequential 2 1222(59) 
   
4000 ms   Simultaneous 1215(56) 
 Sequential 1 1220(57) 
 Sequential 2 1235(48) 
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